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ABSTRACT 
 
This explanatory sequential mixed methods study focuses on gaining an overall 
understanding of the potential variances in self-efficacy in information security and security 
practice behavior in the deaf population.  Very little is understood about the deaf experience 
when engaging in security practices and their confidence levels in doing so.  Due to the fast-
paced nature of cyber security and its many facets, the human factor plays a crucial role in the 
success of cyber security.  It is important to understand the potential implications of variances 
that may affect a deaf end-user’s security practice behavior to be able to provide more 
effective security awareness programs. 
By using a two-pronged approach, further insight is gained on the potential variances 
in self-efficacy in information security and the resultant security practice behavior.  Starting 
with a broad quantitative survey that measures an end-user’s self-efficacy, behavioral 
intention, security practice with technology, and security practice conscious care behavior.  In 
the first phase, data is collected to identify variances when compared hearing end-users allows 
for a greater understanding of what unique areas of weaknesses may need to be addressed.  
The second phase consisted of phenomenological semi-structured interviews that are held 
with deaf end-users that have indicated variances in self-efficacy in information security and 
security practice behavior.  The intent of the interviews was to capture the essence of the deaf 
end-user’s lived experiences when engaging with security practice behavior. 
Through extensive data analysis of 228 responses from 119 deaf participants and 109 
hearing participants, all three null hypotheses in this first phase of the study were rejected.  It 
was concluded that deaf end-users had significantly higher SEIS while having a significantly 
lower behavioral intention, security practice – technology, and security practice – conscious 
  
vii 
care behavior than hearing end-users.  It was also concluded in the first phase that a positive 
SEIS corresponds to improved security practice behavior for both deaf and hearing end-users. 
In-depth semi-structured interviews of 10 deaf end-users who indicated a variance in 
self-efficacy in information security and security practice behavior allowed for the 
identification of essential themes.  These themes were derived from coded analysis of the 
interviews: (1) Deaf-Specific Barriers; (2) Digital Literacy; (3) Positive Security Intention; (4) 
Reliance on Technology; (5) Poor Security Knowledge; (6) Poor Security Behavior; (7) 
Having a Support Network.  These identified themes were prevalent among all deaf end-users 
of varying demographics and backgrounds. 
 The impact of this study is to highlight the need for the development of tailored and 
accessible cyber security awareness programs for deaf end-users to address the significantly 
lower security practice behavior in comparison to hearing end-users.  The identification of a 
such variance and understanding the lived experiences that lead to such behavior raises the 
need for additional research into the full scope of impact on deaf end-users’ security practice 
behavior and how to best address the concerns. 
 Keywords: deaf, self-efficacy in information security, security practice behavior, cyber 
security awareness, phenomenology, deaf culture, explanatory sequential mixed methods 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Nikos Kazantzakis, a Greek Philosopher, once wrote the following, “By believing 
passionately in something which still does not exist, we create it.  The nonexistent is whatever 
we have not sufficiently desired” (Kazantzakis, 1965, p. 434).  Research efforts pertaining to 
cyber security within the deaf community have been nonexistent to date as reflected in the 
extensive literature review that was conducted as part of this research study.  Amid the 
immense growth in cyber security trends and increasing emphasis on the importance of the 
human factor in cyber defense (Bishop, Cheung, & Wee, 1997; Klahr, Amili, Shah, Button, & 
Wang, 2016; Morgan, 2017; Rhee, Kim, & Ryu, 2009; Woerner, 2012), it is time to dedicate 
research efforts to cyber security within the deaf community.  Putting forth an effort in 
understanding the deaf experience when encountering information security threats will allow 
stakeholders to gain invaluable insight on how to provide effective cyber security awareness 
training programs tailored specifically for the deaf population. 
This chapter discusses the implications of the human factor in cyber defense and how 
it has led to the growing importance of cyber security awareness programs.  Further research 
studies on various aspects of the human factor led to the definition of self-efficacy in 
information security (SEIS).  The chapter highlights the lack of research studies addressing 
cultural backgrounds of marginalized end-users, describes the nuances of the deaf community 
and how their unique cultural characteristics may have implications for information security. 
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The study examined whether members of the deaf community indicate a variance in 
SEIS and security practice behavior in comparison to the hearing community.  Providing 
stakeholders new insights on what may be increased areas of concern for the deaf community 
may allow information security educators to develop of a more effective cyber security 
awareness program and potentially highlight the need for additional research into other 
marginalized groups. 
This chapter begins with a background section and researcher interest leading to the 
problem statement by discussing the foundational topics relating to the objective of this study.  
The statement of the problem section provides the reader an insight on the intended research 
design and its contribution to cyber security awareness and the deaf community.  The 
remaining sections include the purpose of the study, theoretical framework, research 
questions, hypotheses, nature of the study, the significance of the study, definitions, and a 
layout of the remaining chapters of this study. 
 
Background 
The primary focus of this study examined the deaf population and attempted to 
understand the potential implications that deaf community may have on cyber defense and 
vice versa compared to the hearing community.  Throughout this research study, the reader 
may encounter a variety of uses for the word “deaf”.  The word “deaf” with a lower-case “d” 
connotes a pathological viewpoint of deafness that refers to a person’s inability to hear and 
understand spoken language, which is often perceived as a medical problem that needs to be 
fixed (Padden & Humphries, 1989).  The word “Deaf” with an upper-case “D” signifies a 
sociocultural viewpoint of deafness where the Deaf person is a member of the linguistic and 
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cultural minority of American Sign Language (ASL) users (Holcomb, 2012; Padden & 
Humphries, 1989).  Hard-of-hearing people are defined to have mild or moderate hearing loss 
and may communicate through either sign language, spoken language, or both (Holcomb, 
2012; Padden & Humphries, 1989).  It is not uncommon for a deaf or hard-of-hearing person 
to learn sign language and become immersed in the deaf culture to an extent where they 
identify themselves as culturally Deaf.  Within this study, the word “deaf” with the lower case 
“d” describe all general participants in this research study who have some degree of hearing 
loss whether they are culturally Deaf or not.   
In the past two decades, there has been development of a diverse set of framework 
designs and approaches to designing cyber security awareness programs (Abawajy, 2014; Al-
Sharif, Iqbal, Baker, & Khattack, 2016; Hansche, 2001b, 2001a; Labuschagne, Burke, 
Veerasamy, & Eloff, 2011; Lan, Chunlei, & Guoqing, 2010; Peltier, 2005; E. M. Power, 
2007; Tianfield, 2016; Tsohou, Karyda, Kokolakis, & Kiountouzis, 2015).  Many 
organizations have taken these frameworks in attempts to create tailored programs to best fit 
their end-users’ technical skills and delivery preferences.  A second set of studies have 
focused on designing metrics that can accurately measure the effectiveness of a security 
awareness program and the end-user’s security awareness (Fink, Best, Manz, Popovsky, & 
Endicott-Popovsky, 2013; Kruger & Kearney, 2006; Rantos, Fysarakis, & Manifavas, 2012; 
Tsohou, Karyda, Kokolakis, & Kiountouzis, 2012).  For example, Rantos, Fysarakis, & 
Manifavas (2012) present a framework that aggregates metrics that measure the effectiveness 
of different components of a cyber security awareness program for an overall score.  
Information security professionals can then more accurately evaluate their cyber security 
awareness program’s effectiveness and identify potential gaps that may need to be addressed 
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based on the individual metrics and overall score.  However, only a handful of studies (e.g., 
Alotaibi, Furnell, Stengel, & Papadaki, 2017; Chen, Dawn Medlin, & Shaw, 2008; Dlamini & 
Modise, 2012) have explored the potential impact of the end-user’s country of residence or 
cultural background has on the effectiveness of a cyber security awareness program.  Even 
further, less have explored the end-user’s self-efficacy with computers or information security 
impacting their security effectiveness (Crossler & Bélanger, 2006; He, Yuan, & Tian, 2014; 
Phelps, 2005; Phelps & Gathegi, 2006; Rhee et al., 2009).  There is a concerning gap of 
research to identify unique sociocultural characteristics of marginalized groups that may 
affect their SEIS and security practice behavior.  Acknowledging any potential implications of 
the deaf population on SEIS and security practice behavior would pave the way for additional 
research in creating tailored cyber security awareness programs for the deaf population.  Even 
further, the need for additional research on addressing potential cyber defense concerns in 
other marginalized populations may potentially be bolstered by this research study. 
 
Researcher Interest 
 This research problem is significant to me in many aspects of my personal and 
professional life.  I was born deaf with profound bilateral sensorineural hearing loss.  My 
father was born deaf and my mother was born hearing but became deaf at a young age due to 
Rubella.  Coming from a deaf family, American Sign Language is my native language and I 
was exposed to deaf individuals who used sign language and Deaf culture throughout my 
whole life. 
At the age of five, I was a recipient of a Cochlear Implant.  Receiving a Cochlear 
Implant transformed my listening and speech skills, allowing me to better connect with my 
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hearing peers.  I was placed in a mainstreamed school and throughout my academic years, I 
was often the only deaf student in the classroom and relied on sign language interpreters to 
fully gain access in understanding my teacher and my classmates. 
I grew up in an information-technology (IT) focused family where I was exposed to 
computer programming and gaming throughout my teenage years.  The experience that I took 
away the most from my childhood years was fixing my friend’s computers damaged by 
viruses and recovering hacked accounts from online games.  What fascinated me the most 
about computers was the lack of knowledge that a lot of people had about how to properly 
secure their equipment.  In high school, I took Advanced Placement (AP) Computer Science 
and learned how to program in Java.  This was my favorite class and it ignited my passion for 
computers.  The field of computing began as a hobby for me, but now it is something that I 
have turned into a professional career for myself.   
I enrolled in my parents’ alma mater, Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT), 
majoring in the Bachelor’s and Master’s (BS/MS) Dual Degree Computing Security program 
within the Golisano College of Computing and Information Sciences in 2012.  The National 
Technical Institute of the Deaf (NTID), another one of RIT’s nine colleges, is a federally 
funded college for only deaf and hard of hearing students and hearing students who want to 
work with deaf community such as interpreting and teaching.  NTID provides unmatched 
university education for deaf students with incomparable support services and vigorous 
academic programs that train their students for absolute success and job placement. 
My desire for conducting research and critical thinking began at RIT/NTID.  I was 
exposed to numerous professors, both deaf and hearing, who pursued and received research 
grants.  These faculty were driven to make meaningful changes in this world and serve as our 
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role models.  Over four years in college, I partook in numerous research projects related to 
cyber security and its many disciplines.  I also did two internships for the federal government 
as a cyber security professional.  I was one of the two members of the first CyberCorps®: 
Scholarship for Service (SFS) in the graduating class of RIT in 2016. 
Upon graduation, I was hired as a permanent cyber security professional for the 
federal government.  At this point in my life, I still felt that there was a gap in my knowledge 
related to cyber security even after I received education at RIT/NTID for four years.  This 
decision led me to apply for Dakota State University’s online doctoral program in Cyber 
Operations.  Nearly three years after graduating from RIT/NTID, I still find myself 
formulating ideas for ways to make positive changes in the deaf community.  Throughout my 
life experiences, I have noticed the unique challenges and barriers prevalent in the lives of 
deaf people that may have led to diminished outcomes that the hearing community does not 
experience.  Cyber security issues were no exception to this observation that I had made and 
that concerned me both as a deaf person and a professional in cyber security. 
One of the helpful features for a successful phenomenological research study, which 
occurred in the second phase of this mixed methods study, is for the researcher to have an 
instinctual perception and fascination of the subject matter at hand (Max van Manen, 2007).  
Coupling my life experiences as a deaf individual who identifies as a member of the Deaf 
community with my educational and professional background in cyber security makes me an 
ideal candidate for performing this study involving both deaf and hearing populations 
(Mertens, 2009).  Naturally, this brought up some concern as a researcher for some potential 
bias, but I took the necessary steps to make sure that these concerns were addressed 
throughout the study, especially during the one-on-one interviews in the second phase. 
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As one of the phenomenological pioneers stated to demonstrate the usefulness of an 
Epoche in the event of potential bias in a phenomenological research study, “In the Epoche, 
we set aside our prejudgments, biases, and preconceived ideas about things” (Moustakas, 
1994, p. 84).  Utilizing the Epoche allows the researcher to, as Moustakas (1994, p. 85) 
describes, “enter anew into consciousness, and to look and see them again, as if for the first 
time … not being hampered by the voices of the past that tells us the way things are or voices 
of the present that direct our thinking.”  Using the researcher’s Epoche, I was able to set aside 
my preconceived ideas, experiences, and assumptions through the use of bracketing and 
reflexive journaling to allow me to experience what the participants were experiencing with 
little or no bias. 
 
Statement of the Problem 
Since the advent of the Internet age in the 1990s, information security professionals 
have struggled to address the weakest point in any form of cyber defense, which is the human 
factor.  Many instances of academic research exist in raising concerns about the human factor 
in any form of cyber defense and the average Internet user’s inability to consistently identify 
and mitigate cyber threats (Bishop et al., 1997; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000; Katsikas, 2000; 
Klahr et al., 2016; Lee & Kozar, 2005; Rhee et al., 2009; Straub, 1990; Woerner, 2012).  
According to Cyber Security Ventures, a leading source for cyber security facts and statistics, 
the dramatic increase in the use of Internet-enabled technologies has led to the explosive 
growth in Internet end-users, which is predicted to reach 6 billion by 2022 and 7.5 billion by 
2030 (Morgan, 2017).  Cyber-crime damages were anticipated to reach $6 trillion annually by 
2021, up from $3 trillion in 2015 (Morgan, 2017).  Factoring in this immense growth of 
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Internet end-users with cyber-crime damages that represent the largest transfer of economic 
wealth in the history of the world, spending on cyber security products and services were 
projected to exceed $1 trillion by 2021 (Morgan, 2017).  In response, security professionals, 
educators, and researchers alike have sought innovative solutions in an attempt to combat the 
challenging problem of the average unsuspecting Internet end-user falling victim to cyber 
compromise.  However, there is a lack of literature addressing human factors in marginalized 
groups i.e. deaf, blind, and other disabilities that resulted in social exclusion from larger 
society and how these factors may hinder their role in combating against potential cyber 
threats. 
The research examines whether the deaf population exhibits a variance in self-efficacy 
in information security (SEIS) and security practice behavior in comparison to the average 
hearing end-user and attempted to capture the deaf experience when encountering information 
security threats.  A primary takeaway of the study is to address this research gap by having an 
increased understanding of the deaf experience pertaining to information security, determine 
whether there need to be further efforts in addressing any potential concerns unique to the 
deaf population, and if more attention needs to be given to marginalized groups as a whole in 
regard to cyber security awareness. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
The study explores the potential influence that sociocultural factors of the deaf 
population have on their end-users’ SEIS and security practice behavior.  Guided by the 
objective of the study, an explanatory sequential mixed method with a two-phase approach 
(Cotten, Tashakkori, & Teddlie, 1999; Creswell, 2014) is utilized to collect quantitative data 
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first and then explain the quantitative results with in-depth qualitative data.  During the 
quantitative phase of the study, survey data results were obtained from both deaf and hearing 
populations across the United States to measure SEIS and security practice behavior to 
identify any statistical variances in responses between the two populations. 
Subsequently, a second phase qualitative study was conducted to follow up on the 
quantitative results to be able to better understand the quantitative results that were obtained.  
Purposefully selected individuals were used to further explore quantitative results through a 
phenomenological research approach to capture the lived experiences of deaf people facing 
information security threats.  In this second phase of the study, these selected individuals from 
the initial quantitative phase were interviewed in a one-on-one environment to be able to 
directly examine the nature of the deaf experience for data collection over video-based 
communication technologies. 
According to Creswell (2014), a mixed methods approach is useful when either the 
quantitative or qualitative approach on its own would be insufficient to derive meaningful 
conclusions to answer the “what”, “how”, and “why” pertaining to the research problem. 
Tashakkori & Teddlie (2010) highlight the usefulness of the mixed methods approach as it 
would be appropriate to elicit the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative research to 
gain an optimal understanding.  Going even further, Mertens (2009) and Johnson & Turner 
(2003) discuss the advantageous benefits of performing a broad quantitative survey and 
following up with a calculated selection of individuals for in-depth analysis of specific views, 
opinions, and experiences regarding a topic.  For this study, the mixed methods approach 
makes sense to allow the researcher to leverage the design to collect a broad set of closed-
ended data on deaf end-users for analysis before beginning the second phase.  The use of a 
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semi-structured approach with open-ended qualitative questions can be built upon the 
quantitative data to fine-tune the approach of questioning to gather in-depth qualitative data 
that explain the research questions in the second phase of the study. 
 
Mixed Methods Research Question 
A mixed methods question was developed to focus the intent of the study, which is to 
leverage qualitative data from the qualitative phase to help better understand results obtained 
from the quantitative phase.  In this instance, the semi-structured interview data obtained from 
select deaf participants capturing the essence of their lived experience allows the researcher to 
further explain the quantitative survey results depicting variances in the deaf population’s 
SEIS and security practice behavior in comparison to the hearing population.  The primary 
mixed methods research question to be answered in this study is: 
Q1. To what extent and in what ways have semi-structured qualitative interviews 
explained quantitative survey results to provide a better overall understanding of variances in 
SEIS and overall security practice behavior in the deaf population? 
 
Quantitative Research Hypotheses 
As outlined in the purpose statement, the study conducts a quantitative phase to 
measure and compare SEIS and security practice behavior between the deaf and hearing 
populations.  To accurately and effectively measure these two metrics of the deaf and hearing 
populations, the following three null hypotheses were proposed: 
H10. There is no statistically significant difference between deaf and hearing end-
users’ SEIS. 
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H20. There is no statistically significant difference between deaf and hearing end-users 
on security practice behavior. 
 
H30. A positive SEIS does not predict the facilitation of improved security practice 
behavior for deaf and hearing end-users. 
 
The above hypotheses were used to guide the design of the survey to collect data that 
indicate whether deaf and hearing individuals vary in SEIS and security practice behavior.  
Through quantitative data analysis, variances between the deaf and hearing participants were 
identified, setting the stage for the development and implementation of the second phase, the 
qualitative portion of the study. 
 
Qualitative Research Question 
 In this second phase of the explanatory mixed methods approach, results from the 
quantitative phase was used to select individuals of interest for a further in-depth qualitative 
study to address one primary research question.  The central qualitative research question that 
was used to explore the general set of factors surrounding the research problem is: 
Q1. What is the essence of the deaf end-user’s lived experiences when engaging in 
security practices and their confidence levels in doing so? 
 
Each interview that is performed was transcribed and analyzed for themes and sub-
themes that emerged from the conversation.  New knowledge on the lived experience of deaf 
end-users may allow for insights on what may have led to statistical variances in the 
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quantitative survey and help pinpoint areas of concern should be focused upon in the design 
of cyber security awareness programs specifically tailored for the deaf population.   
 
Nature of Study 
 The initial quantitative phase of the study makes use of a secure web-based survey 
built on Google Forms to collect data about SEIS and security practice behavior from deaf 
and hearing individuals residing in the United States.  The survey used in the first phase of the 
study is split up into four separate sections.  The first section is composed of demographic 
questions to gather background information of the participant.  The remaining three sections 
of the survey contain a total of 20 Likert-scale items, 19 multiple choice items, and 2 fill-in-
the-blank items.  These items were derived from a validated survey measurement model 
designed to measure self-efficacy in information security and security practice behavior of 
participants (Rhee et al., 2009). 
Permission to utilize the survey instrument was secured from the three researchers 
who co-authored the development of the SEIS and security practice behavior research model 
and survey instrument design by way of personal email contact.  The instrument was used on 
one occasion by Rhee et al. (2009) for the report titled Self-Efficacy in Information Security: 
Its Influence On End-Users’ Information Security Practice Behavior.  Hyeun-Suk Rhee, 
Cheongtag Kim, and Young U. Ryu graciously expressed approval for reuse of the research 
model and survey for this research project as shown in Appendix A. 
 In the second phase, the qualitative phase, of this mixed methods study, one-on-one 
semi-structured interviews were performed with purposefully selected deaf participants from 
the initial quantitative phase of the study.  In-depth and open-ended questions were asked to 
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the participant in this semi-structured environment in an attempt to obtain invaluable insight 
into the essence of the deaf experience when practicing security practice behavior and their 
SEIS.  An interview protocol was followed and answers were recorded for coding and 
thematic analysis afterward.  By interviewing multiple deaf participants who demonstrated 
variances in SEIS and security practice behavior when compared to hearing participants, the 
researcher may be able to gain insight on common themes and sociocultural factors that may 
have led to these variances.   
 
Significance of Study 
 Members of the deaf population in the United States stand to benefit from this study 
because of the increased understanding of sociocultural factors that may lead to variances in 
SEIS and security practice behavior.  This improved understanding promotes attention and 
awareness to a problem that was not previously recognized.  Stakeholders that have a vested 
interest in protecting their critical data and information from potential compromise including 
governments, businesses, and universities may be able to use this new knowledge to develop 
tailored cyber security awareness programs specifically for the deaf population to address 
concerns that are unique to them.  Academic researchers and any stakeholder that employs or 
serves the deaf population may work together to develop better and more user-focused cyber 
security practices. 
 The results of this study also set the stage for further research in studying other 
marginalized groups that experience social exclusion from the larger society.  It is crucial to 
obtain further knowledge that recognizes addresses unique factors that may hinder a group’s 
ability to combat against potential cyber security concerns.  This study can be easily 
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replicated due to the fact that it was designed to be distributed online and would only require 
minor changes to the demographic questions to appropriately suit the targeted marginalized 
group.  The study will also collect baseline aggregate data that may be used for other future 
studies and further tests the survey instrument on measuring SEIS and security practice 
behavior.  
 
Definition of Terms 
 The following terms were defined for the convenience of the reader and will be used 
throughout the dissertation.  The intent is to minimize any misunderstandings or confusion 
that may arise relating to these terms.  All terminology relating to the research methodology 
are displayed in Chapter 3 for the convenience of the reader.  The final section that follows 
discusses the organizational structure that is used for the rest of the study. 
deaf / deafness:  Lower-case “d”, a pathological viewpoint of deafness refers to a 
person’s inability to hear and understand spoken language, which is often perceived as a 
problem that needs to be fixed (Padden & Humphries, 1989). 
 
Deaf: Upper-case “D”, a sociocultural viewpoint of deafness where a deaf person is a 
member of the linguistic minority of sign language users (Padden & Humphries, 1989).  Little 
attention is given to finding a solution for their inability to hear, in fact, deaf people who are 
part of the Deaf culture commonly believe that they are fortunate to not be able to hear. 
 
Hard-of-Hearing: A person who has mild or moderate hearing loss who may 
communicate through either sign language, spoken language, or both (Holcomb, 2012). 
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Phenomenology: A philosophical and thematic study that seeks to reflect upon the 
lived experience of human existence and consciousness (Max van Manen, 2007). 
 
Self-Efficacy: A person’s belief in their ability to achieve a particular goal or task, 
also known as self-confidence (Bandura, 1986). 
 
Self-Efficacy in Information Security (SEIS): “A belief in one’s capability to protect 
information and information systems from unauthorized disclosure, modification, loss, 
destruction, and lack of availability” (Rhee et al., 2009, p. 3). 
 
Sociocultural: A set of beliefs, practices, and behaviors that exists within a population 
(Bandura, 1986). 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduces the reader to the study of measuring SEIS and security 
practice behavior in the deaf community and understanding the deaf experience when 
encountering cyber threats.  Many examples of research efforts exist in raising concerns about 
the human factor in any form of cyber defense and the average Internet user’s inability to 
consistently identify and mitigate cyber threats (Bishop et al., 1997; Dhillon & Backhouse, 
2000; Katsikas, 2000; Klahr et al., 2016; Lee & Kozar, 2005; Rhee et al., 2009; Straub, 1990; 
Woerner, 2012).  The problem addressed by the research was that there is a lack of 
information on the potential impact of the deaf community’s unique sociocultural 
characteristics on their SEIS and security practice behavior.  The purpose of this study was to 
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explore the potential influence that sociocultural factors of the deaf population have on their 
end-users’ SEIS and security practice behavior.  An explanatory sequential mixed method 
with a two-phase approach was used to collect quantitative data first and then explain the 
quantitative results with in-depth qualitative data (Cotten et al., 1999; Creswell, 2014).  In the 
quantitative phase, a survey instrument is distributed online to measure SEIS and security 
practice behavior in the deaf population across the United States (Rhee et al., 2009).  
Statistical analysis is performed to identify any significant variances between the deaf and 
hearing data sets that are collected.  Subsequently, a semi-structured interview approach with 
purposefully selected deaf participants is used in the second phase of the study to capture the 
essence of the deaf experience when practicing security practice behavior and their SEIS.  
Coding and thematic analysis are performed with the qualitative data set to identify any 
underlying common themes and sociocultural factors that may have led to these statistical 
variances in security practice behavior and SEIS.  Through the identification of potential 
variances in SEIS and security practice behavior in this research study, the need for research 
efforts in creating tailored cyber security awareness programs specifically for the deaf 
population and other marginalized populations is raised. 
 
Organization of the Remainder of the Study 
 This dissertation was written and organized into five chapters.  This chapter 
introduced the problem to the reader and provides a comprehensive background for the 
remainder of the study.  Chapter 2 contains a review of literature relating to the sociocultural 
factors of the deaf population, SEIS, and security practice behavior.  Chapter 3 describes the 
research methodology and approach that was taken for this work.  Chapter 4 discusses the 
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analysis and presentation of the quantitative and qualitative data that was collected.  Chapter 4 
also highlights the integration of results from both phases and presents the overall findings of 
this mixed methods study.  Finally, Chapter 5 wraps up the study through sharing 
conclusions, recommendations, and observations that may be relevant for future work in 
studies relating to SEIS, security practice behavior, and the deaf population, or even other 
marginalized groups.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
As defined by Creswell (2014) and Machi & McEvoy (2012), a literature review 
builds and provides the context and background about the current knowledge pertaining to the 
topic of study.  The purpose of this mixed methods study was to explore the influence that 
sociocultural factors of the deaf population may have on their end-users’ SEIS and security 
practice behavior.  In order to build the literature review for this study, the researcher 
performed literature searches using a variety of research databases available through Dakota 
State University’s library to create a foundation of information to build this study upon. 
According to the American Community Survey (ACS), as shown in Figure 1, there are 
an estimated 11,424,813 people in the United States who experience hearing difficulty and 
4,005,393 of those are adults between the ages of 18 and 64 years (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2016). 
Subject United States 
Total With a disability Percent with a disability 
Estimate Margin of 
Error 
Estimate Margin of 
Error 
Estimate Margin of 
Error 
DISABILITY TYPE BY DETAILED AGE       
    With a hearing difficulty (X) (X) 11,424,813 +/-49,990 3.6% +/-0.1 
        Population under 18 years 73,503,793 +/-33,635 431,255 +/-13,604 0.6% +/-0.1 
            Population under 5 years 19,797,852 +/-21,563 96,871 +/-6,348 0.5% +/-0.1 
            Population 5 to 17 years 53,705,941 +/-27,824 344,384 +/-11,839 0.6% +/-0.1 
        Population 18 to 64 years 196,766,286 +/-24,275 4,005,393 +/-35,378 2.0% +/-0.1 
            Population 18 to 34 years 73,528,820 +/-42,755 648,988 +/-16,683 0.9% +/-0.1 
            Population 35 to 64 years 123,237,466 +/-47,865 3,356,405 +/-29,715 2.7% +/-0.1 
        Population 65 years and over 47,905,788 +/-21,613 6,988,165 +/-34,392 14.6% +/-0.1 
            Population 65 to 74 years 28,368,236 +/-18,546 2,608,146 +/-21,556 9.2% +/-0.1 
            Population 75 years and over 19,537,552 +/-16,435 4,380,019 +/-28,294 22.4% +/-0.1 
 
Figure 1 - ACS Disability Characteristics Table (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016) 
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 Performing an extensive literature search in an effort to identify any existing 
knowledge about the deaf population relating to cyber security and its many subsets failed to 
turn up any significant results to date.  The lack of results was especially concerning 
considering how this subset of deaf adults between ages of 18 and 64 years accounts for 
approximately 2% of the entire population of the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016).  
It is important to note that this approximate 2% measure does not include the high number of 
those who have trouble hearing over the age of 65 years, which would bring the overall 
percentage of the population with hearing difficulty to approximately 3.6%. 
Due to the lack of research available for deaf people pertaining to cyber security and 
its related fields, select search terms were used to explore the realm of deaf people and the 
role of technology in their lives along with the human factor in information security, security 
practice behavior, and self-efficacy in information security.  These topics serve as the 
theoretical basis of this study along with the realm of sociocultural perspectives and central 
cultural components pertaining to the deaf population to build necessary context for the 
researcher. 
This literature review begins by developing insight into the importance of the human 
factor in cyber security, leading to the groundings of self-efficacy from social cognitive 
theory to understand how it helps the researcher quantify and measure human behavior.  
Subsequently, the relationship between self-efficacy in information security and security 
practice behavior is explored in existing literature to establish and validate the theoretical 
basis of the study.  Next, the models of deafness and how they affect deaf identity are 
discussed to provide a foundation of the two viewpoints before proceeding to various 
sociocultural perspectives and central cultural components of the lives of deaf people.  An 
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exploration of prior research on how deaf people use technology is also covered.  The 
culmination of the existing literature has led to the formation of the research hypotheses and 
questions used in this study. 
 
The Human Factor in Cyber Security 
The human factor plays a large role in the successes and failures of all forms of cyber 
security implementations designed to protect systems, services, and information (Orshesky, 
2003).  According to Schultz (2005), cyber security is a people problem because people are in 
control of technology, not the other way around.  A widely recognized annual cyber security 
report created by Verizon (2017) outlined that 43% of reported security breaches in 2016 
were social attacks tailored to exploit the weakest link of cyber security – the human factor.  
The majority of these social attacks were in the form of phishing and 28% of phishing 
breaches were designed to target a specific audience (Verizon, 2017).  This statistic is 
particularly interesting because attackers have demonstrated success in tailoring a phishing 
attack to a particular audience’s weaknesses for exploitation. 
No matter how sophisticated a security implementation may be, the lack of security 
awareness and poor security practice behavior will always be its Achilles’ Heel (Badie & 
Lashkari, 2012; Woerner, 2012).  In Deloitte (2009)’s 6th Annual Global Security Survey, it 
was determined that the human error is the greatest weakness in cyber security at 86% 
followed by technology at 63%.  As a result, academic research regarding cyber security 
awareness and security practice behavior has become prevalent in an attempt to address the 
human factor in cyber security. 
Studying the human factor has allowed researchers to establish various categories that 
should be considered in the design of a cyber security awareness framework.  For instance, 
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Badie & Lashkari (2012) and Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem (2009) broke down the factors that 
influence the security of computers into two groups – human factors and organizational 
factors.  First, Kraemer et al. (2009) proposed that there are nine prevalent human and 
organizational factors including: 
1. External influences 
2. Human error 
3. Management 
4. Organization of computer information security 
5. Performance management 
6. Resource management 
7. Policy 
8. Technology 
9. Training 
 
Badie & Lashkari (2012) took things a step further by reviewing work done between 
1989 and 2011 to determine five factors to have a potentially substantial influence on an end-
user’s security practice behavior.  These five factors are the following: 
1. Lack of motivation 
2. Lack of awareness 
3. Belief 
4. Behavior 
5. Inadequate use of technology 
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Each of these factors plays a role in a human’s weakness in their ability to respond to 
security threats (Badie & Lashkari, 2012; Kraemer et al., 2009). 
Metalidou et al. (2014) do an effective job of expanding on and describing each of 
these five factors proposed by Badie & Lashkari (2012).  An explanation on how each factor 
directly applies to a human’s weakness is provided below:  
1. Lack of motivation impacts an end-user’s security practice behavior in a way where 
the end-user will simply not bother to implement safe practices because they have no 
reason or motivation to do so.  By incentivizing people and holding them accountable 
for good security practice behavior, the potential risk is minimized (Metalidou et al., 
2014). 
 
2. Lack of awareness focuses on the end-user’s absence of basic knowledge and skills 
relevant to identifying the presence of a threat and their absence of understanding of 
the importance of security practice behavior.  Albrechtsen (2007) describes that 
general awareness campaigns have very little to almost no effect on an end-user’s 
security awareness. 
 
3. An end-user’s erroneous beliefs can directly implicate in their ability to identify and 
mitigate security threats.  For example, if an end-user believes that they do not need 
anti-virus software to protect their computer system or if they believe that they are 
prepared to click on a link on an email received from an unknown sender (Metalidou 
et al., 2014).   
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4. The behavioral factor may impact security when a person practices risky behavior 
and/or stops practicing good security practice behavior.  Albrechtsen (2007) concluded 
through his study that an approach that involves the end-user is much more effective 
in influencing the end-user’s behavior.  In contrast, documenting requirements of 
expected security behavior and requiring an end-user to comply would not be 
effective. 
 
5. Relating to a concept that was discussed above, no matter how advanced technology 
is, an end-user’s inadequate use of technology will prevent a successful security 
implementation.  Some examples of inadequate technological usage include 
misconfiguration, sharing passwords, or bypassing security configurations for one-
time-use (Metalidou et al., 2014). 
 
Based on the factors discussed above, it is apparent that the vital success of cyber 
security relies on the security practice behavior of its end-users.  Raising security awareness is 
crucial for the reduction of breaches resulting from human weaknesses (Albrechtsen, 2007; 
Gutzwiller, Fugate, Sawyer, & Hancock, 2015; Metalidou et al., 2014; Tayouri, 2015).  The 
development and refinement of various cyber security awareness frameworks and programs 
have taken place based on these research findings on human factors and weaknesses that need 
to be addressed. 
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Types of Security Practice Behavior  
 As outlined above, there are five human factors that have been identified as a 
contributing variable to the weakness of an end-user’s ability to identify and mitigate potential 
threats (Badie & Lashkari, 2012; Kraemer et al., 2009; Metalidou et al., 2014).  Each of these 
factors plays a role in the overall security practice behavior of an end-user.  Research has been 
performed to identify the various security practice behaviors that a person may exhibit.  
Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo, & Jolton (2005) surveyed over 1000 end-users to collect their 
security practice behaviors, interviewed 110 individuals who understood end-user security-
related behavior, and consulted with 49 subject matter experts to identify six categories of 
end-user security-related behaviors.  Figure 2 below shows a two factor taxonomy that was 
created by Stanton et al. (2005) to depict behaviors ranging from malicious to beneficial with 
a range of technical expertise required to exhibit a particular behavior from low to high. 
Expertise Intentions Title Description 
High Malicious Intentional destruction Behavior requires technical expertise together with a strong intention to do harm 
to the organization’s IT and resources.  Example: employee breaks into an 
employer’s protected files in order to steal a trade secret. 
 
Low Malicious Detrimental misuse Behavior requires minimal technical expertise but nonetheless includes intention 
to do harm through annoyance, harassment, rule breaking, etc. Example: using 
company email for SPAM messages marketing a sideline business. 
 
High Neutral Dangerous tinkering Behavior requires technical expertise but no clear intention to do harm to the 
organization’s IT and resources.  Example: employee configures a wireless 
gateway that inadvertently allows wireless access to the company’s network by 
people in passing cars. 
 
Low Neutral Naïve mistakes Behavior requires minimal technical expertise and no clear intention to do harm to 
the organization’s information technology and resources.  Example: choosing a 
bad password such as “password.” 
 
High Beneficial Aware assurance Behavior requires technical expertise together with a strong intention to do good 
by preserving and protecting the organization’s information technology and 
resources.  Example: recognizing the presence of a backdoor program through 
careful observation of own PC. 
 
Low Beneficial Basic hygiene Behavior requires no technical expertise but includes clear intention to preserve 
and protect the organization’s IT and resources.  Example: a trained and aware 
employee resists an attempt at social engineering by refusing to reveal her 
password to a caller claiming to be from computer services. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Two Factor Taxonomy of Security Practice Behaviors (Stanton et al., 2005) 
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Only the intentions of an individual being neutral or beneficial are relevant to this 
mixed methods study being performed.  Malicious intents are not covered or discussed any 
further for this reason.  Aware assurance and basic hygiene are great examples of how a 
person with low or high technical abilities can still demonstrate positive security practice 
behavior (Stanton et al., 2005).  On the flip side, naïve mistakes and dangerous tinkering are 
examples of negative security practice behavior (Stanton et al., 2005).  The authors discuss 
how punishing malicious behavior and setting policies that lay out the ramifications of 
intentionally malicious security practice behavior (Stanton et al., 2005).  However, the aim of 
this study is to deter unintentional bad end-user behavior and to promote good security 
practice behavior to maximize the effectiveness of information security.  There is not a lot of 
prior work that has been performed in exploring ways to promote good end-user behavior in 
information security (Rhee et al., 2009; Stanton et al., 2005).  This led to the work of Rhee et 
al. (2009) exploring possible frameworks for a cyber security awareness program that 
promotes positive end-user security practice behavior.  The crux of their study lies upon the 
concept of self-efficacy in information security (SEIS), which is discussed in the next section 
below (Rhee et al., 2009). 
 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework used in a study provides a general principle for research to 
be performed upon.  More often than not, these frameworks are shaped by ideas and general 
theories that lie in the survey of the literature of topics relating to the study (Bryant, 2004).  
Simultaneously, the theoretical framework at hand shapes the selection of appropriate 
literature for the study.  As described by Creswell & Clark (2011), the use of a social science 
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framework in diverse mixed methods research designs has become prevalent over the last 
decade.  The social science theory should provide a framework for both qualitative and 
quantitative data collection (Creswell, 2014).  Through the use of a well-defined framework, 
the researcher is able to determine the scope of the study in a manner that produces more 
meaningful results. 
Self-efficacy, also more commonly known as self-confidence, is a person’s belief in 
their ability to achieve a particular goal or task (Bandura, 1986).  Self-efficacy is a known 
construct of the social cognitive theory.  The social cognitive theory was developed by Albert 
Bandura built off of prior work on social learning by Neal Miller and John Dollard (Bandura, 
1986).  Bandura’s work originated in the field of psychology, but is now used in the fields of 
education, business, and applied health psychology (Bandura, 1986).  The social cognitive 
theory proposes that there is a direct correlation with a person’s perceived self-efficacy 
resulting from personal, behavioral, and environmental influences and their resultant behavior 
(Bandura, 1986).  By building the study upon the framework of social cognitive theory, the 
nature of the inquiry is appropriately geared towards understanding how a deaf person’s 
personal, behavioral, and environmental influences may affect their resultant behavior in 
regard to cyber security threats.  
The sociocultural theory was also utilized to design this research study.  Leo Vygotsky 
created the sociocultural theory because he disagreed with behaviorism and wanted to address 
the educational and social problems of his time in the 1920s and 1930s  (McGlonn-Nelson, 
2005).  According to John-Steiner & Mahn (1996), the sociocultural theory highlights that 
social interactions and the culture of an individual’s life play a role in the development of an 
individual’s nature and cognition. 
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Finally, Mertens (2009) has put forth studies bolstering the use of the disability 
inquiry lens where the understanding of a population’s sociocultural perspectives allows them 
to take control over their lives instead of the more common biological understanding of 
disability.  Integrating the social cognitive theory and sociocultural theory with a disability 
inquiry lens creates a powerful approach to seek for an explanation to the variances in results 
in SEIS and security practice behavior between the deaf and hearing populations. 
 
Theoretical Basis of Study on SEIS and Security Practice Behavior 
Utilizing the social cognitive theory discussed above, Rhee, Kim, & Ryu (2009) were 
the first to propose self-efficacy in information security (SEIS) as a modification of self-
efficacy used as a proximal determinant of individual behavior.  Rhee et al. (2009) based their 
ideas of SEIS from various research studies that explored correlations between the end-user’s 
self-efficacy in computers or information security and how they impacted an end-user’s 
security effectiveness.  As defined by Rhee et al. (2009), SEIS is the belief of a person’s self-
capability to protect information and systems from cyber security threats.  The focus of the 
study performed by Rhee et al. (2009) was to measure SEIS levels in business graduate 
students and see if there is a relationship between SEIS levels and security practice behavior. 
In order to measure SEIS, the researchers developed a research model composed of 
seven constructs (Rhee et al., 2009).  These seven constructs are comprised in a way where 
the first three constructs – Computer/Internet Experience, Security Breach Incidents, and 
General Controllability were theorized to have a direct relationship with SEIS, which is the 
fourth construct in the study.  The remaining three constructs: Security Practice – Technology, 
Intention to Strengthen Security Effort, and Security Practice – Care Behavior, were theorized 
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to be direct results of a positive or negative SEIS.  The researchers also developed a survey 
instrument that measures each of those seven constructs and validated the research model 
using partial least squares (PLS) to ensure composite reliability (Rhee et al., 2009).   
In the end, the core of the results obtained from the Rhee et al. (2009) study support 
that SEIS has significant indicators of an individual’s security practice behavior (Rhee et al., 
2009).  A positive SEIS significantly influences the user’s security practice– both technology 
and care behavior, and their intention to strengthen security effort (Rhee et al., 2009).  In 
other words, an end-user that indicates positive SEIS has the tendency of demonstrating 
positive security practice behavior, and vice versa.  Further analysis of the remaining three 
constructs that were theorized to influence SEIS revealed that prior relevant 
Computer/Internet experience was determined to have a positive relationship with SEIS while 
negative Security Breach Incident experience was determined to have a negative implication 
on a user’s SEIS (Rhee et al., 2009).  Survey items relating to the user’s perception on 
controllability of threats allowed the researchers to measure the General Controllability 
construct.  Perceived general controllability of information security threats was determined to 
have a positive relationship to a person’s overall SEIS (Rhee et al., 2009).  
Various research studies support the findings that Rhee et al., (2009) obtained through 
their study.  For example, Phelps & Gathegi (2006) attempted to demonstrate the impact that 
training has on the effectiveness of information security implementations using the construct 
of self-efficacy.  Phelps & Gathegi (2006) obtained results that suggest the relevancy of self-
efficacy in understanding the relationship between training and effectiveness.  Additionally, 
Crossler & Bélanger (2006) found that providing different levels of instruction did not have 
an impact on security tool usage of individuals who possessed varying levels of self-efficacy 
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in computers.  However, the researchers found that “a person’s level of computer self-efficacy 
significantly impacts his or her use of security tools” (Crossler & Bélanger, 2006).  He et al., 
(2014) also acknowledge the growing importance of self-efficacy in behavioral information 
security research to ensure that end-users are equipped with the right skills to practice good 
security practice behavior. 
As discussed previously, the goal of this study is to determine if there are any 
variances in results in SEIS and security practice behavior between the deaf and hearing 
populations and to attempt to explain possible causes of such variance.  In the quantitative 
portion of the study, the SEIS measurement model from the Rhee et al. (2009) study is 
replicated with minor modifications and extensions to identify statistical variances in SEIS 
and security practice behavior between deaf and hearing populations.  In the qualitative 
portion of the study, interviews are performed to collect the lived experiences of deaf people 
when practicing SEIS and security practice behavior.  In order to be able to fully grasp the 
interview results that are obtained from the second phase of the study, it is critical for the 
reader to understand the Deaf culture and its unique sociocultural characteristics to be able to 
synthesize the data that is collected.  As a result, the remainder of the literature review focuses 
on deaf people, their culture, and how deaf people generally interact with technology 
differently than the hearing population. 
 
Models of Deaf People 
As briefly touched upon in the Background and Definition of Terms section of 
Chapter 1, there are two opposing models that are generally adopted by both deaf and hearing 
people.  The usage of a model affects a deaf person’s identity, life, experiences, and how they 
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are treated in larger society.  Due to this study’s primary focus on deaf participants, 
understanding each worldview is crucial to be able to better synthesize the experiences, 
attitudes, and perspectives taken by a deaf participant in this study within the frame of SEIS 
and security practice behavior. 
The pathological model, also known as the medical model or infirmity model, is the 
first of two perspectives where the primary focus is upon the amount of hearing loss and how 
to correct the physical disability through medical means (Lane, 1992; Munoz-Baell & Ruiz, 
2000).  In this model, deaf people are not regarded as functionally equivalent members of 
hearing society.  As a result, deaf people often face pressure from doctors, audiologists, 
speech therapists, and educators alike to work towards assimilation into the hearing world 
through a variety of means.  Such attempts to correct the physical condition of deafness 
include aural rehabilitation, cochlear implantation, and speech therapy.  An emphasis of the 
importance to be able to hear and speak as well as any functional member of hearing society 
is prevalent in this model.  It is not uncommon for a deaf person to able to hear and speak to a 
degree where they consider themselves as hearing.   
The alternate model to the pathological model, typically embraced by those in the 
Deaf community, is called the sociocultural model or the cultural model (Lane, 1992).  Those 
who adopt the sociocultural model view deaf people in a more positive light.  Culturally Deaf 
people often have positive attitudes towards being deaf and do not view being deaf as a 
disability or impediment to their daily living and function because they consider themselves 
members of a minority community (Padden & Humphries, 1989).   Through the enrichment of 
shared experiences between deaf people in a predominantly hearing world led to the 
formation of a distinct cultural community with their own language, symbols, values, and 
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norms (Holcomb, 2012).  Deaf people who identify as members of this minority community 
and embrace this sociocultural worldview have developed their own perspectives and cultural 
traits that are unique and different from the larger hearing society.  Delving deeper into each 
of the cultural components of the deaf community provides necessary background information 
to understand the experiences, attitudes, and perspectives taken by a deaf participant 
regarding SEIS and security practice behavior. 
 
Sociocultural Components of Deaf People 
The components of any cultural community are language, symbols, values, and norms 
(Holcomb, 2012).  Symbols in a culture serve as expressions of ideology and often represent 
multiple facets of a culture.  Cultural values are broad ideas that are collectively desired 
within a group to determine what is right and wrong.  Norms are standards of interaction and 
behavior that are considered to be acceptable within the community.  Finally, the language 
component encompasses all of these other components into a form of communication that can 
be written, spoke, or in this case, conveyed visually through sign language.  Studying each 
cultural component helps the researcher reveal fundamental differences in the life of a deaf 
person compared to a hearing person. 
 The most distinctive and identifiable characteristic of the Deaf culture is the use of 
sign language (Baker-Shenk & Cokely, 1980).  American Sign Language is a visual language 
that has its own grammatical structure, linguistic rules, and lexicon that involve the use of 
handshapes, movements, orientation, and facial expressions primarily used for 
communication between members of the Deaf community (Klima & Bellugi, 1979).  The 
visual nature of sign language is often used as a means of identification for those who are a 
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member of the community (Valli & Lucas, 1992).  Deaf people tend to be drawn to sign 
language users because it is not common that they will see other members of the community 
on a daily basis (Holcomb, 2012).  The relevancy of this tendency relates to information 
security when thinking about whether deaf people would be more vulnerable to a targeted 
phishing threat imitating to be a member of the deaf community. 
 Deaf people face challenges throughout their lifetime that deprive them of access to 
information and communication that are easily available to hearing people.  Mitchell & 
Karchmer (2004) validate that more than 90% of deaf children are born to hearing parents 
through their survey in the United States.  Sign language is the only language that deaf 
children can acquire without supplemental teaching similar to how hearing children learn 
from spoken languages (Henner, Caldwell-Harris, Novogrodsky, & Hoffmeister, 2016).  This 
often leads to a deprivation of information-rich language exposure in the early years of a deaf 
child.  As a result of these setbacks in the learning development of a deaf child, the average 
reading skill level of an 18-year-old deaf person is at the third or fourth-grade level (Allen, 
1994; Mitchell & Karchmer, 2012). 
 This lag in reading skill levels is potentially significant as it is common for 
corporations, workplaces, and universities to provide text materials educating end-users on 
current threats and preventive cyber security measures to take upon.  For example, Rochester 
Institute of Technology in upstate New York offers a variety of self-training modules online 
for their students to take (“RIT Information Security,” 2017).  This is particularly concerning 
as a deaf person may be intellectually competent in their field of work, but may be unable to 
fully comprehend the security advisories that are provided because they are not conveyed in 
sign language. 
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 A variety of symbols that represent the ability to communicate and function with the 
hearing world includes the advent of medical, assistive, and consumer technology.  For 
instance, using cell phones for text messaging plays such a large role in a deaf person’s ability 
to communicate with hearing people.  Multiple studies have been performed to assess how 
deaf people utilize texting and other communication technologies in comparison to hearing 
people (Bakken, 2005; Okuyama & Iwai, 2011; D. J. Power, Power, & Rehling, 2007; M. R. 
Power & Power, 2004; M. R. Power, Power, & Horstmanshof, 2006).  M. R. Power et al. 
(2006) surveyed 172 deaf people to gain insight into the role of texting and the use of video 
phones in their lives.  The primary use of texting and video phones appeared to be sociability.  
Deaf people utilize these technologies to be able to contact deaf and hearing family and 
friends (M. R. Power et al., 2006).  “Without this technology, communication would be very 
limited.  There was a time when we didn’t have these things.  Now I often wonder how we did 
survive” (M. R. Power et al., 2006, p. 91).  These studies show that deaf people have adapted 
to new technologies that provide new avenues of communication to people that were 
previously difficult to reach due to accessibility barriers. 
Research on the deaf adolescent use of social networking sites (SNSs) and the Internet 
reveals that these technologies serve as important tools of communication for deaf people.  
Being able to use technology to avoid the stigma associated with hearing loss while still 
maintaining contact with both hearing and deaf peers is an attractive method of 
communication (Kožuh, Hintermair, Holzinger, Volčič, & Debevc, 2014).  The takeaway 
from these studies is that deaf people rely on texting and other technologies to be able to share 
information without experiencing barriers that are normally faced between deaf and hearing 
peers. 
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There are numerous technological advances that have improved the daily living 
functions of deaf people inside and outside of the workplace (World Health Organization, 
2011).  Assistive technologies are vital for deaf people to be able to succeed in the workplace 
by increasing their independence and participation.  A short list of consumer technologies that 
can be found at home or in the workplace include a variety of Internet of Things (IoT) 
devices, doorbells and baby monitors attached to flashers, video phones, Bluetooth enabled 
alarm shakers, and even washers and dryers that are Internet enabled to push notifications to 
the phone when laundry cycles have been completed (World Health Organization, 2011). 
Research shows that deaf people do rely on technology more intensely than their 
hearing counterparts for daily living function (Maiorana-Basas & Pagliaro, 2014).  Deaf 
people often get frustrated when they are at airports, on public transportation, and other places 
where announcements are prevalent due to the lack of visibly accessible signage (Morrissey & 
Way, 2007).  Deaf people are forced to demand more information to be able to successfully 
traverse through these barriers.  A plethora of potential security concerns are introduced when 
the attack surface is expanded through the addition of assistive technologies, IoT devices, and 
cell phones in the lives of deaf people.  Additionally, reliance on such technologies to be able 
to communicate and perform essential functions may result in a more severe impact on the life 
of a deaf person in event of a security compromise. 
The deaf population has a set of values and norms that are unique to them when 
compared to the hearing population.  Deaf people have behavioral and communication 
tendencies that differ from the hearing people due to a wide variety of factors.  Living a life in 
a dominantly hearing world as a deaf person leads to continued occurrences of information 
deprivation due to both intentional and incidental barriers.  As a result, deaf people tend to be 
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more open and blunt when it comes to certain topics that may be considered sensitive to the 
hearing world such as income, personal lives, and details that otherwise are not usually shared 
when they encounter another member of the culture (Goss, 2003).  Open communication 
between peers of the deaf community is a known trait as a result of straightforward talk.  The 
moment a deaf person has the opportunity to fully communicate with another member of their 
community, they tend to make the fullest use of the opportunity to do so. 
Deaf people do not always have the opportunity to attend a school that offers deaf 
education and often go through many years of schooling without exposure to meeting other 
deaf peers who are like them.  A direct result of this is a strong presence of collectivism 
throughout the deaf culture.  Withholding any information from one another works against the 
collective culture mindset that deaf people follow (Holcomb, 2012; L. Siple & Holcomb, 
2004).  Additionally, it is not uncommon for linguistic minority groups to have a high 
percentage of in-group marriage than the rest of society.  In the deaf community, in-group 
marriages range from 86% to 90% (Padden & Humphries, 1989; Reagan, 1990).  These 
behavioral traits associated with their values and norms are particularly concerning in regard 
to security.  Again, the possibility of a deaf end-user being more likely to befriend and trust 
other members of their cultural peers in comparison to hearing people in the hearing world 
may pose a security risk.  For instance, if the attacker imitates to be a member of the deaf 
culture, a deaf end-user may be more likely to become a victim of a cyber security threat. 
 
Tailoring Cyber Security Awareness Programs 
There are some studies that explore the unique cyber security awareness challenges 
that are prevalent in an end-user’s country of residence and the implications that those 
challenges have on a cyber security awareness program.  For instance, Alotaibi et al., (2017) 
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explored levels of cyber security awareness in Saudi Arabia. Alotaibi et al., (2017) collected 
data that indicated that Internet skills correlate with an end-user’s cyber security practices.  
Additionally, the researchers found an association between the security practices of an end-
user with security measures that are implemented by organizations in an end-user’s region.  
Dlamini & Modise (2012) identify cyber security awareness initiatives that are prevalent in 
South Africa.  The effectiveness of each initiative is assessed to better understand key issues 
that arose in specific target groups, delivery methods, and evaluation of the success (Dlamini 
& Modise, 2012).  The authors recommend formulating a cyber security awareness 
framework that incorporates all unique key issues that arose in the initiatives found 
throughout South Africa to ensure that all needs of their citizens are fully addressed. 
Taking things a step further, Chen et al., (2008) aim their research directly at 
addressing the differing effects of cultural dimensions in those who are learning about issues 
in cyber security.  The research study found that “Certainly, awareness of the risks and 
safeguards is the first line of defense that can be employed by any individual, but how 
individuals address these risks can be very dissimilar in different cultures” (Chen et al., 2008, 
p. 360).  Chen et al., (2008) recommend that further research is dedicated to studying and 
understanding the issue of security awareness from different cultural perspectives.  Security 
awareness training and the resultant security practice behavior are culturally-bounded and 
further questions are raised on how educators can best train their students to effectively 
address cyber security threats (Chen et al., 2008).  Unfortunately, there is a lack of existing 
research that explores the impact of deaf culture on the effectiveness of cyber security 
awareness programs. 
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Chapter Summary 
Schultz (2005) and Orshesky (2003) discuss how the human factor plays a crucial role 
in the successes and failures of cyber security because people are in control of technology, not 
the other way around.  Verizon (2017) collected data from companies all over the United 
States and determined that 43% of reported security breaches in 2016 were due to the human 
factor.  In Deloitte (2009)’s 6th Annual Global Security Survey, it was determined that the 
human error is the greatest weakness in cyber security at 86%.  No matter how sophisticated a 
security implementation may be, the lack of security awareness and poor security practice 
behavior will always be its Achilles’ Heel (Badie & Lashkari, 2012; Woerner, 2012).  These 
concerns have led to further research in ways to mitigate the human factor weakness in cyber 
security.   
Badie & Lashkari (2012) and Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem (2009) break down the 
human factor into individual components that influence security practice behavior.  These 
components that play a role in a human’s weakness to respond to security threats include lack 
of motivation, lack of awareness, belief, behavior, and inadequate use of technology (Badie & 
Lashkari, 2012; Kraemer et al., 2009).  Raising cyber security awareness in individuals is 
extremely important in reducing the likelihood of breaches (Albrechtsen, 2007; Gutzwiller et 
al., 2015; Metalidou et al., 2014; Tayouri, 2015).  Tiers of implications from security practice 
behaviors were demonstrated ranging from malicious to beneficial with a range of technical 
expertise required to exhibit a particular behavior form low to high  (Stanton et al., 2005).  
This security practice behavior study led to the exploration of measuring self-efficacy in 
information security and security practice behavior in individuals to be able to develop a 
framework for effective cyber security awareness programs by Rhee et al. (2009). 
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 Self-efficacy, also more commonly known as perceived self-confidence, is a person’s 
belief in their ability to achieve a particular goal or task (Bandura, 1986).  This concept of 
self-efficacy is a known construct of the social cognitive theory.  The social cognitive theory 
proposes that there is a direct correlation with a person’s perceived self-efficacy resulting 
from personal, behavioral, and environmental influences and their resultant behavior. 
(Bandura, 1986).  According to John-Steiner & Mahn (1996), the sociocultural theory 
highlights that social interactions and the culture of an individual’s life play a role in the 
development of an individual’s nature and cognition.  The use of the disability inquiry lens 
allows the researcher to utilize the understanding that a population’s sociocultural 
perspectives allow them to take control of their lives instead of the more common biological 
understanding of disability.  Through the integration of social cognitive theory, sociocultural 
theory, and disability inquiry lens, the researcher is able to effectively seek for answers to 
explain the possible variances in results in SEIS and security practice behavior between the 
deaf and hearing populations. 
Rhee et al. (2009) proposed SEIS as a modification of self-efficacy used as a proximal 
determinant of individual behavior.  Through the use of a survey instrument, measurement of 
end-users’ SEIS and security practice behavior is made possible (Rhee et al., 2009).  A 
positive SEIS significantly influences the user’s security practice– both technology and care 
behavior, and their intention to strengthen security effort (Rhee et al., 2009).  Further research 
studies support the relevancy of self-efficacy in understanding the effectiveness of security 
awareness programs (Phelps & Gathegi, 2006).  Taking things a step further, Chen et al., 
(2008) aim their research directly at addressing the differing effects of cultural dimensions in 
those who are learning about issues in cyber security.  Chen et al., (2008) point out that 
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awareness of potential cyber security risks is the first line of defense and the manner in which 
individuals address these risks vary vastly between different cultures.  Deaf people are 
members of a linguistic minority community that have developed their own unique cultural 
traits and perspectives that differ from the larger hearing society (Holcomb, 2012).  Deaf 
adults between ages of 18 and 64 years account for approximately 2% of the entire population 
of the United States, which is an estimated 4,005,393 people in the United States (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2016).  Looking further into each of the cultural components of the deaf 
community reveals unique experiences, attitudes, and perspectives that may influence a deaf 
person’s SEIS and security practice behavior.   
Some cultural characteristics that were discussed in the chapter include how deaf 
people tend to be drawn to sign language users because it is not common that they will see 
other members of the community on a daily basis (Holcomb, 2012).  Additionally, deaf 
people face challenges throughout their lifetime that deprive them of access to information 
and communication that are easily available to hearing people due to the fact that more than 
90% of deaf children are born to hearing parents (Mitchell & Karchmer, 2004).  The average 
reading skill level of an 18-year old deaf person is at the third or fourth-grade level (Allen, 
1994; Mitchell & Karchmer, 2012).  Multiple studies have been performed to assess how deaf 
people utilize texting and other communication technologies in comparison to hearing people 
(Bakken, 2005; Okuyama & Iwai, 2011; D. J. Power et al., 2007; M. R. Power & Power, 
2004).  Being able to use technology to avoid the stigma associated with hearing loss while 
still maintaining contact with both hearing and deaf peers is an attractive method of 
communication (Kožuh et al., 2014). 
The gap of existing knowledge on how a marginalized group’s unique sociocultural 
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characteristics may implicate their end-users’ SEIS and security practice behavior needs to be 
addressed.  As stated by Peltier (2005, p.41), “In the awareness field, one size or presentation 
does not fit all.”  It would be beneficial to explore potential implications of the deaf culture on 
the deaf population’s SEIS and security practice behavior.  Studying the implications will lead 
to the creation of effectively tailored cyber security awareness programs for the deaf 
population.  To this day, there is virtually no research in deaf studies relating to the field of 
cyber security and this study will be one of the first to contribute to an area of literature that 
sorely needs more attention in academia.  The next chapter of this study discusses the research 
methodology used in this study to gather and analyze relevant quantitative and qualitative data 
to answer the overarching mixed methods research question.  The following chapter also 
discusses any assumptions, limitations, and delimitations from each phase of the study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine any influence that sociocultural factors have 
on SEIS and security behavior of deaf end-users.  The study surveyed a broad set of deaf and 
hearing end-users to measure SEIS and security practice behavior until a dataset that was 
sufficient for the second phase of the study was obtained.  The validated survey instrument 
was minimally modified to ensure consistency throughout the dataset and every effort was 
made to obtain an equal amount of deaf and hearing end-users for statistical comparison.  
With the quantitative data from the quantitative study, carefully selected deaf end-users were 
asked to participate in a one-on-one interview to capture the essence of the lived experience of 
a deaf person when practicing security practice behavior and their SEIS.  Subsequently, a 
qualitative data analysis was performed to identify any common themes and characteristics 
during this second phase of the study.  The questions used by the researcher in the qualitative 
portion was semi-structured to allow for the conversation to lead to the essence of the lived 
experiences of the deaf end-user. 
 
Overall Research Method and Design 
 The design selected for this study was explanatory sequential mixed methods.  The 
mixed methods research methodology leveraged the ability to use qualitative research and 
data to help explain the quantitative data to effectively address the research problem 
(Creswell, 2014; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010).  The origins of mixed methods research go 
back to Campbell & Fisk (1959) where multiple methods were used to study human traits, 
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prompting other researchers to begin collecting multiple forms of data (Sieber, 1973).  
Evidence of more individuals utilizing this multimethod approach began to surface in the late 
1980s and early 1990s in a diverse set of fields as individuals began to incorporate data 
collection and analysis of both quantitative and qualitative research (Creswell, 2014).  The 
mixed methods approach was still in its developing stages compared to the well-established 
and traditional quantitative and qualitative approaches at the time of this study.  In the recent 
past, the presence of mixed methods in various research studies has increased tremendously as 
researchers begin to recognize the benefits of playing the strengths of both open-ended and 
closed-ended research data to answer the “what”, “how”, and “why” of a research problem.  
As a result, this study may give more validity and credibility to the sequential explanatory 
mixed methods approach as an effective methodology that plays the strengths of both the 
quantitative and qualitative approaches to successfully explore answers that address the 
research problem. 
 
Mixed Methods Appropriateness 
The study relies on the two-pronged approach of mixed methods to be able to attempt 
to successfully examine how sociocultural factors of the deaf population affect their SEIS and 
security practice behavior.  The first phase of the study consisted of quantitative data 
collection and analysis.  The results of the quantitative phase are used to “inform the types of 
participants to be purposefully selected” for the second phase (Creswell, 2014, p. 224).  The 
second phase consisted of qualitative data collection and analysis.  By performing an 
additional follow-up phase, we allow “a more in-depth understanding of the quantitative 
43 
 
results (often with cultural relevance)”, which will allow us to answer the questions posed by 
the research problem of this study (Creswell, 2014, p. 231). 
It is common for researchers to rely on the quantitative phase to select participants for 
the qualitative phase (Cotten et al., 1999).  One of the clear benefits of utilizing this approach 
at the procedural level is that it allows the researcher to ensure that they are able to select 
participants of interest for subsequent qualitative data-collection and analysis.  Additionally, 
the use of this methodology permits the researcher to develop a thorough and complete 
understanding of potential changes needed for a marginalized group by utilizing qualitative 
research data and findings to further explain quantitative data findings (Creswell, 2014).  With 
these benefits in mind, the explanatory sequential mixed methods design was selected for this 
study. 
 
Mixed Methods Challenges 
 There are challenges to the usage of the mixed methods research design.  For the 
explanatory sequential mixed methods design, unique challenges that arise for the inquirer 
that are not usually prevalent in other types (Cotten et al., 1999).  For example, the mixed 
methods approach requires for extensive data collection and requires ensuring that the sample 
sizes are large enough to attain data saturation for both phases of the study.  The researcher 
made use of existing literature of similar research design in an attempt to ensure that enough 
data was collected.  Every attempt was made to ensure that the quantitative data collection has 
sufficient participants before moving onto the second phase.  Another concern derives from 
the time-intensive nature of having to analyze both quantitative and qualitative data and 
needing to have sufficient knowledge in both realms of research.  The researcher has 
44 
 
continually consulted the dissertation committee and other identified experts in the field to 
ensure success.  Finally, Creswell (2014) discusses that the complexity of the design of a 
mixed methods research will require concise visual models to be created to appropriately 
demonstrate the flow throughout the study.  Several visual diagrams were generated and 
incorporated as figures in the paper to assist the reader in fully understanding the procedures 
that were followed. 
 
Phase 1: Quantitative Research Method 
 As defined by Creswell (2014), a survey design provides quantitative trends, attitudes, 
or opinions of a population by studying a sample of a population.  In the first phase of the 
study, a broad quantitative survey is released with the intent of measuring SEIS and security 
practice behavior to identify any variances between deaf and hearing end-users.  Based on the 
deductive nature of the quantitative research hypotheses, a cross-sectional quantitative 
instrument utilizing the online survey method made the most sense to be able to reach out to 
both the deaf and hearing populations.  By performing online survey research, we are able to 
access unique populations that are otherwise difficult to reach through other channels at an 
extremely low cost (Wright, 2005).  Other benefits that are associated to performing an online 
survey over other quantitative data collection methods include a rapid turnaround time and 
being able to identify variances in a large population through a survey of a small subset of the 
population (Wright, 2005). 
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Participants and Sampling 
 The target population for the survey consisted of both deaf and hearing adults who 
reside in the United States.  As previously discussed in the literature review, there are an 
estimated 11,424,813 people in the United States who experience hearing difficulty and 
4,005,393 of those are adults between the ages of 18 and 64 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016).  
Additionally, there are no supported claims that accurately estimate how many ASL users 
there are in the United States (Mitchell, Young, Bachleda, & Karchmer, 2006).  However, 
reputable sources in the field of Deaf research have been identified to state their estimates to 
be, “Fewer than two million (and likely fewer than one-half million) people in the United 
States use ASL” (Mitchell et al., 2006, p.314). 
Taking this estimate based off of reputable sources in the field with the ACS 2016 
Census Bureau data into consideration, gaining access to such a small percentage of the 
United States population where deaf people are dispersed all across the country would be 
difficult.  Due to the marginalized and hard-to-reach nature of the deaf population, it was 
determined that a non-probability convenience sampling technique would be most effective to 
gather useful data.  The requirement of having formal lists of the deaf population for 
probability sampling was deemed to be too difficult to achieve (Nardi, 2006).  Additionally, 
non-probability sampling is known to be a quick and inexpensive way of testing a theory of a 
problem that has very limited to almost no research available (Nardi, 2006). 
The selection of an appropriate formula to obtain an ideal sample size for use in 
survey research is discussed by Bartlett, Kotrlik, & Higgins (2001).  Cochran's (1977) formula 
is considered to be an appropriate tool to determine the ideal sample size of a large 
population.  As a result, Cochran's (1977) formula was used to determine the minimum 
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number of respondents needed to ensure that the data collected from the survey would have 
statistical significance.  Each variable in Cochran’s formula was obtained through the use of 
existing literature supporting the use of an appropriate value.  The alpha level was chosen to 
be 0.10 as that value was determined by Bartlett et al. (2001) to be appropriate for identifying 
marginal relationships and differences.  The t-value used in Cochran’s formula for an alpha 
level of 0.10 for populations above 120 people is 1.65 (Bartlett et al., 2001).  The estimate of 
standard deviation in a population was determined to be 1.167 by dividing the inclusive range 
of scale with 6, which is the number of standard deviations to include almost all values in the 
range (Bartlett et al., 2001).  According to Krejcie & Morgan (1970), a 3% margin of error is 
acceptable for continuous data, which would allow the researcher to be confident that the true 
mean of a seven-point Likert scale is within + / - 0.21 of the mean from the data collected 
from the survey.  Calculating the sample size using Cochran’s formula with each of these 
determined values as variables resulted in a sample size of 83, which aligned with the values 
shown in Table 1 of Bartlett et al.'s article (2001, p. 48) outlining the appropriate sample size 
depending on each of the variable’s values.  Taking this recommended sample size of 83 into 
consideration with the fact that statistical outliers in comparison to the hearing population will 
be asked to participate in a follow-up interview, a target number of 100 participants is 
selected to ensure sufficient participants will be available for the second phase of the study. 
 In order to create a reliable set of data for statistical comparison of SEIS and security 
practice behavior, an equal amount of participants from the hearing population was also 
sampled in the same manner. 
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Quantitative Survey Design 
The design of this survey was replicated from Rhee, Kim, & Ryu's (2009) study where 
a survey measurement model was developed to measure SEIS and security behavior practices 
in end-users.  By utilizing an existing instrument, the validity of the measurement model has 
already been established in a prior study.  For this instance, Rhee et al. (2009) established 
validity in their SEIS model by piloting the survey, asking experts for feedback on survey 
items, and calculating the composite reliability to ensure that each construct had adequate 
values to be considered acceptable for drawing meaningful and useful inferences from the 
results of the survey. 
The original instrument consisted of seven sections with 41 items including 20 Likert-
scale items, 19 multiple choice items, and two fill-in-the-blank items to measure SEIS and 
security practice behavior through seven constructs: self-efficacy in information security, 
security practice behavior, their intent to improve this behavior, general controllability, 
security breach incidents, computer/Internet experience, and security practice – technology 
use (Rhee et al., 2009). 
For the purposes of this study, the original instrument remained intact with exception 
to an added sentence for clarification on one item that contained the term “phishing” to aid the 
reader in their understanding of the terminology.  Additionally, a section containing 12 
demographic questions was introduced to allow the researcher to better understand the 
background of the participant taking the survey.  The demographic questions included items 
about gender, age, city and state of residence, ethnicity, race, hearing status, use of hearing 
assistive devices, the preferred method of communication with other deaf people, level of 
education, employment status, and field of employment.  The purpose of adding these detailed 
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demographic questions was to ensure that a full picture of each participant was obtained to 
allow for careful selection of participants for the second phase of the study.  Another benefit 
of collecting such data was that future researchers would be able to find comparable sets of 
data or reuse the data from this study for future work.  Given that ASL is the first language of 
some of these participants, ASL-based interpretation video clips of each survey item are 
incorporated in the survey to ensure full inclusion, comprehension, and increased the accuracy 
of responses from deaf participants as the likelihood of confusion was reduced. 
 
Quantitative Data Collection 
 Permission to conduct this quantitative survey was obtained from the Dakota State 
University (DSU) Institutional Review Board (IRB) before performing data collection.  
DSU’s IRB approval letter for the quantitative phase of the study is included in Appendix B.  
The survey was administered online using Google Forms to rapidly and securely collect data 
from deaf and hearing adults across the United States.  The survey link was distributed 
through a variety of ways including personal contacts, word of mouth, social media, and 
handing out mini recruitment handouts when attending social events.  The snowball effect 
quickly came into play in spreading the survey to potential participants.  All participants who 
were invited through any means received an email as shown in Appendix C.  A copy of the 
mini recruitment handouts is shown in Appendix D.  All participants were required to 
complete the provided informed consent electronically before being able to proceed to the 
survey.  The informed consent that was agreed upon for this phase of the study is included in 
Appendix E.  The survey that was administered and was filled out by deaf and hearing 
participants in this study is also included in Appendix E. 
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Social media posts were made on Facebook and LinkedIn to distribute the survey 
amongst the deaf and hearing population within the researcher’s network, which consisted of 
approximately 250 deaf and 250 hearing people.  Additional posts were made after two weeks 
to improve the visibility and increase the response rate. 
The researcher attended a variety of outings and social events to pass out the mini 
recruitment handouts and spread the word about the survey to deaf and hearing people.  The 
largest event that was attended is the NTID’s 50th Anniversary Reunion in Rochester, New 
York where over 3,000 deaf people attended from all over the country.  Additional events that 
were attended include the monthly Howard County Association of the Deaf recreational 
events held in Howard County, MD, and monthly Deaf Night Life social events in 
Washington, D.C. 
 
Quantitative Data Analysis 
The steps outlined by Creswell (2014) in how to perform a successful data analysis 
and interpretation of quantitative data assisted the researcher in the analysis portion of the first 
phase.  By following Creswell's (2014) steps, appropriate analysis of the data collected by the 
measurement survey model discussed above was ensured.  Descriptive analysis of all 
independent and dependent variables is used to indicate the means, standard deviations, and 
range of scores for SEIS and security behavior practices of deaf and hearing end-users.  
Factor analysis is used to combine survey items into scales to measure these values.  
Reliability checks are also performed to ensure the internal consistency of the scales using the 
Cronbach alpha statistic.  Statistics that are used to test the research hypothesis are identified 
to allow the researcher to compare groups in terms of variables to be able to draw inferences 
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between the two collected samples (Creswell, 2014).  Lastly, the data results are presented 
using concise tables and figures with an interpretation of the results.  The interpretation of 
data includes information on how the results answered the hypotheses with statistical 
significance testing and confidence intervals. 
 
Methodological Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
As discussed by Bryant (2004), no study will answer its research questions with 
complete certainty because of assumptions that take place throughout a study.  It is assumed 
that the quantitative survey will be fully understood by the subjects and provide an accurate 
reflection of an end-user’s SEIS and security practice behavior.  For accuracy, the survey was 
delivered in the forms of English text and ASL videos to ensure full comprehension, 
consistency, and reduce the likelihood of any misunderstandings by the participants.  Existing 
literature was reviewed and information security experts were consulted to maintain 
consistency and validity of the questions in the survey. 
The primary limitation of this quantitative phase of the study assesses the dependent 
variable, the survey participant, through self-report.  A participant may attempt to portray 
themselves in a more positive or negative manner by selecting particular answers even if it is 
not true.  This limitation of the study was addressed through internal statistical analysis and 
validation to ensure the confidence of the data that was collected.  Another limitation is that 
the population sample set was primarily collected through the researcher’s network.  The 
researcher’s network was created around the researcher’s upbringing in a deaf family and his 
experiences at schools that educated numerous deaf individuals.  This may result in a skewed 
data set toward a certain demographic of deaf individuals.  In order to address this concern, 
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the researcher made every effort to take advantage of the snowball effect in spreading the 
word about the survey in the community and attended to a wide variety of social events.  
Additionally, survey items were used to collect demographic data from each participant to be 
able to show that a diverse set of participants took part in this study. 
The primary delimitation of this quantitative phase of the study is that non-probability 
sampling was used to obtain data.  As a result, attempts to make generalizations or statistical 
inferences from the sample to the deaf or hearing populations in the United States as a whole 
cannot be made.  Instead, the goal of this quantitative phase is to be able to identify members 
of the deaf population that show variances from the hearing population in SEIS and security 
practice behavior for the second phase of the study.  This delimitation was minimized by 
ensuring that the sample population was a diverse representation of the deaf and hearing 
population as a whole through the use of demographic survey questions.  The results of these 
demographic survey questions were incorporated in the findings of this study.  The steps 
taken to address these delimitations allow other researchers to be able to utilize the obtained 
data set for future research. 
 
Phase 2: Qualitative Research Method 
 The qualitative research question was designed to assist the researcher in explaining 
the results collected in the initial quantitative phase of the study.  The research question for 
the second phase was, “What is the essence of the deaf end-user’s lived experiences when 
engaging in security practices and their confidence levels in doing so?”.  The exploration of 
lived experiences of participants was necessary to be able to successfully answer the research 
question.  Phenomenology, as Moustakas (1994, p. 25) describes, is “knowledge as it appears 
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to consciousness, the science of describing what one perceives, senses, and knows in one’s 
immediate awareness and experience”.  In this phase of the study, utilizing a 
phenomenological approach with an open-ended and semi-structured interview design, the 
researcher was able to record rich textual descriptions of deaf participant’s experiences to 
elicit particular views, opinions, and experiences that may lead to common themes across deaf 
participants as a whole.  
 
Key Concepts of Phenomenology 
The roots of present-day phenomenological research can be traced back to the early 
20th century to Edmund Husserl’s work with the realms of philosophy and science.  During 
Husserl’s time, he was the first to develop, “a philosophic system rooted in subjective 
openness” and was criticized by many for his pioneering ideas (Moustakas, 1994, p. 25).  
Husserl’s concern with ways humans discovered meanings and essences in knowledge led to 
the emphasis of a sharp contrast between facts and essences (Moustakas, 1994).  The essence 
or nature of an object is often an abstract quality what determines its character and outcome.  
The challenge that researchers face is to “describe things in themselves” before the experience 
being captured enters one’s consciousness and is understood through a blending of what is 
present with what is imagined as the present from the viewpoint of potential meanings 
(Moustakas, 1994). 
The heart of phenomenology concentrates on describing and analyzing consciousness 
with the concept of intentionality, which is a contrast to hard facts and accounts from 
differing origins.  The concept of intentionality plays a large role in Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology.  Intentionality is defined to be, “consciousness, to the internal experience of 
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being conscious of something; thus the act of consciousness and the object of consciousness 
are intentionally related” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 27).  In this instance, consciousness being 
directed to an object being studied is considered to be “intentional”.  To understand 
intentionality is to, “recognize that self and world are inseparable components of meaning” 
(Moustakas, 1994, p. 27).  Phenomenology strives to capture lived experiences in thick, rich 
textual descriptions where the inquirer is able to unlock aspects of the human experience that 
was not initially understood. 
By collecting the essence of a number of participants who have experienced a specific 
phenomenon, a rich, textual and descriptive data set is available for further analysis.  
Performing organization and thematic analysis on the collected data set through coding allows 
the researcher to create an overall picture of the essence of the lived experiences of the 
participants (Max van Manen, 2007; Moustakas, 1994).  The use of a qualitative interview 
design is prevalent in many fields that involve in-depth analysis of one or more individuals 
bounded by either time and activity (Stake, 1995). Based on the qualitative research question, 
a semi-structured interview approach will allow the participants to share historical 
experiences and information while allowing the researcher to control the line of questioning in 
an interview setting (Mertens, 2009). 
One of Husserl’s contributions to phenomenology was the Epoche.  The term 
“Epoche” means, “to refrain from judgment, to abstain from or stay away from the everyday, 
ordinary way of perceiving things” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 32).  Naturally, humans hold 
judgments toward knowledge and presuppose things that are perceived in nature than what is 
actually there.  Husserl’s Epoche is what allows the inquirer to ensure that their perception is 
transcendental, or “moved beyond the everyday to the pure ego in which everything is 
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perceived freshly, as if for the first time” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 32).  Through “bracketing”, 
the inquirer sets aside their personal experiences to be able to experience the phenomenon as 
it is experienced by the participants in the study.  The researcher used some bracketing 
methods as outlined by Tufford & Newman's (2012) conceptual bracketing framework.  The 
researcher developed a reflexive journal at the start of the research process and maintained the 
journal throughout.  Starting from the project conceptualization stages, the researcher 
captured memories and preconceptions to identify potential biases that may influence the 
process (Tufford & Newman, 2012).  Bracketing was also utilized in the interviewing process 
to record potential biases and help maintain a focus on the research questions while capturing 
the experiences of others.  This was achieved by writing observational comments and notes, 
which contained the researcher’s feelings and thoughts allowing for deeper engagement with 
the data upon review (Tufford & Newman, 2012).  By taking notice of prior and present 
experiences relating to the phenomena, the researcher is able to re-experience the phenomena 
to form new meanings that were not initially evident.  The researcher is then able to revisit 
their prior experiences with the reflexivity characteristic to examine their personal 
background, culture, and experience to shape their interpretations (Creswell, 2014). 
 
Qualitative Participants and Sampling 
In this second phase of the mixed methods study, purposively selected deaf 
participants that have demonstrated variant SEIS and security practice behavior in comparison 
to the hearing population were asked to participate in an interview.  The sample size of a 
qualitative research study relies heavily on the quantitative design being used (Creswell, 
2014).  Creswell (2014, p. 189) states, “I have found … phenomenology to typically range 
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from three to ten”.  Morse (1995) aligns with Creswell’s (2014) assessment on 
phenomenology by suggesting that there need to be at least six participants for a successful 
phenomenology study.   
Morse (1995) also discusses the significance of recognizing the occurrence of data 
saturation in a phenomenological study.  Data saturation is defined to be “when gathering 
fresh data no longer sparks new theoretical insights, nor reveals new properties of your core 
theoretical categories” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 113).   
Finally, Malterud, Siersma, & Guassora (2016) propose a relatively new concept 
called information power because of inconsistent applications of saturation to a variety of 
qualitative research methodologies.  Information power is a relative measurement of how 
much relevant information the participant holds (Malterud et al., 2016).  Information power 
accounts for five different dimensions that should be considered when determining the sample 
size of a qualitative research study – aim, specificity, theory, dialogue, and analysis (Malterud 
et al., 2016).  Figure 3 shows how the information power directly affects the N that is needed 
for a successful research study (Malterud et al., 2016). 
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Figure 3 - Components of Information Power (Malterud et al., 2016) 
 
Each of these five dimensions of information power that play a role in determining the 
sample size of a qualitative research study based is described with further detail below: 
1. The aim of the study plays a role in determining the sample size where a broad study 
aim will require a larger sample than a narrow aim to effectively study a phenomenon 
(Malterud et al., 2016). 
 
2. Sample specificity plays a role in information power to a point where participants who 
hold characteristics that are highly specific for the study aim will be able to provide 
the necessary information (Malterud et al., 2016). 
 
3. The use of theory in the qualitative inquiry will determine whether the researcher 
needs to increase or decrease the N (Malterud et al., 2016).  For example, a study that 
utilizes social sciences theoretical background will not require as large of a sample in 
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comparison to a study that may be trying to start from scratch with no theoretical 
background (Malterud et al., 2016). 
 
4. The quality of interview dialogue is another dimension of information power that 
needs to be accounted for in the determination of a sample size (Malterud et al., 2016).  
The strength and clarity of communication between the researcher and participant 
determine whether sufficient information power has been attained (Malterud et al., 
2016). 
 
5. The analysis strategy will influence the information power required in a research 
study.  An exploratory cross-case analysis will require far more participants compared 
to a study that seeks in-depth experiences from a select group of participants 
(Malterud et al., 2016).   
 
The researcher made every effort to take each of these dimensions into consideration 
when determining the necessary sample size for the qualitative portion of the study: 
1. Sufficient information power is achieved with a small sample size because the 
objective is to interview deaf participants from the first phase who have demonstrated 
variant SEIS and security practice behavior in comparison to hearing people. 
 
2. Specific participants of the qualitative interviews are purposefully selected from the 
results of the quantitative survey, which suggests that the participants will contain the 
ideal characteristics and experiences that pertain to the focus of the study. 
58 
 
 
3. The necessary N will be lower because of the use of social cognitive theory, 
sociocultural theory, and use of disability inquiry lens providing a solid foundation 
for the synthesis of new knowledge. 
 
4. The researcher will be able to establish a personal and trusting relationship with the 
participant to facilitate a strong quality of dialogue because of the researcher’s 
background and experience with the deaf community, therefore, provide thicker 
descriptive data for analysis. 
 
5. A purposive sample of six to ten participants with diverse backgrounds that have 
demonstrated variance in SEIS and security practice behavior is believed to be 
sufficient for identifying common themes across multiple participants through a 
phenomenological approach. 
 
The target population for the qualitative interviews consisted of deaf adults who have 
taken the quantitative survey first phase of the study.  The sample size of the quantitative 
survey was approximately 100 deaf adults.  Taking account of evidence from Creswell 
(2014), Morse (2000), and Malterud et al. (2016), a sample size of eight deaf participants was 
determined to be appropriate for the second phase of this mixed methods study. 
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Qualitative Interview Design & Data Collection 
 Permission to conduct this qualitative research study was received from the DSU IRB 
before performing data collection as shown in Appendix F.  Purposefully selected deaf 
participants from the initial phase based on their results were asked to voluntarily partake in 
the second phase of the study.  The selection of these participants was largely focused on 
survey respondents that demonstrated variance in SEIS and security practice behavior 
compared to the hearing population.  By doing so, the researcher increased the sample 
specificity and will likely have candidates who contain the appropriate characteristics that are 
being sought out in this research study.   
Upon receiving IRB approval, interview invitations were sent out to twenty 
participants using the email template in Appendix G.  The one-on-one interviews were 
administered via video-telecommunication technology such as video phones, FaceTime, and 
Skype depending on participant availability and preferences.  All participants who were 
invited were required to complete the provided informed consent form as shown in Appendix 
H before proceeding to the interview.  The interviews were recorded using the QuickTime 
Player with its Screen Recording feature that captures the contents of the screen on a laptop 
computer that was used to conduct the interviews into digital video.  Creating recordings 
enabled the researcher to review the interview for further transcription and data analysis.  The 
digital video was reviewed by the researcher to create textual transcriptions of the ASL-based 
digital videos.   
As advised by Moustakas (1994), the long interview method was used to collect data 
on the topic and question through open-ended comments and questions.  Upon meeting with 
the participant, the researcher attempted to start a social conversation to create a relaxed and 
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trusting atmosphere to encourage the participant to open up about their experiences (Max van 
Manen, 2007; Moustakas, 1994).  A semi-structured interview protocol was used with probing 
questions to capture the essence of the participant’s experience as shown in Appendix I.  The 
exact line of questioning that was used with each individual in an open-ended interview 
varied depending on the flow of conversation.  Follow-up questions were asked in various 
instances to encourage the participant to fully elaborate on their experiences to allow the 
researcher to capture rich descriptions.  An open question was asked at the end of the 
interview to collect any remaining experiences and data that may have not been covered by 
prior questions in the interview.  
 Throughout the interview, notes were written down to capture some key thoughts and 
points that came to mind along with observational comments and notes for bracketing 
purposes to minimize bias.  These notes were used to help enable cross-referencing with the 
transcripts that were created from the recordings of the interviews.  The researcher then 
transcribed the recordings from ASL to English text.  By doing so, the researcher was able to 
gain an intimate understanding of the experiences of the participant while creating a text-
based copy of the interview data.  A copy of the transcribed interview was sent to each 
participant to allow for additional review to ensure accuracy and omission of any potentially 
identifying information.  However, it was prohibited for changes to be made to the transcripts 
except for any errors that may have taken place in the transcription process.  Subsequently, a 
pseudonym was created for each participant to protect their identity in the event where their 
data was used in this report.  Additional steps were also taken to generalize any potentially 
identifying information obtained in the interviews such as locations, specific names, and so 
forth. 
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A total of ten participants were interviewed to capture the lived experiences of deaf 
people when practicing security practice behavior and their confidence in doing so.  One 
interview took place over a video phone while the remaining nine took place over FaceTime.  
All of these interviews took place between December 17, 2018, and January 4, 2019.  Each of 
the interviews was completed in a private setting void of distractions and allowed the 
participants to share their true experiences without fear of their privacy being compromised.  
The participant was notified that the interview may take up to an hour.  All in all, ten deaf 
participants from the initial phase of the study were interviewed in the second phase of the 
study and the average interview length was 45 minutes long. 
 
Qualitative Data Analysis 
As recommended by Creswell (2014), an interactive and iterative analytic approach 
with multiple interrelated stages should be followed in an order that makes the most sense to 
researchers.  Organization of the collected data is the first step that the researcher took to 
prepare the data to be analyzed.  This consisted of transcribing the interview videos from 
either ASL to written English or spoken English to written English depending on the form of 
communication that was used with an individual.  Upon transcription, the data were analyzed 
to get a sense of the overall content of the interviews and notes will be written to document 
general ideas and themes that come to the researcher’s mind. 
 Rossman & Rallis (2012) define coding as the process of organizing data through 
writing brackets to create chunks of text and writing words in the margins to categorize them.  
These categories that are created will allow the researcher to identify codes that contained 
topics that were anticipated based on literature, codes containing topics that were not 
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anticipated, and even codes containing unusual topics.  A small number ranging from five to 
seven themes and categories should be generated from the coding process (Creswell, 2014).  
According to Mertens (2009), codes in social sciences should not be predetermined and shall 
emerge during the data analysis process.  As a result, codes were not developed prior to 
performing the qualitative data analysis phase.  The coding process allowed the researcher to 
generate descriptions and themes that can be used for further analysis.   
 Atlas.ti was used as the primary tool for coding and sorting the qualitative data into 
codes and themes.  Each transcript that was created from each recorded session was imported 
into Atlas.ti as a document.  Notes that were written throughout the interviews were also 
incorporated into these documents as memos to remind the researcher of any key thoughts and 
bracketing notes that may have come to mind at that point in time during the interview.  
While reviewing the data, Atlas.ti allowed the researcher to mark specific portions of text and 
associate a code name for the initial development of codes.  This process is called open 
coding (Creswell, 2014).  After reviewing all of the data, these memos that were generated 
were used as a foundation for theme analysis.  Similar codes were then clustered and 
organized into code groups that became the overarching common themes across multiple sets 
of transcribed data.  By merging all of the codes into a single master list, the researcher is able 
to generate meanings through cross-case analysis (Ruona, 2005).  This master list of codes 
was easily sorted by code to identify interrelated themes across multiple interviews.  Utilizing 
Atlas.ti required the researcher to transcribe all of the digital videos into text, which required 
additional time and resources, but allowed the researcher to have a rigorous understanding of 
the data by having to analyze every piece of data obtained from the interviews.  Using the 
following steps below for data analysis and coding consists of multiple data checks that 
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ensure redundancy conforms to Creswell's (2014) recommendation for an interactive and 
iterative approach. 
 During the analytical process of uncovering themes from within the data, the 
researcher followed a modified phenomenological analysis methodology.  As outlined by 
Creswell (2014), Moustakas (1994) and Ruona (2005), the steps listed below were followed 
for each interview: 
1. Transcription of the interview into text format from digital video format. 
 
2. Familiarization and organization of interview transcripts into Atlas.ti documents with 
individualized codes for each important concept as described by Ruona (2005). 
 
3. Performing redundant data checking and re-reading transcript (Creswell, 2014; Ruona, 
2005). 
 
4. Listing and preliminary grouping of relevant statements into codes (Moustakas, 1994). 
 
5. Reduction and elimination of irrelevant and repetitive statements (Moustakas, 1994). 
 
6. Clustering and thematizing meaning units into code groups and themes (Moustakas, 
1994). 
 
7. Synthesize themes and codes into a constructed table (Moustakas, 1994). 
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8. Reorganize table of codes and themes in order of prevalence.  
 
These identified themes in the final table of codes are used as headings in the findings 
section of the study and contain a variety of insights from individuals through the use of 
quotations. Discussion and visual representations of interrelated themes about various 
participants are presented in the findings section.  Finally, the researcher interpreted the 
qualitative findings using disability inquiry lens to form interpretations that call for reform 
and change.  Additional comparisons to existing literature and the theories were made in an 
effort to present meaningful results that answer both the qualitative research question and the 
overarching central mixed methods research question. 
 
Methodological Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
During the qualitative phase of the study, assumptions are made that the participants 
who were chosen will contain the information that is sought out to answer the research 
questions.  Every effort is made to ensure the selection of best candidates based on the results 
of the quantitative phase of the study. 
A primary limitation of this qualitative phase of the study, similar to the quantitative 
phase, it is assumed that the participant will be able to provide an accurate and honest 
recollection of their life experiences (Bryant, 2004).  Additional limitations include the fact 
that information is collected in a designated place where the interviewee can filter information 
rather than obtaining data through observations in the participant’s natural setting (Creswell, 
2014).  In order to address these limitations, the researcher will utilize their life experiences 
from being raised in a deaf family to be able to relate to the subject, perform the interview 
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using the participant’s preferred style of communication, and earn the subject’s trust to 
maximize responsiveness to the interview questions. 
The primary delimitations of this qualitative phase of the study are that participants 
must have taken the quantitative survey and be deaf.  The researcher has decided to exclude 
hearing people from the qualitative survey because the scope of the study has been defined to 
focus solely on studying factors prevalent in the deaf population that may influence their SEIS 
and security practice behavior.  In order to minimize the impact of this delimitation, an 
attempt to ensure the sample population for the quantitative survey was a diverse 
representation of the deaf population.  In order to do so, demographic information was 
collected from participants to ensure a diverse set of data was collected.   
 
Validity & Reliability of Results 
A variety of reliability checks were performed throughout the second phase of the 
study to ensure the validity of the data that was collected.  For instance, Creswell & Miller 
(2000) discuss the importance of performing member checks as a technique to explore the 
credibility of results by sending data or results back to the participants to check for accuracy 
and further feedback on the significance of their experiences.  In this study, two member-
checks were performed.  The first member-check occurred once the transcripts were created 
from the recorded interviews.  These transcriptions were sent to the participants for review to 
ensure the accuracy of information.  The majority of responses received from participants 
consisted of clarification about specific dates and other concerns regarding personal 
identifiers. 
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As suggested by Creswell & Miller (2000), the second member-check that took place 
was in the last step of the qualitative research phase where interview participants were 
provided a preliminary draft of Chapter 4 for review, which is primarily about the findings 
from the collected data.  By allowing participants to review Chapter 4, the researcher was able 
to ensure that all potential identifiers were eliminated.  Additionally, participants were given a 
final opportunity to be able to share their thoughts about the themes that were derived from 
the interviews and to offer final input on any potential inaccuracies. 
Another useful form of validation utilized in this research project was cross-checking.  
Cross-checking allows for the verification of the data through validation with other similarly 
collected data or an external reviewer to see if similar observations are achieved when 
reviewing the same data set (Creswell & Miller, 2000).  Cross-checking was accomplished in 
this study in two ways.  Cross-analysis between multiple interviews were performed to 
identify common themes.  After these themes were identified, members of the dissertation 
committee review the themes that were created from following the modified 
phenomenological analysis methodology outlined above.  The feedback that was received 
from the committee members were incorporated to modify the finalized version of the themes 
that are presented in this paper. 
Finally, as discussed in previous sections of this paper, bracketing was utilized by the 
researcher to minimize the introduction of bias through the use of a reflexive journal and 
taking notes throughout the research process.  Each of these reliability checks increases the 
rigor and reliability of the results that were obtained in this study. 
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Mixed Methods Data Interpretation 
After completing data collection, analysis, and interpretation in both quantitative and 
qualitative phases of the study, the researcher followed up with a third form of interpretation 
as recommended by Creswell (2014).  This third interpretation will consist of discussing how 
the qualitative findings helped the researcher explain the quantitative results to gain a 
thorough understanding of what may have influenced deaf end-users to have varying SEIS 
and security practice behaviors when compared to hearing end-users. 
 
Research Validity 
The quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods approaches in this study will require 
the researcher to perform some validity checks to ensure the integrity of the study.  For 
example, the validity of the quantitative data is verified by comparing scores from past use of 
the instrument to see if there are any test-retest correlations.  An above section was dedicated 
to qualitative data validity and reliability.  The qualitative data was checked for validity 
through the use of triangulation and member checking to convince the readers of the 
researcher’s ability to assess the accuracy of the findings.  Finally, the researcher will have to 
address additional concern derived from utilizing the mixed methods approach.  The 
possibility of the researcher failing to consider all possible options for following up on the 
quantitative results may lead to compromised overall findings.  The researcher will consult 
the dissertation committee and experts in the field to reduce the possibility of missing 
additional areas of follow up on the quantitative results.  Another challenge of adhering to the 
mixed methods research approach is ensuring that enough time is allotted to each phase of the 
research as there is more data to collect and analyze. 
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Chapter Summary 
 This chapter focused on discussing the research methodology that is performed in the 
study.  An explanatory sequential mixed methods methodology with quantitative and 
qualitative phases was utilized as shown in Figure 4 below. 
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Figure 4 - Sequential Explanatory Mixed Methods Procedures 
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In the quantitative phase, a broad quantitative survey is used as the primary vehicle of 
data collection due to the ability to access unique populations at an extremely low cost with a 
low turnaround time (Creswell, 2014; Wright, 2005).  The participants of this survey were 
deaf and hearing people who lived in the United States.  Convenience sampling through social 
media, word of mouth, and attendance to deaf events were employed to recruit survey 
participants.  Cochran’s formula and other existing literature were used to determine that 100 
deaf and 100 hearing participants are the appropriate sample size for this research study 
(Cochran, 1977; Creswell, 2014). 
 The survey was powered by Google Forms and contained five sections with the first 
section focusing on demographics and the remainder of the survey focusing on collecting data 
relating to these seven variables: self-perceived skills in information security, security 
practice behavior, their intent to improve this behavior, general controllability, security breach 
incidents, computer/Internet experience, and security practice – technology use.  Statistical 
analysis of the descriptive and inferential types was utilized to test the null hypotheses that 
deaf people would show no variance in SEIS and security practice behavior compared to 
hearing people. 
 In the qualitative phase, one-on-one semi-structured interviews were performed with 
purposefully selected candidates who participated in the quantitative survey and demonstrated 
variances in SEIS and security practice behavior in comparison to hearing participants.  The 
interview used a semi-structured approach that allowed the researcher to guide the 
conversation to capture the essence of the lived experiences of participants to address the 
qualitative research question and potentially the overarching research question defined in this 
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study.  Transcription, coding, and thematic analyses are performed after qualitative data 
collection to identify common themes across multiple deaf participants. 
 Finally, a final interpretation was performed to examine how the qualitative findings 
assisted the researcher in explaining the results of the quantitative findings.  The objective is 
to demonstrate a greater understanding of the factors that may have influenced deaf end-users 
to have varying SEIS and security practice behavior when compared to hearing end-users. 
 All assumptions, limitations, and delimitations relating to each phase of the study are 
discussed in various sections of this chapter.  The next chapter contains the findings derived 
from the analysis of the data that was collected in each of the two phases in the study.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
FINDINGS 
  
 
Members of the deaf population encounter a variety of cultural factors as a linguistic 
minority group that may influence their SEIS and overall security practice behavior when 
responding to potential threats.  Reviewing existing literature has identified a gap in 
knowledge on how a marginalized group’s unique cultural background may affect their 
security practice behavior.  Virtually no research exists in the field of deaf studies that address 
the possibility of additional challenges in the world of cyber security for deaf people.  Chapter 
4 presents the findings and results of both phases of the mixed methods study.  Lastly, the 
results obtained in the second phase are used to explain the results obtained in the first phase 
to answer the overarching mixed methods research question. 
 
Phase 1 Results 
The methodology that was developed utilized a quantitative survey approach to collect 
data from a broad set of deaf and hearing people to identify the presence of a statistical 
difference between the two populations in SEIS and security practice behavior.  The 
following hypotheses were developed for the first phase of this mixed methods research 
study:  
H10. There is no statistically significant difference between deaf and hearing end-
users’ SEIS. 
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H20. There is no statistically significant difference between deaf and hearing end-users 
on security practice behavior. 
 
H30. A positive SEIS does not predict the facilitation of improved security practice 
behavior for deaf and hearing end-users. 
 
 The researcher analyzed the data that was collected from participants in the survey that 
was distributed using statistical software.  After performing data analysis, the data was 
utilized to answer the research questions that were developed for this phase and provide a 
basis for the second phase of the study to attempt to answer the overarching mixed methods 
research question. 
 
Demographic Results 
Overall, a total of 228 individuals participated in the survey.  Figure 5 displays a 
descriptive map of the United States with circles of varying sizes representing the locations of 
where participants were from and how many there were.  The color of the circles in the map 
represents the hearing status of a participant.  In this case, blue circles represent deaf and 
hard-of-hearing participants and orange circles represent hearing participants.  The 
distribution appears to show that there was a stronger presence of participants in the Midwest 
and East coast than the West coast of the United States.  There are larger clusters of blue 
circles in the Chicagoland area, Upstate New York area, and DC Metro area.  This makes 
sense as these areas are known to be hotspots for the deaf community to gather and live their 
lives in close proximity to one another.  The United States Government is known for hiring 
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people with disabilities and most government jobs are in the DC Metro area.  The Upstate 
New York area is where Rochester Institute of Technology has up to 1,200 deaf students 
enrolled in various collegiate degree programs.  Overall, a diverse set of participants residing 
across the United States was successfully obtained. 
 
Figure 5 – Overall Participant Hearing Status / Location Map (N = 228) 
 
Table 1 contains a summary of the demographic characteristics of all the participants.  
A variety of demographic data was collected from each participant to be able to understand 
the backgrounds that each participant came from.  Overall, there was an approximately equal 
amount of male (49.6%) and female (50.4%) respondents in the survey.  There was also an 
approximately equal amount of deaf (52.2%) and hearing (47.8%) respondents.  The most 
common levels of education reported by participants was a Bachelor’s (55.27%) and Master’s 
(19.73%), while the remaining participants reported having completed some college credit 
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(10.09%), Associate (8.34%), High School Graduate (3.95%), Doctoral (1.31%), Professional 
(0.87%), and less than a high school diploma (0.44%).  The employment status of participants 
ranged from full time (53.94%), part-time (7.45%), self-employed (5.26%), out of work and 
currently looking for work (3.51%), out of work and not currently looking for work (1.32%), 
student (21.93%), homemaker (2.2%), and retired (4.39%).  Participants also reported their 
field of study and employment, this was used to determine if their specialty was technology 
related (21.1%) and non-technology related (78.9%).  To understand the diversity of 
participants, the ethnicities of participants were collected and showed that a small percentage 
of participants were Hispanic or Latino (3.5%) whereas the remaining participants were not 
Hispanic or Latino (96.5%).  The average age of a participant was 34.1 years old (SD = 
14.57). 
 
Table 1 - Demographic Characteristics of Overall Population Sample (N = 228) 
 n % of Total 
Gender   
      Male 113 49.6% 
      Female 115 50.4% 
Hearing Status   
      Deaf or Hard-of-Hearing 119 52.2% 
      Hearing 109 47.8% 
Level of Education   
      Doctoral 3 1.31% 
      Professional 2 0.87% 
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 n % of Total 
      Master’s 45 19.73% 
      Bachelor’s 126 55.27% 
      Associate 19 8.34% 
      Some College Credit 23 10.09% 
      High School Graduate or the equivalent (For example: GED) 9 3.95% 
      Less than a high school diploma 1 0.44% 
Ethnicity   
      Not Hispanic or Latino 220 96.5% 
      Hispanic or Latino 8 3.5% 
Employment Status   
      Employed for wages (40 hours or more per week) 123 53.94% 
      Employed part-time (up to 39 hours per week) 17 7.45% 
      Self-employed 12 5.26% 
      Out of work and currently looking for work 8 3.51% 
      Out of work and not currently looking for work 5 1.32% 
      Student 50 21.93% 
      Homemaker 5 2.2% 
      Retired 10 4.39% 
      Unable to work 0 0.0% 
Field of Study / Employment   
      Technology Related 48 21.1% 
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 n % of Total 
      Non-Technology Related 180 78.9% 
 M SD 
Age 34.1 14.57 
  
Table 2 contains a comprehensive overview of the varying races of all participants of 
the survey ranging from Asian (3.94%), Black or African American (3.51%), Eurasian 
(0.44%), Ethiopian-Sudanese (0.44%), Jamaican (0.44%), Latino (0.44%), Mexican American 
(0.44%), White (89.03%), White/Asian (0.44%), and White/Black or African American 
(0.88%). 
 
Table 2 - Race Characteristics of Overall Population Sample (N = 228) 
 n % of Total 
Race   
      Asian 9 3.94% 
      Black or African American 8 3.51% 
      Eurasian 1 0.44% 
      Ethiopian-Sudanese 1 0.44% 
      Jamaican 1 0.44% 
      Latino 1 0.44% 
      Mexican American 1 0.44% 
      White 203 89.03% 
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 n % of Total 
      White, Asian 1 0.44% 
      White, Black or African American 2 0.88% 
 
The next few tables take a granular look at the deaf and hearing subsets of the overall 
participant demographics to be able to elicit useful analysis and comparisons later in the 
chapter.  Table 3 contains descriptive statistics for the demographic characteristics of 
participants who identified themselves as deaf or hard-of-hearing.  A total of 119 deaf or 
hard-of-hearing respondents participated in the survey, exceeding the minimum required 
sample size of 83 for statistical significance determined in Chapter 3 using Cochran's (1977) 
formula.  There was an approximately equal amount of male (53.78%) and female (46.22%) 
participants, which was similar to the overall population sample.  Of the 119 respondents, the 
most prevalent hearing status was deaf (81.51%) and the remaining participants identified 
themselves as hard-of-hearing (18.49%).  These participants have most commonly indicated 
that they were deaf at birth (65.55%) and the rest indicated that they became deaf at some 
point in life after birth (34.45%).  A variety of hearing devices were utilized by participants 
ranging from hearing aids (44.54%), cochlear implant (31.09%), both (5.04%), and nothing 
(19.33%).  The most common communication style of respondents was ASL (71.43%) and 
Contact Signing / Pidgin Signed English (19.33%), followed by Oralism / Spoken 
Communication (9.24%).  Levels of education of deaf participants included Master’s 
(17.65%), Bachelor’s (55.46%), Associate (11.77%), Some College Credit (10.08%), High 
School Graduate (4.2%), and Less than a high school diploma (0.84%).  Deaf participants 
who were not Hispanic or Latino (98.2%) vastly outnumbered deaf Hispanics or Latinos 
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(1.8%).  The majority of deaf respondents were either employed full time (48.74%) or 
students (24.37%), followed by part-time employment (9.24%), out of work and currently 
looking for work (5.88%), retired (5.04%), self-employed (2.52%), out of work and not 
currently looking for work (2.53%), and homemaker (1.68%).  Reported fields of study and 
employment were mostly not specialized in technology (69.73%) with the remaining 
participants coming from technical backgrounds (20.17%).  The average age of a deaf or 
hard-of-hearing participant was 35.26 years old (SD = 15.13). 
 
Table 3 - Demographic Characteristics of Deaf Population Sample (N = 119) 
 n % of Total 
Gender   
      Male 64 53.78% 
      Female 55 46.22% 
Hearing Status   
      Deaf 97 81.51% 
      Hard-of-Hearing 22 18.49% 
Year became Deaf/Hard-of-Hearing   
      At Birth 78 65.55% 
      At Some Point After Birth 41 34.45% 
Hearing Device   
      Hearing Aids 53 44.54% 
      Cochlear Implant 37 31.09% 
      Both 6 5.04% 
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 n % of Total 
      Nothing 23 19.33% 
Communication Style   
      ASL 85 71.43% 
      Oralism / Spoken Communication 11 9.24% 
      Contact Signing / Pidgin Signed English 23 19.33% 
Level of Education   
      Doctoral 0 0.0% 
      Professional 0 0.0% 
      Master’s 21 17.65% 
      Bachelor’s 66 55.46% 
      Associate 14 11.77% 
      Some College Credit 12 10.08% 
      High School Graduate or the equivalent (For example: GED) 5 4.2% 
      Less than a high school diploma 1 0.84% 
Ethnicity   
      Not Hispanic or Latino 117 98.2% 
      Hispanic or Latino 2 1.8% 
Employment Status   
      Employed for wages (40 hours or more per week) 58 48.74% 
      Employed part-time (up to 39 hours per week) 11 9.24% 
      Self-employed 3 2.52% 
      Out of work and currently looking for work 7 5.88% 
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 n % of Total 
      Out of work and not currently looking for work 3 2.53% 
      Student 29 24.37% 
      Homemaker 2 1.68% 
      Retired 6 5.04% 
      Unable to work 0 0.0% 
Field of Study / Employment   
      Technology Related 24 20.17% 
      Non-Technology Related 95 79.83% 
 M SD 
Age 35.26 15.13 
 
Table 4 contains descriptive statistics for the demographic characteristics of 
participants who identified themselves as hearing.  A total of 109 hearing respondents 
participated in the survey, exceeding the minimum required sample size of 83 for statistical 
significance determined in Chapter 3 using Cochran's (1977) formula.  There was an 
approximately equal amount of male (55.05%) and female (44.95%) participants, which was 
similar to the deaf population sample.  Of the 109 hearing respondents, the most common 
level of education was Bachelor’s (55.05%) followed by Master’s (22.02%), Some College 
Credit (10.09%), Associate (4.59%), High School Graduate (3.66%), Doctoral (2.75%), and 
Professional (2.75%).  Hearing respondents reported similar statistics to the deaf sample in 
regard to ethnicity with a majority being not Hispanic or Latino (94.5%) and the remaining 
being Hispanic or Latino (5.5%).  Aligning with the deaf respondents, the two most common 
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employment statuses were full time (59.64%) and student (19.26%).  The remaining 
participants reported being self-employed (8.25%), employed part-time (5.51%), retired 
(3.66%), homemaker (2.76%), and out of work and currently looking for work (0.91%).  
Hearing participants shared their fields of study and area of employment, which indicated that 
the majority were not technical (78.98%) and some coming from a technical background 
(22.02%).  The average age of a hearing participant was 32.83 years old (SD = 13.9), which 
was slightly lower than the average age of a deaf participant at the age of 35.26 (SD = 15.13). 
 
Table 4 - Demographic Characteristics of Hearing Population Sample (N = 109) 
 n % of Total 
Gender   
      Male 60 55.05% 
      Female 49 44.95% 
Level of Education   
      Doctoral 3 2.75% 
      Professional 2 1.84% 
      Master’s 24 22.02% 
      Bachelor’s 60 55.05% 
      Associate 5 4.59% 
      Some College Credit 11 10.09% 
      High School Graduate or the equivalent (For example: GED) 4 3.66% 
      Less than a high school diploma 0 0.0% 
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 n % of Total 
Ethnicity   
      Not Hispanic or Latino 103 94.5% 
      Hispanic or Latino 6 5.5% 
Employment Status   
      Employed for wages (40 hours or more per week) 65 59.64% 
      Employed part-time (up to 39 hours per week) 6 5.51% 
      Self-employed 9 8.25% 
      Out of work and currently looking for work 1 0.91% 
      Out of work and not currently looking for work 0 0.0% 
      Student 21 19.26% 
      Homemaker 3 2.76% 
      Retired 4 3.66% 
      Unable to work 0 0.0% 
Field of Study / Employment   
      Technology Related 24 22.02% 
      Non-Technology Related 85 78.98% 
 M SD 
Age 32.83 13.9 
 
After collecting demographic data from each participant, each of these seven 
constructs as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3: self-efficacy in information security, security 
practice behavior, their intent to improve this behavior, general controllability, security breach 
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incidents, computer/Internet experience, and security practice – technology use were  
measured using of 41 survey items including 20 Likert-scale items, 19 multiple choice items, 
and two fill-in-the-blank items (Rhee et al., 2009).  Upon data collection, aggregate statistical 
results were generated for both the deaf and hearing populations utilizing IBM SPSS Statistics 
Software for each of the seven constructs that were designed by (Rhee et al., 2009). 
 
SEIS Results 
11 SEIS Likert-scale items were used to measure a participant’s SEIS as shown in 
Table 5.  In almost every item, deaf participants averaged a higher score than hearing people 
with an exception to “managing files in my computer” where the scores were almost equal 
(5.81 for deaf vs. 5.79 for hearing) and “getting help for problems related to my information 
security” (5.39 for deaf vs. 5.42 for hearing).  Figure 6 below also displays a Gantt chart of 
the SEIS scores to provide a visual representation of the overall responses from deaf and 
hearing participants. 
 
Table 5 - Results for SEIS Items (Deaf N = 119, Hearing N = 109) 
SEIS Items Deaf M 
Deaf 
SD 
Hearing 
M 
Hearing 
SD 
I feel confident…     
• Handling virus infected files 4.18 1.79 3.32 1.90 
• Getting rid of spyware 4.05 1.88 3.30 1.95 
• Understanding terms/words relating to 
information security 
4.71 1.63 4.18 1.69 
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SEIS Items Deaf M 
Deaf 
SD 
Hearing 
M 
Hearing 
SD 
• Learning the method to protect my 
information and information system 
5.24 1.48 4.75 1.63 
• Managing files in my computer 5.81 1.27 5.79 1.27 
• Setting the Web browser to different security 
levels 
5.20 1.58 4.61 1.81 
• Using different programs to protect my 
information and information system 
4.79 1.63 4.44 1.77 
• Learning advanced skills to protect my 
information and information system 
4.87 1.64 4.62 1.88 
• Getting help for problems related to my 
information security 
5.39 1.53 5.42 1.70 
• Using the user’s guide when help is needed 
to protect my information and information 
system 
5.01 1.55 4.69 1.83 
• Updating security patches to the operating 
system 
4.80 1.83 4.37 2.13 
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Figure 6 – Gantt Chart of SEIS Scores 
 
Scores from participant responses were aggregated into the sum of the 11 SEIS Likert-
scale items with a higher sum of scores indicating positive SEIS.  The sum of scores for deaf 
respondents ranged from 17 to 77 with a mean of 54.05 (SD = 14.53).  The sum of scores for 
hearing respondents ranged from 16 to 77 with a mean of 49.50 (SD = 15.67).  The internal 
consistency reliability of the 11 SEIS Likert-scale items was determined using Cronbach’s 
alpha.  The Cronbach’s alpha value from Rhee et al. (2009) for the SEIS variable (0.965) was 
similar to the values obtained for the deaf respondents (0.948) and hearing respondents 
(0.942) indicating adequate composite reliabilities for usability in this study. 
  
 
87 
 
Table 6 – Results for Sum of SEIS Items (Deaf N = 119, Hearing N = 109) 
Hearing Status Min. Max. M SD α 
Deaf 17 77 54.05 14.53 0.948 
Hearing 16 77 49.50 15.67 0.942 
 
Security Practice Behavior Results 
Four Likert-scale items were used to measure a participant’s behavioral intention in 
addition to eight multiple choice items measuring security practice – technology and eight 
multiple choice items measuring security practice – care behavior (CCB).  Certain responses 
of the multiple-choice items are known to indicate positive security practice behavior whereas 
the higher the behavioral intention score, the better security practice behavior.  Table 7 
displays descriptive statistics of the four Likert-scale items that measured a participant’s 
behavioral intention.  Deaf participants indicated a higher average score in all four behavioral 
intention items than hearing participants.  This scoring difference between the two groups is 
more visible in the Gantt chart in Figure 7. 
 
Table 7 - Results for Behavioral Intention Items (Deaf N = 119, Hearing N = 109) 
Behavioral Intention Items Deaf M 
Deaf 
SD 
Hearing 
M 
Hearing 
SD 
I will…     
• Enforce stronger security procedures 5.55 1.26 5.17 1.27 
• Add additional security measures to protect 
my information and information system 
5.57 1.29 5.06 1.38 
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Behavioral Intention Items Deaf M 
Deaf 
SD 
Hearing 
M 
Hearing 
SD 
• Buy more software to mitigate impacts of 
information security breaches 
4.13 1.74 3.70 1.70 
• Learn more about how to strengthen my 
information security 
5.47 1.17 5.09 1.62 
 
 
 
Figure 7 – Gantt Chart of Behavioral Intention Scores 
 
The composite scores for the 8 multiple choice items measuring security practice – 
technology and 8 multiple choice items measuring security practice – care behavior were 
calculated by allocating one point for those who chose a positive security practice behavior 
answer.  Answers that demonstrate mediocre security practice behavior were given a half 
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point.  In instances where the participant chose answers that did not indicate positive security 
behavior, zero points were awarded.  Through the utilization of this calculation scheme, the 
composite score of each individual item was generated as shown in Tables 8 and 9 below. 
 
Table 8 - Results for Security Practice - Technology Items (Deaf N = 119, Hearing N = 109) 
Security Practice – Technology Deaf M 
Deaf 
SD 
Hearing 
M 
Hearing 
SD 
• Do you currently have anti-virus software on 
your computer? 
0.60 0.49 0.72 0.45 
• If you have anti-virus software on your 
computer, how often do you update the virus 
database? 
0.38 0.46 0.43 0.50 
• Do you currently have anti-spyware software 
on your computer? 
0.36 0.48 0.50 0.50 
• Do you currently use a spam-filtering 
function in the email software on your 
computer? 
0.63 0.49 0.77 0.42 
• Do you currently use firewall on your 
computer or in your home network? 
0.56 0.50 0.52 0.50 
• How often do you check and apply security 
updates/patches to the operating system and 
critical applications on your computer? 
0.45 0.46 0.50 0.50 
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Security Practice – Technology Deaf M 
Deaf 
SD 
Hearing 
M 
Hearing 
SD 
• Do you use a pop-up window blocking 
function/tool on your computer? 
0.74 0.44 0.84 0.36 
• Do you use any form of wireless encryption 
feature in your wireless connection? 
0.42 0.50 0.44 0.50 
 
Table 9 - Results for Security Practice – CCB (Deaf N = 119, Hearing N = 109) 
Security Practice – Conscious Care Behavior Deaf 
M 
Deaf 
SD 
Hearing 
M 
Hearing 
SD 
• Do you use file-sharing software such as 
BitTorrent, Kazaa, and E-Donkey over 
Internet? 
0.13 0.34 0.14 0.35 
• When was the last time you made a backup 
copy of important files? 
0.28 0.38 0.30 0.46 
• Do you store sensitive information, such as 
financial data and medical record, on your 
computer? 
0.41 0.49 0.49 0.50 
• Have you sent sensitive information (such as 
account numbers, passwords, and the social 
security number) via email? 
0.29 0.45 0.37 0.48 
• Do you use same passwords for on-line 
accounts? 
0.13 0.33 0.27 0.44 
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Security Practice – Conscious Care Behavior Deaf M 
Deaf 
SD 
Hearing 
M 
Hearing 
SD 
• When sending your personal information on 
the Internet, do you check whether the site 
encrypts transferred data? 
0.45 0.50 0.40 0.49 
• Do you share your computer with other 
people? 
0.29 0.46 0.26 0.44 
• Do you use password which is very difficult 
to guess such as a combination of upper and 
lower cases, symbols, and numbers? 
0.85 0.36 0.92 0.28 
 
Table 10 and 11 contain the sum of scores for behavioral intention, security practice – 
technology, and security practice – care behavior for both the deaf and hearing participants as 
a whole.  For hearing participants, the sum of scores for behavioral intention ranged from 5 to 
28 with a mean of 19 (SD = 4.92).  Deaf participants had a sum of scores for behavioral 
intention ranging from 8 to 28 with a mean of 20.72 (SD = 4.38).  Secondly, hearing 
participant sum of scores for security practice – technology ranged from 0 to 8 with a mean of 
4.82 (SD = 2.22).  Deaf participants scored lower for this construct with a range from 0 to 8 
and a mean of 4.14 (SD = 2.03).  Lastly, the scores for security practice – care behavior 
ranged from 0.5 to 6.5 with a mean of 3.24 (SD = 1.23) for hearing participants while deaf 
participant scores ranged from 0 to 6 with a mean of 2.82 (SD = 1.10).  Overall, deaf 
participants scored lower than hearing participants for behavioral intention and security 
practice – technology and security practice – conscious care behavior, while scoring higher in 
behavioral intention.  The internal consistency reliability of the 4 behavioral intention Likert-
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scale items was determined using Cronbach’s alpha.  The resultant value for the hearing 
population was 0.835 and for the deaf population was 0.801.  In both instances, the 
Cronbach’s alpha value is above the acceptable internal consistency reliability cutoff at 0.70 
(Rhee et al., 2009).  Cronbach’s alpha was not used to calculate the consistency for security 
practice – technology and security practice – conscious care behavior due to the fact that the 
items were not using a Likert-scale measurement. 
 
Table 10 - Results for Security Practice Behavior Variables (Hearing N = 109) 
Variable Items Min. Max. M SD α 
Behavioral Intention 4 5 28 19.00 4.92 0.835 
Security Practice - Technology 8 0 8 4.82 2.22 - 
Security Practice – CCB 8 0.5 6.5 3.24 1.23 - 
 
Table 11 - Results for Security Practice Behavior Variables (Deaf N = 119) 
Variable Items Min. Max. M SD α 
Behavioral Intention 4 8 28 20.72 4.38 0.801 
Security Practice - Technology 8 0 8 4.14 2.03 - 
Security Practice – CCB 8 0 6 2.82 1.10 - 
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Inferential Statistics 
 The primary research question of this mixed methods research study was: 
Q1. To what extent and in what ways have semi-structured qualitative interviews 
explained quantitative survey results to provide a better overall understanding of variances in 
SEIS and overall security practice behavior in the deaf population? 
 
 The developed hypotheses for the first phase of this study was: 
H10. There is no statistically significant difference between deaf and hearing end-
users’ SEIS. 
 
H20. There is no statistically significant difference between deaf and hearing end-users 
on security practice behavior. 
 
H30. A positive SEIS does not predict the facilitation of improved security practice 
behavior for deaf and hearing end-users. 
 
 The normality of the SEIS and the three security practice behavior variables was 
assessed by calculating the Shapiro-Wilk normality test as it is more suited for small and 
medium sample sizes up to 2000 (Royston, 1982).  The Shapiro-Wilk test indicated a 
statistical significance of p = .037 for hearing respondents and p = .011 for deaf respondents 
for non-normality of distribution for SEIS scores.  Figure 8 and 9 below contain the histogram 
of SEIS scores for both deaf and hearing participants with a normal distribution curve. 
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Figure 8 – Histogram of SEIS Scores for Hearing Participants (N=109) 
 
 
Figure 9 – Histogram of SEIS Scores for Deaf Participants (N=119) 
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As a result of the non-normality of distribution of scores, a nonparametric version of 
the independent t-test was utilized to be able to compare the SEIS scores between the deaf and 
hearing sample sets.  The Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test was determined to be most 
appropriate for this scenario as the MWW has been proven to have a greater power for Likert-
scale items (Nanna & Sawilowsky, 1998).  The MWW test is useful for nonparametric testing 
of null hypotheses where it is equally likely for a randomly selected value from one group 
will be less than or greater than a randomly selected value from another group (Nanna & 
Sawilowsky, 1998).  By using the MWW test, the assumption of normality of the data being 
analyzed plays no role in the result of the computations. 
The results of the MWW test for SEIS between deaf and hearing participants are 
shown in Tables 12 and 13.  Table 12 contains the mean ranks for both the deaf (104.85) and 
hearing (123.34) populations.  Table 13 contains the values of the Mann-Whitney U test and 
the statistical significance of the results.  In this instance, the Mann-Whitney U value is 5434 
with a statistical significance, p = .034.  Based on the results of the MWW test, the null 
hypothesis H10 was rejected, concluding that there is a statistically significant difference 
between deaf and hearing end-users’ SEIS.  Deaf participants demonstrated significantly 
higher SEIS (U = 5434.000, p = 0.34) than hearing participants. 
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Table 12 - Mann-Whitney Test Ranks for SEIS Scores 
Hearing Status N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
      Hearing 109 104.85 11429.00 
      Deaf 119 123.34 14677.00 
Total 228   
 
Table 13 - Mann-Whitney Test Statistics for SEIS Scores 
Statistic SEIS 
Scores 
Mann-Whitney U 5434.000 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .034 
 
 The Shapiro-Wilk normality test also indicated a statistical significance, p = .021 for 
deaf respondents for non-normality of distribution for behavioral intention scores.  Hearing 
respondents indicated a statistical significance of p = .086, which meant the distribution was 
in fact normal.  Figure 10 and 11 display the histogram of behavioral intention scores for both 
deaf and hearing respondents with a normal distribution curve. 
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Figure 10 – Histogram of Behavioral Intention Scores for Hearing Participants (N=109) 
 
 
Figure 11 – Histogram of Behavioral Intention Scores for Deaf Participants (N=119) 
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Similar to the process that was used for SEIS scores, the MWW test was used for 
behavioral intention between deaf and hearing participants due to the non-normal distribution 
of deaf respondents.  The results of the MWW test for behavioral intention between deaf and 
hearing participants are shown in Tables 14 and 15.  Table 14 contains the mean ranks for the 
hearing (102.74) and deaf (125.27) respondents.  Table 15 displays the value of the Mann-
Whitney U test and the statistical significance of the results.  The Mann-Whitney U value was 
determined to be 5204.000 with a statistical significance, p = .010. 
 
Table 14 - Mann-Whitney Test Ranks for Behavioral Intention 
Hearing Status N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
      Hearing 109 102.74 11199.00 
      Deaf 119 125.27 14907.00 
Total 228   
 
Table 15 - Mann-Whitney Test Statistics for Behavioral Intention 
Statistic SEIS 
Scores 
Mann-Whitney U 5204.000 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .010 
 
 The Shapiro-Wilk normality test was used to assess normality of distribution in 
security practice – technology and security practice – conscious care behavior scores.  For 
both security practice – technology and security practice – conscious care behavior, a non-
normality of distribution was indicated by their statistical significance scores, p < 0.05.  
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Figures 12, 13, 14, and 15 show the histograms correlating to both deaf and hearing 
participants for each of the security practice – technology and security practice – conscious 
care behavior scores. 
 
Figure 12 – Histogram of Security Practice – Technology for Hearing Participants (N=109) 
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Figure 13 – Histogram of Security Practice – Technology for Deaf Participants (N=119) 
 
 
Figure 14 – Histogram of Security Practice – CCB for Hearing Participants (N=109) 
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Figure 15 – Histogram of Security Practice – CCB for Deaf Participants (N=119) 
 
 The MWW test was performed for both security practice – technology and security 
practice – conscious care behavior as shown in Tables 16, 17, 18, and 19 below.  The Mann-
Whitney U value was for security practice – technology was determined to be 5240.500 with 
a statistical significance, p = .012.  Subsequently, the Mann-Whitney U value was for security 
practice – conscious care behavior was determined to be 5328.000 with a statistical 
significance, p = .018.   
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Table 16 - Mann-Whitney Test Ranks for Security Practice – Technology 
Hearing Status N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
      Hearing 109 125.92 13725.50 
      Deaf 119 104.04 12380.50 
Total 228   
 
Table 17 - Mann-Whitney Test Statistics for Security Practice – Technology 
Statistic SEIS 
Scores 
Mann-Whitney U 5240.500 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .012 
 
Table 18 - Mann-Whitney Test Ranks for Security Practice – Conscious Care Behavior 
Hearing Status N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
      Hearing 109 125.12 13638.00 
      Deaf 119 104.77 12468.00 
Total 228   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
103 
 
Table 19 - Mann-Whitney Test Statistics for Security Practice – Conscious Care Behavior 
Statistic SEIS 
Scores 
Mann-Whitney U 5328.000 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .018 
 
Utilizing the MWW test results for behavioral intention, security practice – 
technology, and security practice – conscious care behavior, the null hypothesis H20 was 
rejected, concluding that there is a statistically significant difference between deaf and hearing 
end-users for all three security practice behavior variables.  Deaf participants demonstrated 
significantly lower behavioral intention (U = 5204.00, p = 0.01), security practice – 
technology (U = 5240.500, p = .012), and security practice – conscious care behavior (U = 
5328.000, p = .018) than hearing participants. 
Table 20 consists of the correlations between SEIS and each of the three security 
practice behavior constructs – behavioral intention, security practice – technology, and 
security practice – conscious care behavior.  Correlations between SEIS and each of the three 
constructs were statistically significant.  SEIS and the behavioral intention variable had a 
moderately positive correlation with statistical significance, r = .432, p < .01.  SEIS and 
security practice – technology had the largest positive correlation with statistical significance, 
r = .576, p < .01.  Lastly, SEIS and security practice – conscious care behavior had the lowest 
positive correlation with statistical significance, r = .225, p < .01. 
Based on the statistical results of correlation analysis between SEIS and the three 
security practice variables, the null hypothesis H30 was rejected.  It was concluded that a 
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positive SEIS predicted the facilitation of improved security practice behavior for deaf and 
hearing end-users. 
 
Table 20 - Overall Correlations among SEIS and Security Practice Variables (N = 228) 
Variable SEIS Behavioral 
Intention 
Security 
Practice – 
Technology 
 
Security Practice - CCB 
SEIS –    
Behavioral Intention .432* –   
Security Practice – 
Technology 
.576* .295* –  
Security Practice – CCB .225* .075 .140** – 
*p < 0.01. 
**p < 0.05. 
 
Evaluation of Findings 
In this section, all findings from the first phase of the study are discussed in several 
contexts.  First, the findings are discussed in the context of the theoretical framework that was 
used for the basis of this study.  Next, the findings from this first phase are compared to past 
studies in this area.  Lastly, the findings are summarized in the context of what the results may 
mean for the deaf and hearing populations. 
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Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework that was used for the basis of this study is the social 
cognitive theory developed by Bandura (1986).  Self-efficacy, also more commonly known as 
self-confidence, is a person’s belief in their ability to achieve a particular goal or task 
(Bandura, 1986).  The social cognitive theory proposes that there is a direct correlation with a 
person’s perceived self-efficacy resulting from personal, behavioral, and environmental 
influences and their resultant behavior (Bandura, 1986).  As a deaf individual grows up, they 
are exposed to unique personal, behavioral, and environmental experiences that may affect 
their resultant behavior relating to cyber security threats.   
With the social cognitive theoretical framework in mind, it was predicted that deaf 
individuals would have varying SEIS and security practice behavior when compared to 
hearing individuals.  The results from the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test indicated that SEIS 
and the three security practice constructs were significantly different for deaf participants 
compared to hearing participants.  The results indicated that deaf respondents had 
significantly higher SEIS than the hearing population while having a significantly lower 
behavioral intention, security practice – technology, and security practice – conscious care 
behavior.  Lastly, the results indicated a positive correlation between SEIS and resultant 
security practice behavior for both hearing and deaf respondents.  Bandura's (1986) social 
cognitive theory was supported by the results from this study: Individuals with a higher SEIS 
generally indicate positive security practice behavior.  However, it is important to note that 
exhibiting higher SEIS does not always indicate greater positive security practice behavior as 
shown in the results where deaf individuals indicated significantly higher SEIS than hearing 
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individuals, but practiced significantly lower positive security practice behavior than hearing 
individuals. 
 
Comparison to Past Studies 
The objective of this section is to compare the results from this study to findings from 
past studies to conclude whether the results are consistent or contradictory.  The primary 
focus of prior researchers was to identify whether there was a positive correlation between 
SEIS and security practice behavior (Rhee et al., 2009).  Rhee et al. (2009) found that SEIS 
has significant indicators of an individual’s security practice behavior – including behavioral 
intention and security practice – technology and care behavior.   One of the findings of this 
study was that a positive SEIS predicted the facilitation of positive security practice behavior 
in end-users.  This conclusion was consistent with Rhee et al. (2009) and their findings. 
Phelps & Gathegi (2006) found that self-efficacy has a relevance to understanding the 
relationship between cyber security awareness and effective security practice behavior.  
Crossler & Bélanger (2006) also found that an individual’s self-efficacy has significant 
impacts on the individual’s usage of security tools.  He et al., (2014) also acknowledge the 
growing importance of self-efficacy in behavioral information security research to ensure that 
end-users are equipped with the right skills to practice good security practice behavior.  The 
conclusion that positive SEIS is an indicator of positive security practice behavior in this 
study is consistent with the findings of past studies discussed above. 
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Summary of Phase 1 Results 
This section presented the results from this study to the reader.  A total of 228 
individuals participated in the quantitative online survey.  A total of 109 of these participants 
were hearing and the remaining participants were deaf.  Preliminary computations of 
Cronbach’s alpha on the quantitative survey items demonstrated adequate internal consistency 
reliability coefficients.  Utilizing the Shapiro-Wilk normality test indicated non-normality of 
the distribution of scores.  This led to the use of nonparametric computations such as the 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test for the statistical significance of differences between the two 
groups.     
Analysis on the data collected from these 228 respondents indicated that (a) there are 
significantly higher scores in SEIS for deaf end-users compared to hearing end-users, (b) 
there are significantly lower scores in behavioral intention, security practice – technology, and 
security practice – care behavior for deaf end-users compared to hearing end-users, and (c) a 
positive SEIS predicts the facilitation of positive security practice behavior for both deaf and 
hearing end-users. 
Through data evaluation, the researcher was able to conclude that Bandura's (1986) 
social cognitive theory was supported by the collected data in this study.  The results 
indicated that there was a correlation between an individual’s SEIS and their resultant security 
practice behavior including behavioral intention, security practice – technology, and security 
practice – conscious care behavior.  The results obtained from the study were also consistent 
with the findings of Rhee et al. (2009) that SEIS has significant indicators of an individual’s 
security practice behavior.  Other past research were supported by this study’s findings 
including Phelps & Gathegi's (2006) work finding self-efficacy’s relevance to effective 
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security practice behavior, Crossler & Bélanger's (2006) work finding that an individual’s 
self-efficacy has significant impacts on the individual’s usage of technology, and He et al.'s 
(2014) work finding that self-efficacy has a growing importance in behavioral information 
security.  Identifying statistically significant differences between the deaf and hearing 
participants raises the need for further investigation in understanding what may lead to such 
differences.  In the next section of this chapter, the findings of phase 2 of this study attempt to 
capture the essence of the lived experiences of deaf individuals, their SEIS, and security 
practice behavior. 
 
Phase 2 Results 
“I was stuck with a bad virus on my computer.  I had no idea what to do and tried to 
google some answers, but the terminology was too complex.  I was forced to spend 
money and use the Best Buy Geek Squad to clean up the computer.  I struggled to 
understand what the experts tried to explain to me after they fixed the computer 
because there were no interpreters.  Even after that, I still had some problems with my 
computer and I ended up throwing it out and buying a new one because there seemed 
to be no other way.  I was not prepared to address the threat and now I am trying my 
best to make sure that it does not happen again on my new computer.  It is like a 
never-ending cycle.” 
-Eva, Deaf Participant 
 
 
“When I run into problems with my computer or phone, I usually would hand off the 
device to an expert.  If I was anywhere else away from upstate New York, it would be 
much more difficult to get help because nobody knows sign language except for the 
tech center on campus.  I would have to write on paper back and forth to be able to 
communicate with the technician.  Missed learning opportunities occur because I 
would not be able to understand the expert when bringing in the computer and when I 
bring it home, I would end up making the same mistakes and bring it back in.  It is like 
a cycle.  Even if I understood what they were saying, I would still struggle to 
understand because of my own literacy in computers is poor. It is like a double 
whammy.” 
 
-Alison, Deaf Participant 
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The research question of the qualitative phase of the study was “What is the essence of 
the deaf end-user’s lived experiences when engaging in security practices and their 
confidence levels in doing so?”  The purpose of the qualitative phase of this explanatory 
sequential mixed methods study was to explore the potential influence that sociocultural 
factors of the deaf population have on their end-users’ SEIS and security practice behavior by 
capturing the essence of deaf end-user’s lived experiences.  Through this second phase of the 
study, the following overarching research question of this study is answered: “To what extent 
and in what ways have semi-structured qualitative interviews explained quantitative survey 
results to provide a better overall understanding of variances in SEIS and overall security 
practice behavior in the deaf population?” 
The qualitative interview data were analyzed through the use of Moustakas' (1994) 
phenomenological research methodology.  Relevant themes from experiences of deaf end-
users who have engaged in security practice behavior were captured directly from the 
transcribed text generated from interviews with ten deaf end-users.  Open coding and 
grouping allowed the researcher to identify similar statements.  These similar statements were 
prepared into clusters that portrayed fundamental aspects of the participants’ experiences in 
engaging with security practice and their confidence levels in doing so.  Seven clusters were 
created from the organization of statements from coding.  These clusters morphed into major 
themes that highlighted the essence of the experience of being a deaf end-user.  Further 
subthemes were also created to better describe the underlying components of each major 
theme that was identified. 
Deaf participants who shared their experiences in one-on-one semi-structured 
interviews signified a comprehensive set of experiences, ages, and levels of education.  
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Invited participants for the second phase of this study were purposively selected based on 
specific criteria.  The participant had to be either deaf or hard of hearing.  The participant had 
to have taken the quantitative survey that was distributed in the first phase of this research 
study.  Lastly, the participant had to indicate SEIS and security practice behavior scores that 
fell within the statistically significant range that signified higher SEIS and lower security 
practice behavior scores than hearing people.  The average age of the participants was 38 
years old and their highest levels of education completed ranged from High School diplomas 
to Master’s degrees.  These participants reported coming from a wide range of fields of study 
and employment from both technical and non-technical fields.  Table 21 below contains 
profiles of the participants who were interviewed. 
 
Table 21 – Profiles of Study Participants 
Pseudonym* Gender Age General Field of Study or Employment 
Level of 
Education 
Completed 
Cooper M 27 Program Coordinator Master’s 
Eva F 54 Software Developer Bachelor’s 
Cathy F 54 Guest Service Representative Bachelor’s 
Cody M 24 Computer Science High School  
Alexa F 25 Counseling Bachelor’s 
Trista F 64 Business Owner Associate’s 
Jenni F 53 Retail Associate’s 
Ryan M 28 Engineer Master’s 
Steven M 26 Marketing High School 
Alison F 28 Medical Master’s 
 
*Pseudonyms were used to ensure the confidentiality of participants and their responses. 
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Throughout these interviews, it became apparent that the responses that were received 
did not vary even if a participant’s educational background or general field of employment 
related to the field of computers.  For example, several participants who work in the field of 
computers exhibited similar responses to other participants who have basic knowledge of 
computers.  The level of education and age also did not seem to affect a participant’s overall 
experience with SEIS and security practice behavior.  For example, a participant working 
towards their doctoral degree indicated similar themes with those who have only completed 
their high school education. 
Being a deaf individual engaging in security practice behavior and their confidence 
level in doing so was portrayed as a multifaceted and intricate experience.  Seven themes 
were derived from the ten interviews that captured the essence of the deaf experience of the 
deaf individual engaging in security practice behavior.  Each of the seven themes was 
interconnected in one way or another.  The first theme was described as the deaf-specific 
barriers that were faced in a deaf individual’s experiences relating to cyber security.  The 
second theme conveyed the digital literacy challenges of a deaf individual practicing SEIS 
and security practice behavior.  The third theme described a deaf individual’s positive security 
intention and their desire to try and improve their security practice behavior.  The fourth 
theme portrayed the deaf individual’s reliance on technology for a successful daily living and 
the potential impact if access was taken away.  The fifth theme reflected upon the poor 
security knowledge and misconceptions that deaf individuals indicated.  The sixth theme 
depicted a deaf individual’s poor security care behavior and their current priorities.  Finally, 
the seventh theme outlined the support network that a deaf individual relies on to be able to 
navigate through their experience with engaging in security practices and their confidence 
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levels in doing so.  Figure 16 provides a visual representation of the seven themes and their 
underlying sub-themes that capture the essence of the deaf experience. 
 
Figure 16 – Essential Themes of the Deaf Experience 
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As shown in Figure 16, there are sub-themes within each theme detailing the unique 
components of the deaf experience.  The themes and associated sub-themes are listed below: 
Theme I: Deaf-Specific Barriers 
a. English as a Second Language 
b. Lack of Accessibility 
c. Missed Incidental Learning Opportunities 
Theme II: Digital Literacy 
a. Believing Literacy is Subpar Compared to Hearing People 
b. Poor Literacy as a Cause of Overall Poor Security Behavior 
Theme III: Positive Security Intention 
a. Positive Security Knowledge & Behavior 
b. Desire to Try and Improve Security Behavior 
Theme IV: Reliance on Technology 
a. Increased Reliance 
b. High Impact if Loss of Access 
Theme V: Poor Security Knowledge 
a. No Background Knowledge 
b. No Breach Experience 
c. Common Misconceptions 
Theme VI: Poor Security Care Behavior 
a. Security not a Priority 
b. Functionality over Security 
c. Knowing but Not Doing 
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Theme VII: Having a Support Network 
 
Description and Analysis of Identified Themes 
This section is dedicated to describing the themes that were discovered through the 
one-on-one semi-structured interviews that captured the essence of the deaf experience.  Each 
theme and its associated sub-themes are discussed with excerpts from the interviews 
supporting the findings. 
 
Theme I: Deaf-Specific Barriers 
 The first theme that was established from analysis of the data from the interviews was 
barriers that are unique to deaf people as a linguistic minority of sign language users and as a 
community of people who have some degree of hearing loss.  These barriers are the epitome 
of the challenges that deaf individuals face when attempting to engage in security practice 
behavior and directly affects their confidence levels in doing so.  
 
a. English as a Second Language 
A good number of participants pointed to barriers that they experienced due to ASL 
being their first language and English as their second.  For some of these participants, their 
primary form of communication and learning style is through ASL and prefer relying on 
visual-based information, rather than English and text-based information.  Ryan explained 
that in circumstances where ASL is not an option, he would attempt to read English through 
captioning on videos or in textbooks and shared that the materials are difficult to understand 
and require reading multiple times. 
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Watching videos often poses some challenges if it does not provide a side-by-side with 
instructions and examples and would need to be captioned so I can follow things step 
by step with my own hands-on learning.  Reading on my own would be tough because 
of the terminology.  It is very involved and I haven’t been exposed to the words.  I 
would have to read them multiple times and try to teach myself as I go on and look up 
the definitions of words. (Ryan) 
 
Cody described how the ASL-interpreted course was extremely helpful in his learning 
about security, but outside the class, everything was much more difficult due to the lack of 
visual representations of concepts. 
To be fair, that class really helped me expand my vocabulary and basic knowledge.  I 
do run into some terminology that I didn’t learn in the class and that was more 
difficult.  If it weren’t for the class, these concepts would have been much more 
difficult for me to learn and utilize.  I think it is really important how the concepts are 
presented with concrete and visual examples.  Without that thorough explanation, it 
would be difficult for me and other deaf people to understand.  (Cody) 
 
Jenni shared her frustrations in trying to learn about cyber security without ASL-based 
instruction.  She talked about how reading or watching videos with captions is not as helpful 
as learning from ASL-based instruction.  Jenni even takes things further and pointed out her 
appreciation for the ASL-based videos provided in the survey and how much of a difference it 
made in helping her understand the material. 
Watching videos and stuff like that does not help me.  Asking ASL-signing people 
questions in person or over the video phone using ASL allow me to learn better.  I 
could read, but I need to read multiple times and that takes up more time and effort.  I 
don’t know what to look for anyway.  I’ve found that the concepts are really complex 
when in English.  I even had a hard time with your survey, which is why it took me a 
long time to fill out.  I had to look up each of the words and the ones that I did not 
understand, I would have ended up contacting you for clarification.  The ASL videos 
in your survey were what made the difference.  Nobody else does that for articles and 
readings relating to computers and technology.  If I don’t understand something, I 
prefer someone to explain it to me in ASL for clear and effective communication. 
 
I usually can’t read a guide or use something online.  My skills with computers are not 
good enough.  If I am going to get help, I need it to be in person or over a video call 
with someone who uses ASL.  I suppose I could go in person at the store or call over 
the video phone, but I find these options to be cumbersome.  It is so much easier to 
talk to someone who is already deaf and knows how to communicate with ASL but 
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finding someone with the knowledge and skills to be able to help me is hard to find.  
Even working with my hearing brother is hard sometimes.  I have to find someone 
who is familiar with technology and can sign.  Deaf communication makes it perfect 
and I am much more comfortable with that.  (Jenni) 
 
 Eva expressed similar thoughts as Jenni about how it would be much easier for her to 
understand concepts if they were in ASL instead of English along with the inaccurate 
captioning, making things much more difficult for her. 
Another barrier is my language; I am unable to understand the computer concepts 
because my English is not that strong.  I have a hard time watching YouTube and the 
captions are not perfect, combined with my English, it becomes a nightmare.  I wish 
these videos would be in ASL.  (Eva) 
 
Alexa mentioned how she wishes that websites have more content that allows a visual-
based learner to be able to better understand the material. 
There need to be clearly written sentences in basic English, a lot of visual 
representations and pictures, and step by step instructions for me to be able to 
understand what is going on.  Most websites do not have these things.  If they did, I 
would be able to learn more easily.  I’ve found that most information is hidden and not 
in the open.  I always have to look out of the way trying to find the right answer.  It is 
generally hard for me to access.  (Alexa) 
 
In describing the challenges as having English as a second language, these individuals 
shared how important it is to have information conveyed through ASL rather than English.  
Otherwise, learning becomes a far more tedious task for deaf people as it takes longer to read 
and understand the material being taught due to English not being their first language.  Some 
of these experiences have discouraged deaf people from learning more about cyber security 
and how to better protect their information and devices. 
 
b. Lack of Accessibility 
Many of the participants explained that the lack of accessibility in a variety of settings 
play a role in their resultant knowledge about security and overall security practice behavior.  
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These accessibility challenges arose whenever trying to access information through the 
Internet, classroom, or even when trying to receive expert assistance whether over the phone 
or in-person.  Steven described his experiences in trying to learn more about cyber security.   
If they don’t have captioning or a clear speaking voice, that is a barrier for sure.  I 
think not having a clear picture would also be a barrier.  If I want to learn more about 
information security, I need to have these things to effectively learn.  If I want to learn 
at a workshop or something, I would have to have an interpreter as well.  One time, I 
wanted to take this free cyber security workshop at a local library and they were not 
able to provide an interpreter for me, so I ended up not going. (Steven) 
 
Alison shared her experiences in trying to learn more about cyber security and how 
anything outside of the classroom often did not have the captioning that she needed to be able 
to learn the materials that were being taught. 
I had to make sure I had an interpreter for class so I could understand the materials 
being taught.  I also had a note taker.  I would have struggled to learn without those 
two things.  Some articles have videos, but they never have captions available.  Rarely 
are they available on YouTube, but if they are, the auto-generated captions are not 
very accurate.  Fortunately, for class, the school was required to abide by the ADA 
and provide captioning for any video materials.  But on my own, most of these videos 
are not captioned. (Alison) 
 
Cathy described how her overall ability to learn about cyber security is more difficult 
because of her deafness.  She needed interpreting services for when she went to the Apple 
store and was unable to understand what the worker was saying when getting assistance with 
her Apple device.   
I just think that it is harder for me because I am deaf.  I have to get an interpreter, a 
note taker, change the language to something that is compatible with how I learn.  I 
would take it to the Apple store, but there won’t be an interpreter there.  I try and hope 
that they will be able to help me and explain how to prevent things from happening 
next time.  I am able to get the help, but I am unable to learn from the experience 
because I don’t understand what or why it happened and was not able to understand 
the helper. (Cathy) 
 
Cathy detailed the challenges that she faces when she tried to watch some cyber 
security awareness videos on the Internet. 
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Sometimes I try to watch some videos online and they are often on Vimeo or 
Facebook.  Vimeo is never captioned so I end up not watching it.  YouTube captions 
are not perfect, especially with the complicated terminology.  There were some 
interesting podcasts about security from my favorite show host, but they were not 
captioned nor were there any transcripts, so I was unable to listen in. (Cathy) 
 
Cathy disclosed additional challenges that she experiences in the workplace that 
restricted her from learning more about information security and at home when she needs to 
use her video phone to address information security threats. 
A lot of conference calls or video calls do not have any captioning, like a Zoom 
meeting.  I can’t join and participate like any other hearing person because of the 
overlapping chatter.  TED Talks, Podcasts, Zoom meetings all do not have captions.  
This prevents me from being able to learn more about information security.  
Sometimes I don’t bother with phone calls to cancel a card or dispute a charge because 
I have to deal with the video relay interpreting process.  The local library offered 
cyber security awareness courses and they were unable to provide interpreting services 
and I also found it difficult to find the time to match up my schedule with theirs to 
attend due to work.  (Cathy) 
 
Alexa explained her experience when she attends the tech center for some assistance 
with her devices.  She wished that these places would be more accessible and even said she 
would rather not go get help at all if there were no interpreters available. 
When I go to the tech center, everyone is hearing and I can’t communicate with them 
to get help and learn how to protect my system.  Basically, I miss out on the 
opportunity to learn because I am deaf.  The difference in the language itself 
minimizes my willingness to go into the tech center and ask for help because I don’t 
want to sound dumb.  I can’t speak well and my attempts to explain things would be 
perceived as if I don’t know what I am talking about or I don’t know what to say.  
That miscommunication makes me want to avoid the encounter altogether.  Videos at 
home are also not captioned, so it’s a double whammy and I don’t know what to do at 
that point.  I wish that the tech center would take the time to learn some basic signs to 
be able to communicate with those who are deaf.  Especially here in Rochester where 
the deaf community is much larger than most places.  (Alexa) 
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Alexa elaborated further about her concerns with video relay interpreting services and 
how the quality of interpreting services and internet services affect the integrity of the 
information that she receives.  
Some barriers also come from the video phones themselves, such as the internet 
dropping during a long hold, or the interpreter themselves is lousy and does not sign 
the correct information.  I assume that they are accurate, but there is no way for me to 
know for sure because I can’t hear the person on the other end of the phone. 
Sometimes when I have to use a video phone, I admit that I’ve taken some extra time 
than a hearing person probably would because the Wi-Fi or service isn’t good.  
Sometimes it is just a bother.  Sometimes I will actually walk into a retail location 
instead of calling just for the convenience even if I have to drive.  (Alexa) 
 
Trista shared similar experiences with how the lack of interpreting services at the 
repair shop makes her opt not to go if she can help it.  
When I would go to the local repair shop, I always went with my husband.  He was 
able to understand these geeks even if he was deaf.  He would talk to them and try to 
understand what was wrong with the computer.  They would tell us and teach us what 
to look out for.  If my husband was not there, I would not go because I have a hard 
time understanding these tech geeks.  They don’t speak clearly.  We work as a team 
and help each other to try to understand the workers.  I would not go alone.  To me, I 
need to know everything, so I drop it off and pick it up with my husband, otherwise, I 
would rather not bother.  (Trista) 
 
Trista also described the challenges that she has at home when she tried to learn more 
about information security. 
Another challenge is when I try to watch videos and sometimes they do not have 
captions at all or rely on YouTube captioning.  Typically, these captions are not done 
correctly and display the wrong terms because it is not expecting security terminology.  
In cyber security, we need to understand all of the words.  (Trista) 
 
Trista also described how she was not able to take care of her credit card theft 
concerns until she got home from out of town because of not having access to her video phone 
when traveling. 
Recently, we went out of state to visit our friends.  We used our husband’s laptop 
computer on this trip.  My relative asked us in the last minute to donate to his 
fundraiser for his high school.  I donated via a website on my husband’s laptop 
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connected to Wi-Fi at our friend’s house.  Shortly after donating, I was contacted by 
the bank that our credit card information was stolen.  The notification came from the 
bank via email then I eventually got a letter.  Because I was out of town, I was not able 
to do much until I got home to be able to contact the bank with my video phone.  I was 
pretty worried until I got home.  (Trista) 
 
Eva pointed out that she experienced accessibility challenges when she attempted to 
learn more about cyber security in her local community and how she wishes some 
functionality would be provided through the Internet instead of requiring phone calls. 
I have faced a variety of accessibility issues relating to cyber security in the past.  The 
first thing that I can think of is lack of interpreting services for local county-offered 
security awareness courses and sometimes the things that I google lead me to 
YouTube videos where the captions are auto-generated and are not perfect.  A lot of 
them require you to call to be able to reset the password and it is inconvenient for me 
as a deaf person to call for a password reset.  Why can’t they let me do it online?  
(Eva) 
 
Jenni detailed her frustrations with the lack of interpreting services when an expert 
comes into her home to assist with fixing some technical issues including the Wi-Fi and its 
encryption.  She also pointed out the problems that she faced with inaccurate YouTube 
captioning. 
When I reach out for help or try to learn, very rarely do I have an interpreter with me.  
I end up writing back and forth and that is not effective communication.  That is 
frustrating.  When the Comcast technician comes to fix my internet, there is no way 
that they would ever send an interpreter with them.  I can’t understand their questions 
and they struggle to help me because I can’t explain what is wrong.  It is two barriers.  
One is that I can’t speak, and the other is that I can’t explain the complicated 
technology.  I even tried calling a video phone interpreter to interpret our interactions 
in the room, but they hung up because they are not allowed to unless it is an actual 
phone call from the Comcast technician to me.  Some technicians do not understand 
and struggle to help my problem.  YouTube videos also do not have captions.  I do not 
like using videos to learn anyway because the captions are too fast and I can’t keep up 
with the words.  If the captions are on, they are not accurate anyway.  (Jenni) 
 
Cody described a similar experience about the lack of accurate captioning and how it 
led to further confusion when trying to address cyber security threats. 
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If there was a YouTube video showing things step by step, that would be nice, but the 
problem is captioning.  The captions suck.  It helps that it includes visual cues and 
instructions, but there is always a portion that is covered only by audio.  A lot of times 
these videos are outdated as well.  The versions are wrong and the video is for the 
older version and the newer version does not have the buttons anymore.  I am pretty 
confident that I would be able to learn how to do better, but the problem is I don’t 
know what to use to be able to learn this stuff that is accessible to deaf people. (Cody) 
 
Cody shared how he usually does not bother with anything that involves using the 
phone because of the various barriers that are involved in the process. 
I would not call the bank or anything that requires a phone call.  If it does not have an 
online option to do whatever it is that I need to, the chances of me calling them are 
very little to none because using the video phone and all of that is a hassle for me.  For 
example, my bank has an online lock option to be able to freeze all charges and let me 
get a new card in the mail without having to lift a finger.  If this wasn’t the case, I 
probably would not call them.  I probably would end up asking my parents to call for 
me.  That isn’t very secure because I would have to give them all of my information 
before they can call.  They have run into problems where the banker won’t verify them 
because the voices don’t match.  Sometimes if I want to download the software and I 
run into problems, they oftentimes have a phone number for a helpline.  I won’t call 
them.  I basically just miss out.  Security support hotline, customer service, anything 
of that sort.  It is always a phone number.  (Cody) 
 
Cody conveyed similar concerns how a lot of the solutions to the problems that he 
faces are not accessible. 
The problem is that a lot of these answers are delivered via audio or on a video that is 
not captioned.  That is when it becomes an issue for me.  If these things were fully 
accessible, I feel that I would be able to get help.  (Cody) 
 
Cooper communicated similar struggles with understanding the captions on YouTube 
and how he often has to seek alternative accessibility options. 
I tend to use YouTube if I need to fix an issue. For example, if I need to fix my 
computer from a certain error or potential compromise, I would like to use YouTube 
videos where they explain how to resolve these problems, but I am unable to hear 
what the person in the video is saying and the auto-captioning feature on YouTube are 
not perfect and is often unclear.  Being unable to follow the instructions really impact 
my ability to learn more about information security.  Online classes are often delivered 
through a voice-based instruction and I am unable to participate.  I tend to try to seek 
out information through these venues but the barriers prevent me from being able to 
capitalize.  Sometimes I am lucky, but more often than not, I have to look for second, 
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third, fourth, and fifth options that might provide the necessary accessibility options to 
be able to learn effectively.  (Cooper) 
 
Ryan described how he is not able to quickly address concerns over the phone at work 
because of the lack of a video phone in his workplace. 
I had to call the bank using a video phone to have the charges removed.  When I am 
working, I have a hard time because there are no video phones in the office.  I have to 
walk outside to my car to make a phone call, so sometimes I put things off because of 
that.  (Ryan) 
 
Ryan expressed how he learns best in an environment where there are accessible 
materials presented with ASL-users for feedback.  Ryan acknowledged that inaccessible 
materials would take longer and more effort for him to learn the materials.  
Sometimes if it is a subject that none of my peers know much about, it takes me a little 
bit longer or more effort for me to learn about because I learn best when I have a mix 
of accessible materials and dialogue with deaf peers who can easily communicate with 
me so I can ask for clarification.  (Ryan) 
 
Cathy explained that the bank often calls her cell phone instead of her video phone 
number, which prevents her from being able to address credit card theft in a rapid fashion.   
Another security incident that happens often is that someone steals my credit card 
information and puts a hotel or other types of charges on the account from another 
country like India.  I typically find out when I look at my credit card statements that 
are mailed to me monthly.  The bank has not called me, I think it is because the phone 
number on file goes to my cell phone and I can’t answer those because I am deaf.  I 
end up having to call through a video phone a week later when I am home and ask 
them to remove the charge.  (Cathy) 
 
For deaf individuals engaging in security practice behavior, they face multiple 
accessibility challenges relating to interpreting, note-taking, captioning, and video phones.  
These participants described the frustrations and challenges that they face when trying to learn 
more about information security and addressing potential security threats that arise on their 
devices.  These participants also indicated an obvious interest in wanting to participate and 
learn more about the topic of cyber security. 
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c. Missed Incidental Learning Opportunities 
Missed incidental learning opportunities are the third sub-theme that falls under the 
deaf-specific barriers theme that encompasses the essence of deaf individuals’ experiences.  
Most people shared that they felt they were missing out on critical information that is often 
picked up through sound-based learning that takes place incidentally such as gossip in the 
workplace, listening to the radio, podcasts, word of mouth, and conversations at social events.  
Trista recalled that she was not able to learn about current cyber security threats through the 
word of mouth in her environment. 
The first thing that comes to mind is being able to hear and understand the current 
news from hearing people around me.  I miss out on that and know for sure that a lot 
of people gossip about recent viruses and that puts me at a disadvantage.  (Trista) 
 
Alexa described how she was not able to take advantage of incidental learning 
opportunities about cyber security as a deaf individual. 
Growing up, I did not have the opportunity to take advantage of incidental learning 
experiences that hearing people do.  Like, hearing people can hear stories from word 
of mouth and the radio about various things to look out for and avoid while I was not 
able to.  So deaf people consistently missed out on that opportunity.  (Alexa) 
 
Alison elaborated on additional missed incidental learning opportunities taking place 
in her daily life. 
Missed incidental learning opportunities occur all the time with hearing co-workers, 
technicians, or friends that I end up interacting with. The lab that I work in, I do not 
have any interpreting services so people chatter, I do not hear any of that and I do not 
learn anything from those conversations.  When I walk down the hall, I know my 
friends can hear chatter from others, and I cannot.  That happens all the time.  The 
radio… NPR… deaf people can’t have that.  (Alison) 
 
Cathy shared that the cyber security knowledge she has primarily comes from reading 
and word of mouth from her deaf friends while not being able to capitalize on incidental 
learning from her hearing co-workers. 
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Word of mouth and family.  Word of mouth as in the news on TV with captions and 
conversations with other deaf friends.  If my deaf friends were not in the equation, I 
don’t know how I would know what I know now about information security.  The 
stories that my deaf friends have told me made me more aware of what is possible.  I 
always miss what my hearing co-workers talk about.  (Cathy) 
 
Cody recounted his experiences in having to work twice as hard to keep up with the 
incidental learning that takes place within his environment.  His hearing family and friends 
are able to listen to the radio and discuss with co-workers via word of mouth to know more 
about general security issues while he is not. 
The general literacy level - like for Heartbleed or any other famous hacks - my family 
will have already known about it because they listened to the radio or a podcast while 
driving to work.  For general security issues, I have to work twice as hard to read, 
research, and try to keep up with the current threats.  They can just drive to work and 
immediately know all of these things by just listening while driving.  Word of mouth 
is another big thing for that as well.  They can overhear their office co-workers and 
friends at a party while I miss everything.  (Cody) 
 
Ryan pointed out that an additional barrier that he experiences in being able to learn 
about cyber security is missing out on a variety of incidental learning opportunities.  
Another barrier that I do face is that I miss out on the daily gossip that hearing people 
get access to through sound.  Some examples include not being able to listen to the 
radio or hear my co-workers in office cubicles, and even at home with my hearing 
family. (Ryan) 
 
These deaf participants described that missed incidental learning opportunities put 
them at a disadvantage compared to their hearing peers in being able to address cyber security 
threats.  Some of these missed incidental learning opportunities include not being able to 
listen to the radio, word of mouth taking place at social events, in the workplace, and even at 
home, and podcasts. 
The first theme was “Deaf-Specific Barriers”, which was an essential component of 
the deaf experience when attempting to practice security practice behavior.  This theme was 
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supported with three sub-themes ranging from English as a second language, lack of 
accessibility, and missed incidental learning opportunities. 
 
Theme II: Digital Literacy 
 The second theme was something that deaf participants saw as an essential component 
of their experience in engaging with security practice behavior and their confidence in doing 
so.  This theme was categorized as digital literacy and deaf participants reported that they felt 
their literacy was subpar compared to hearing people.  Others felt that poor literacy was a 
cause of their poor overall security behavior. 
 
a. Believing Literacy is Subpar Compared to Hearing People 
In this sub-theme, the majority of the deaf participants discussed how they felt that 
their digital literacy levels are lower than hearing people.  Trista shared that she felt her 
literacy skills are slightly worse than hearing people. 
Overall, my digital literacy is slightly worse.  I think it depends on your interests.  
Some people are interested. Some people are not.  I like to read and try to find more 
information.  I have many friends that do not.  Never talk about it.  Never research.  If 
I ask them about anything, they have no idea.  If they were not interested and could 
read, they might be able to figure some things out.  But on the flip side, it is possible 
also that people are interested, but they cannot read or don’t have the necessary 
literacy skills to do so.  (Trista) 
 
Cody expressed that he thinks his literacy levels could be the same as a hearing 
person, but only when he puts in double the amount of effort to keep up with current 
happenings and knowledge pertinent to cyber security. 
I can see my computer and digital literacy being the same as the average hearing 
person, but only when I put in the work.  Like I mentioned earlier in this interview, I 
had to work twice as hard as everyone else in my family to keep up with the current 
happenings for multiple reasons (accessibility and multitasking).  I do feel that I am 
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ahead of the curve from other deaf people because I took that required class at my 
school.  If it weren’t for that class, I would be worse than the average hearing person 
because they can hear the news and have incidental learning experiences.  If I were to 
not put in twice the amount of work, I would also definitely be worse than the average 
hearing person.  (Cody) 
 
Cody also shared some insight on an experience that he had about how important it is 
to be able to hear and keep up with the current news relating to cyber security. 
For example, if I didn’t hear about Target’s news leak, I could’ve gone to Target that 
day and used my credit card on their point of sale system.  I happened to read about it 
a few days after the breach and fortunately, I hadn’t gone shopping at Target yet.  and 
Hearing people would only use cash and that immediately puts me at a disadvantage 
because I would still use my credit card not knowing that it was vulnerable.  That 
would be a negative impact.  I have to spend so much time trying to keep up with the 
news and current threats.  (Cody) 
 
Cathy explained how she felt that her digital literacy levels are worse because of 
missed incidental learning opportunities, especially when compared to anyone younger than 
her.   
I think that my levels are worse.  Because hearing people can hear and pick up and 
excel more than deaf people.  Having access to sound provides opportunities for 
hearing people learn incidentally whereas deaf people cannot.  Older than me, maybe 
not as much, but younger than me, definitely.  For me, the way I was raised, I think 
that I was at a disadvantage for those same reasons.   
 
Alexa described that she thought she may have stronger literacy skills than the average 
deaf person because of her upbringing with a deaf family, but she still felt that her literacy 
was worse than the average hearing person due to a variety of accessibility barriers. 
I think that I am probably somewhere between average and worse because sometimes 
I look online and I see that a lot of other people are asking the same questions as I am.  
I’ve noticed that a lot of hearing people know more than I do, but that may be a 
scenario specific type of thing.  My dad himself knows a good amount of computers 
so I learned some from him, but everything else is from self-teaching.  I feel that my 
level is higher and closer to average than other deaf people because I was raised by 
deaf parents.  I had full access to communication right from when I was born.  My 
experience is unique because I came from a deaf family with parents who were college 
educated and their experiences bolstered mine.  (Alexa) 
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Ryan rationalized that there are a variety of factors that may affect a person’s literacy 
levels including interest, motivation, priorities, and barriers that are experienced in one’s life. 
I think it depends on whom you talk to, to be honest.  If you talk to deaf people who 
are not interested in computers, they probably are worse than the average hearing 
person.  If you talk to deaf people who are motivated, roll up their sleeves, and enjoy 
diving into these type of things and invest their time into learning, they would be 
closer to the average hearing person.  Those who don’t invest the time would likely 
not perform as well.  I think that being deaf plays a slight disadvantage due to a 
variety of factors that we discussed earlier, but if they put in the time, they might be 
able to perform almost just as well if they make it a priority and put time into it.  
(Ryan) 
 
Ryan detailed that he feels that his literacy level is lower than hearing people because 
it takes him longer to read and understand materials. 
I believe my literacy level is lower.  When I’m reading things for the first time, I 
struggle with understanding the context and what the general terms mean.  After 
reading it multiple times and looking up things, that is when I start to fill in the bits 
and pieces to be able to form an overall understanding as I go on.  For example, 
phishing was a brand new term and concept when I started working.  At first, I was 
like what is that?  But after taking the training, things started to make more sense.  
(Ryan) 
 
Jenni recounted her upbringing and life experience as a deaf person to justify her 
response that she felt deaf people generally have a lower literacy level due to a variety of 
reasons. 
Deaf people are behind.  There is no doubt.  Deaf people are way behind compared to 
hearing people.  But deaf can catch up if they read more.  They need to read a lot 
more.  Deaf have to put in the extra work and try hard to keep up.  Really, for me, it 
depends on the person and whether they are interested or passionate about wanting to 
keep up.  Honestly, deaf people who grew up during my childhood, deaf people are 
behind, period. No matter what.  Do deaf people read every minute to keep up with 
hearing people?  There are only 24 hours in a day and tell me the truth, there is no way 
that those deaf people want to read enough to keep up with hearing people’s ability to 
hear things from word-of-mouth, the radio, and other things.  My niece is hearing and 
she is light years ahead of me just because she can hear.  I compare that to my 
childhood and I was nowhere close to where she already is right now.  Her vocabulary 
is far more advanced than mine ever was.  That is my point, deaf people are behind, 
doesn’t matter whether it is about computers or other topics, already way ahead by 
being able to hear.  It is really sad about the deaf people in general.  They have to put 
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in so much more work and time.  Deaf people must rely on their eyes to be able to do 
everything, read articles, watch interpreters, read captions, everything.  Hearing people 
can easily split between hearing and seeing.  It must be nice for hearing people.  I see 
deaf people not bother reading all the time.  My mother was right when she was trying 
to get me to read more when I was growing up.  That is not my mom’s fault, I really 
did not understand the importance when I was growing up.  (Jenni) 
 
Jenni pointed out that deaf people who are raised by deaf parents would have better 
literacy than most deaf people, but still not better than hearing people.  
Growing up in a deaf family is perfect. Deaf people know deaf people.  Deaf parents 
know what deaf children need.  Most hearing parents do not know what deaf 
children’s weaknesses are.  Many times, hearing parents do not listen to what deaf 
children need.  My parents did not believe me when I grew up.  If I had deaf parents, 
my English and language would 100% be much better than it is today.  I would have 
got the communication and language exposure that I needed.  (Jenni) 
 
Along with Cody, Steven believed that they had the same literacy level as a hearing 
person, but Steven warned that if he did not work to keep up with the news, he would not be 
able to have a similar literacy level.  
My literacy level is probably the same as a hearing person, but I put in a lot of effort to 
be able to say that.  I have to keep reading the news on a daily basis to be able to keep 
up with the current happenings.  If I did not do that, I would definitely be worse than 
the average hearing person.  (Steven) 
 
Cooper described that he believes the overall literacy level of deaf people have been 
improving over the last few decades, but still lag behind most hearing people. 
I think overall literacy around the world is improving because deaf people are more 
tech-savvy than before.  Compare the 1990s to now for deaf people, things are better, 
but we still definitely lag behind compared to hearing people.  It is solid, but not the 
best or the worst.  Most of the time when I’m in a room, I’m not the smartest person 
when it comes to security and my deafness definitely plays a role in that.  (Cooper) 
 
Cooper further elaborated that he believes there is a huge gap of knowledge in the deaf 
community relating to cyber security and that there needs to be more change in the near future 
to fill that gap. 
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I think that in the deaf community that there is a big need for improvement in 
understanding information security and the underlying concepts behind it.  Right now 
there is a huge push by Rochester Institute of Technology and University of Rochester 
in increasing awareness in science and STEM fields, but there is still a huge lacking 
gap in information security.  The concepts and content explaining information security 
to the deaf community are sorely needed.  There needs to be more visibility for 
researchers and educators alike to address the gap in the deaf community regarding 
information security.  (Cooper) 
 
Alison shared that most deaf people including herself do not have the same access to 
information as hearing people.  Due to the lack of access and missed incidental learning 
opportunities, Alison believed that deaf people have worse literacy levels. 
I want to say it is the same because of my faith in the world, but honestly, it is 
probably worse.  My access to information is not the same or as good as a hearing 
person’s access to information is. Incidental learning also plays a role in that too.  Our 
level of effort to be able to get the same amount of information is much higher.  We 
need more time and have to want to learn about anything including information 
security.  It also depends on our interests as well.  If a person is interested in learning 
and wants to keep up with the news, they would put in the effort to make sure that 
happens.  Deaf people share information quickly, but the question of whether they 
share information security stories as much is also a question.  We know more about 
disabilities and resources while hearing people don’t, but I am not sure when it comes 
to information security.  Probably not.  (Alison) 
 
Alison elaborated that it is important to keep in mind that all deaf people are different 
in regard to their interests, priorities, upbringings, and barriers, but the majority likely struggle 
with cyber security concepts just as much as she did. 
Like with hearing people, there is a spectrum of deaf people - those who were raised 
by deaf parents or hearing parents and have varying interests, levels of intellect, but in 
the end, I think it is fair to say that we are at a disadvantage because of the 
accessibility challenges that deaf people face to gaining access to information quickly, 
timely, and incidentally.  My literacy I think I have good literacy, but I still have a 
tough time with information security-related terminology.  I know deaf people who 
have terrible English and I can’t imagine how hard it might be for them.  Everything 
would have to be changed to intensive ASL to make sure that they understand fully. 
 
What your interests are, whether you care about security, you know enough to care 
about it, priority and time in our lives, English literacy level, upbringing, environment, 
and barriers.  All of these things play a role.  Access is critical to understanding.  
Hearing people are very similar to one another in terms of access to information.  
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They all grew up hearing things, but for deaf people, it is extremely diverse.  Some 
oral, some can be equal to hearing people, some are completely deaf and fall behind.  
There are so many factors.  (Alison) 
 
Eva conveyed that her literacy levels were much worse than most hearing people 
because of her deafness and the barriers that she often encountered in her experiences. 
My language and literacy are definitely worse than any hearing person.  How much 
worse?  That is a great question.  I think this is the case because I can’t hear the 
general lingo from other people around me.  Most of my deaf friends do not know 
much about technology.  Another thing is that a lot of times public service 
announcements are on the radio and those obviously do not have captions.  Sometimes 
I take the time to read news articles and they do have some information, but in 
general, I don’t have time for that.  Our county provides free security seminar classes, 
but they do not provide interpreting services.  I wish they did, so I can take advantage 
of some of these courses to help increase my knowledge.  I do use YouTube for 
captions, but the quality is not there for successful learning.  (Eva) 
 
Digital literacy and language skills are critical in a person’s ability to learn about 
important cyber security concepts to be able to defend a person’s information, their devices, 
and network.  The majority of deaf participants expressed concern that their digital literacy 
and language skills were lower than hearing people due to a variety of factors including deaf-
specific barriers, upbringings, backgrounds, interests, level of effort, and priorities as 
discussed above. 
 
b. Poor Literacy as a Cause of Overall Poor Security 
In this sub-theme, the majority of the deaf participants discussed how they felt that 
their digital literacy levels were a source of their poor security behavior and frustrations.  Eva 
described that she has poor security behavior because of her limited English language skills. 
I would describe my experience with security as mediocre at best.  I do not know how 
to handle viruses and rely on my deaf husband to help me.  Even then, we both 
struggle mainly because of the language.  The complexity of the terminology is too 
much and I just get frustrated, give up, and let it go.  (Eva) 
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Eva elaborated that she struggled when her employer would ask her to apply security 
patches on her work computer at home. 
Work will contact me every now and then with a captioned video describing how to 
apply a required security update or patch.  I struggle to understand these videos even if 
they are captioned because I do not understand the security and computer terminology 
that is in the video.  I just end up hoping that I did it the correct way.  I really wish that 
I could just drag and drop the solution on my computer and have it automatically do 
everything necessary.  (Eva) 
 
Alexa expressed her limitations in being able to effectively protect her devices against 
cyber security threats due to her literacy skills. 
I don’t know if I can solve about that.  I guess it depends on what the problem is.  I 
can google for some things or ask a friend if they have any idea what to do.  The main 
problem I have is not being able to find the right article or find a friend who knows 
exactly how to solve the problem that I am experiencing.  But if I find the right article, 
I guess I could, but it would take me a few tries.  The terminology is usually really 
advanced.   Not in English.  No, it is English but not my level of English, it is too 
advanced for me.  My language is not advanced enough to be able to understand 
concepts in the first try.  
 
I don’t understand anything anymore these days online.  All of the terms and concepts 
are so confusing.  I will say for example when I saw an article saying that if I see a 
picture or word doc or PDF in an email, I need to be careful and not click on any .exe 
files or anything.  I don’t really understand what they mean by that or why that even 
matters.  I feel like my deafness plays a role in that being a problem.  My field is not 
in computers, but it does not mean that I shouldn’t know that.  (Alexa) 
 
Trista explained that without any step by step help and learning through reading is too 
difficult for her to understand and improve her security practices. 
If someone showed me step by step and explained everything and answered all of my 
questions, then maybe I would be able to learn how to protect my computer.  I have 
tried to read Google, online, and follow directions.  It always seems to not work or be 
too confusing to follow.  It always seems to be a different level of understanding 
between what I read and what the article actually means.  My confidence in being able 
to learn how to do this is somewhat shaky.  I am not entirely sure if I would be able to.  
Sometimes I feel like I can read and understand what the directions say, but when I 
attempt to do it, it often does not result into success.  (Trista) 
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Cathy recounted her confusion and difficulties in understanding computer-related 
concepts even if she held a computer science degree. 
I feel that some of the terminologies is hard to understand.  The rest is just confusing.  
A lot of times I guess what they really mean when I read about something related to 
computers.  My degree was in computer science, but that was over 30 years ago with 
mainframes.  I would benefit from accessible training.  I would try to google the 
answer myself, but most of the time I find that the solutions are extremely confusing 
to me.  I always misunderstand the directions and end up having my deaf husband or 
friend to help.  I try to follow the steps but most of the time the instructions do not 
make sense to me or sometimes it is too much information.  (Cathy) 
 
This sub-theme focused on how poor digital literacy was a cause of a participant’s 
poor security knowledge and behavior.  Being able to read and understand concepts about 
cyber security to protect one’s information and devices is extremely important.   
The second theme was “Digital Literacy”, which encompasses the key role that digital 
literacy plays in a person’s knowledge and understanding of how to address potential cyber 
security threats.  This theme was supported by two sub-themes ranging from believing that 
digital literacy levels of deaf individuals are subpar compared to hearing people and that poor 
digital literacy is a cause of a participant’s poor overall security behavior. 
 
Theme III: Positive Security Intention 
 The third theme that emerged from the data was the positive security intention of deaf 
participants.  Participants that were interviewed indicated either positive security behavior or 
the desire to try to learn and improve their security behavior. 
 
a. Positive Security Knowledge & Behavior 
In this sub-theme, the majority of deaf people shared that they possessed some 
positive security knowledge and took part in positive security behavior.  Cooper indicated that 
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he is able to secure his information to a certain extent because of the unique environment that 
he lives and works in where there are many deaf people.  This allowed him to capitalize on 
word of mouth and other experiences that are often not available to deaf people. 
The word of mouth allows me to learn more about ways to protect my information.  I 
see my students, classmates, colleagues, for some information.  For example, when I 
sign up for an account, it tells me to use a strong password.  Those different venues 
allowed me to learn a little about information security.  I felt that was enough for me 
to be able to protect myself.  I’ve heard plenty of stories to treat lightly.  My primary 
venue of information is through ASL and I am fortunate that I live in upstate New 
York where there are many other deaf people that I can communicate and exchange 
stores and experiences with.  If I did not have that access like many other deaf people 
in the world, I feel that my knowledge about potential threats would be nearly as good.  
I’m definitely in a unique situation where most of my deaf friends are brilliant in 
technology and science.  If I was in another state, maybe I would learn some things, 
but it would definitely not be on a higher level.  (Cooper) 
 
Cooper reiterated how helpful it was to take an accessible course on the fundamentals 
of cyber security and the difference it has made in his current knowledge.  
Taking a class on security made such a big difference in what I know today.  The class 
encourages that I take these steps to secure my computer.  I’ve had some Murphy’s 
Law happen to me where I lost my information and it woke me up and made me try to 
protect my data.  The school’s disability services office provided captioning and 
interpreting services for these classes for me to have access. If it weren’t for that, I 
would not be able to do what I currently do to protect my information.  (Cooper) 
 
Cooper added that his employer requires him to utilize additional security mechanisms 
to protect his data. 
My employer requires that we use UbiDuo and DuoMobile for 2-factor authentication 
of signing into anything work-related.  Other than that, strong passwords and 
consistently changing them is also required.  These security features allow me to 
conveniently protect my work and personal data. 
 
Alison shared that she regularly backs up her data to ensure that she does not lose any 
data that is important to her. 
I do back up my stuff using my university’s cloud drive - they use Box, which is an 
online storage system.  I also have my own physical hard drive that I back up stuff 
probably once every six months.  My research data is pretty important to me and I 
cannot imagine what would happen if I lost it all.  (Alison) 
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Alison described that her upbringing played a role in how she tries to be aware of 
potential threats online. 
Growing up, my parents were somewhat paranoid about the internet and shopping 
online.  I remember begging my mom trying to convince her to let me buy some 
clothes on the internet.  They would not let me do that.  Now we do, but we try to be 
aware of the websites that we shop from.  (Alison) 
 
Alison also conveyed that she benefited the most from taking a class about security 
with a sign language interpreter and that has helped her become far more cognizant about 
potential threats. 
Word of mouth, reading articles, taking an ethics class that talked about computer 
security and the importance of protecting data.  The field I am in involves a lot of 
medical research.  Out of these sources, the class has been the most useful and 
applicable to my understanding of information security.  I had an interpreter.  After I 
learned some things from there, it helped my curiosity and planted the seed to have me 
ask further questions and learn more things on my own through talking with other 
people and reading more about the topic.   
 
The class that I took helped me the most in my knowledge of computer security.  I 
never thought about anything security related before until I took the class.  In class, 
they warned us that people are watching and can see what we are doing on the 
Internet.  Whatever you google, like if you search how to make a bomb and other 
shady things, someone will eventually come knocking on your door and anyone can 
hack into your computer as well.  So I’ve been trying to be careful.  Reading articles 
on my phone – New York Times, New York Post, and other places.  (Alison) 
 
Steven described the steps that he takes to protect his information at home and how he 
believes it is working well for him. 
I have multiple passwords that are all different.  I have them completely memorized 
and keep it on my notepad on my computer as well.  I do store my stuff on iCloud 
Drive and that seems to be working well so far.  (Steven) 
 
Trista explained that she made an effort to ensure that she used complex passwords for 
her accounts. 
I needed to make sure that all of my passwords had different variations and that took a 
long time to do because I had a good number of accounts with the same password.  I 
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had to make sure that they all used different words and numbers.  (Trista) 
 
Ryan pointed out that the security training that he was able to take at work allowed 
him to expand his knowledge and improve his security behavior. 
The security awareness offered by my employer was by far the most helpful out of the 
things that I have used to learn about information security.  It was the most helpful 
because it simplified all of the instructions to clearly explain information security to a 
wide variety of audiences ranging from new hires to experienced employees.  Plus, I 
have a few common sense things that I learned from personal emails.  Having some 
trial and error experience was helpful.  (Ryan) 
 
Cody reiterated the benefit of having taken a class at his university about security even 
if it was required, and the impact it has had on his security behavior. 
I took a class at my school.  It was required for my field.  Secure software engineering.  
It was extremely in-depth and everything I know now, which isn’t too much, was from 
that class.  My school provided interpreting services for me in that class.  My school 
also sends out informational reminder emails to make sure that students remain 
cognizant to potential threats. If it wasn’t for that class or my school’s proactivity, I 
would know pretty much nothing about security.  (Cody) 
 
Alexa explicated that the knowledge that her father taught her while growing up 
played an important role in what she knows today.  She is able to identify potential security 
threats and mitigate them. 
I’ve gotten those phishing emails.  Those are usually painfully obvious and I just 
delete them or ignore them.  I get them pretty often.  My dad taught me to never click 
on any of those links.  I’ve also read online about those and that I shouldn’t click on 
anything.  If it weren’t for my dad, I don’t think I would have been prepared to address 
those threats.  A lot of my deaf friends click on them and they have absolutely no idea 
what they are getting themselves into.  (Alexa) 
 
This sub-theme focused on capturing the positive security knowledge and behavior 
that deaf participants indicated.  Such behavior included using complex passwords, two-factor 
authentication, backing up data on the cloud, and learning from the word of mouth of other 
deaf people whenever possible. 
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b. Desire to Try and Improve Security Behavior 
In this sub-theme, the majority of deaf people indicated that they would like to 
improve their overall security knowledge and behavior.  Cathy described her perspective on 
whether she felt her computer was secure enough and if she intends to improve her current 
security implementation. 
Probably not. I don’t know.  I can’t wake up and say oh my computer is secure. No. I 
am not sure.  I need to know for myself and learn.  I don’t know.  I feel like… with all 
of the data breaches… news, Facebook, everything, I mean it is constant.  It never 
ends.  Credit card thefts.  One thing after another.  Recently there was a big 
corporation that was hacked but there is always something.  If it happens to those big 
companies, it definitely happens to me too and I need to do everything I can to ensure 
that does not happen.  (Cathy) 
 
Cathy further detailed her thoughts about the interview that took place and that she 
would benefit from a cyber security awareness program made specifically for deaf people. 
This interview really made me think and realize that I need to prove my computer 
security and re-evaluate my priorities.  Maybe I should do something better. When am 
I going to be hacked yet? I don’t know.  Maybe this is a wake-up call.  Do you have an 
answer or something that I can follow?  I feel that I would benefit from a program 
made specifically for deaf people and helping them defend their systems.  (Cathy) 
 
Alison suggested that she would like to do what she can to improve her security. 
Now I want to after this interview.  I am realizing that I do not have much set up and 
probably should change that.  That adds another thing to my ever-growing list of 
things to learn more about and I need to make sure I have enough time for all of that.  
(Alison) 
 
Trista expressed her interest in taking an accessible course on the fundamentals of 
security to enhance her knowledge. 
I would love to learn more about the fundamentals of security.  Especially if there was 
a workshop or free class offered specifically for deaf people.  I know very little right 
now. (Trista) 
 
Ryan conveyed his willingness to capitalize on opportunities to learn more about 
security. 
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From our experiences with my dad’s laptop or my old laptop from high school, we 
have always taken it to best buy or another tech shop to resolve the security issues.  
Outside of that, I do not know how to remove viruses or add security patches.  If I had 
the opportunity to learn or if someone taught me how to do these things, I might be 
able to, but right now, I do not know how to do any of these things.  I put off updating 
my phone as well.  (Ryan) 
 
Alexa shared that she tries her best to be mindful of keeping her data secure by 
deleting sensitive information.  
I try to make sure that my sensitive information isn’t put on anything that could be 
shared.  I do admit I’ve emailed my social before, but I try to delete everything on 
Facebook, email, or any desktop where it might be visible or accessible.  I do try to 
clean up my computer every now and then.  I delete the cookies, browser history, and 
other things.  (Alexa) 
 
Alexa described further that while she has minimal experience, she intended to protect 
her computer by downloading protection software, but was unsuccessful in doing so as it 
made things worse. 
I have minimal experience.  Often times my computer will get viruses.  I try to 
download different types of protection software but that leads to more problems, too.  
Things have improved since I switched to a Mac laptop, but I still run into things when 
I click on advertisements and visit websites that I probably should not visit.  Like one 
time, I remember when I wanted to download a game from this shady website, and it 
ended up having so many pop-ups and I could not make it stop.  When this happened, 
I would worry a lot that my computer might stop working and that I would lose all of 
my information.  (Alexa) 
 
Cody expressed his desire to be able to learn more about security when there is a fully 
accessible option available. 
A web-page or a series of instructional videos that are fully accessible (signed, 
captioned, etc.) would be really beneficial for the deaf community.  All of these 
complex concepts need to be explained clearly in ASL-form for them to benefit from 
it.  Honestly, if not for that class, I would have no sense of security nor would I 
understand the importance of it.  Deaf people are missing out on incidental learning 
opportunities to have this “common sense” that is already there for hearing people.  I 
would love to take a course like that.  (Cody) 
 
138 
 
Eva admitted that she has minimal experience in protecting her computer, but she 
would like to learn how to. 
I would describe my ability to protect my computer as minimal.  I am usually not 
successful in trying to figure out how to solve security issues, as a result, I usually just 
give up.  One time, my husband and I had to hire the Best Buy Geek Squad and pay 
them to clean up our computer.  I sometimes wonder if I could do it myself to save 
money, but I don’t know how.  I would like to take a class someday.  (Eva) 
 
Eva cautioned that she felt uncertain about learning ways to protect her computer 
because of her literacy, but would gladly take a course if it was taught in ASL. 
I want to learn but I feel like it is too difficult.  It is hard to understand the concepts of 
how the systems work.  My router and modem, my goal is to not to reset it, everything 
would get screwed up and I don’t know how to fix it.  I don’t want to spend 2-3 hours 
on the phone with my internet service provider.  I am not a computer person and it is 
just too hard for me to learn.  I am more of a software person; I am afraid to break 
things so I leave it alone.  If I took a class, it would have to be in ASL, then I would 
gladly consider it.  (Eva) 
 
Jenni recalled that she keeps getting viruses on her computer and that she would like 
to take a class to learn more. 
My computer for some reason keeps on getting viruses and I would like to take a class 
on that.  I need help with my computer.  I don’t know why my computer gets so much 
more problems than my iPad.  Aren’t they all the same thing anyway?  I have no idea 
how I would even start to make sure that what I download on my computer is safe.  
Computers are so complicated and confusing to use.  (Jenni) 
 
Cooper opined that the deaf community including himself would benefit tremendously 
from an accessible cyber security awareness program. 
Deaf community and people would benefit from a cyber security awareness course a 
lot.  Not only would it help with general understanding, but it would help 
tremendously with academics because people rely on technology to be able to succeed 
in school.  The current state is extremely inconsistent.  If there were ASL-based 
instruction videos with tidbits on information about security and best practices, I feel 
that I would benefit from this a lot.  Or even integration of ASL and accessibility 
based instruction in courses themselves.  (Cooper) 
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This sub-theme described how participants indicated the desire to learn more about 
security to try to improve their overall security practice behavior.  Half of the battle is to want 
to learn more about security and it appears that the other half of the battle is ensuring that 
these deaf participants are able to receive access services. 
The third theme was “Positive Security Intention”, which captured the deaf 
participant’s overall intent to try and learn more about cyber security.  This theme was 
supported by two sub-themes: positive security knowledge & behavior and the desire to try 
and improve security behavior. 
 
Theme IV: Reliance on Technology 
 The fourth theme arose from the descriptions of deaf participant experiences when 
interacting with technology and their reliance on technology.  This theme is categorized into 
two sub-themes where one embodies the descriptions of increased reliance on technology due 
to deafness.  The other sub-theme represents the potential impact on deaf participants in the 
event of losing access to technology. 
 
a. Increased Reliance 
This sub-theme focuses on how participants shared their experiences with technology 
and how much they rely on technology in their daily living.  Every participant admitted that 
they rely on technology on a daily basis and number of participants cited their deafness as the 
underlying reason for that reliance.  Trista expressed that she uses the computer and the 
internet on a daily basis to run her business because she is not able to talk on the phone. 
I use the computer and internet every day.  My uses are primarily for research, health, 
watching videos, Facebook, communicating with friends, emails.  I also do some 
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graphic design.  Primarily those uses.  My husband and I own a business and I use a 
template to type up my invoices and emails.  I email them through Gmail.  Without 
email, I am not sure how we would proceed with our business because I rely on those 
communications to be able to reach out to customers and bill them.  (Trista) 
 
Ryan explained that he uses his computer and the internet to be able to communicate 
with his family and friends that would otherwise be inconvenient. 
Every day.  I don’t use my phone or personal laptop while I am at work.  When I get 
home, I use my phone and personal laptop for Facebook, social media, texting, catch 
up with the news.  This way I can keep in touch with my family and friends.  Talking 
on the phone is not as convenient for me.  I do use my emails occasionally.  Job 
applications. I definitely rely on the computer and Internet for my daily living.  (Ryan) 
 
Jenni recalled that since she received her iPad, she uses it on a daily basis to 
communicate with everyone she knows. 
Everyday.  Once I got my iPad, I’ve been glued to it.  I do everything on it.  Banking, 
stocks, bills, sports, news, you name it, I do it.  I use it to communicate with everyone 
I know.  Emails and texting. (Jenni) 
 
Alexa described that she utilizes computers and the internet both in the workplace and 
at home for communicating. 
I use it all the time.  Everyday.  My primary use is for communications - emails, social 
media, texting, etc.  My social life relies on it.  At work, I use the computer a lot to 
handle confidential information with clients.  Data recording, filing, contacts, school 
system information.  (Alexa) 
 
Cooper shared that he uses the internet for his daily living because he needs to be able 
to communicate with his coworkers using a video phone. 
I use the internet every day for work and my personal life.  Primarily to communicate 
with texting and emails because I cannot use the phone.  I use my video phone a lot 
because most of my coworkers are deaf anyway.  I like to surf websites too.  (Cooper) 
 
Cathy explained that she relies on the Internet on a daily basis.  She uses a speech to 
text app in the workplace to be able to understand her coworkers. 
I use it every day.  Check my email, message my family because I can’t talk on the 
phone, mostly personal use.  I use an app to convert speech to text at work to 
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understand what my co-workers are saying.  I would not be able to understand my 
coworkers who have an accent if I did not have the app.  (Cathy) 
 
Alison admitted that she spends 2 to 3 hours a day using the Internet and her computer 
because the Internet gives her access to important communication and information. 
Every day.  Maybe 2 to 3 hours a day.  Primarily used for work, research, look up 
databases and publications.  Internet, pleasure, social media, Facebook, Instagram, 
email, communication, video phones, shopping.  A lot of stuff!  The internet is my 
access to communication and information.  If I don’t know something, I ask google or 
phone a friend using FaceTime.  (Alison)  
 
 This sub-theme portrayed the reliance that deaf people have on technology for a day to 
day living.  This increased reliance on technology presents interesting ramifications when 
considering the potential security impact of increased reliance on technology, tying into the 
next sub-theme that was identified. 
 
b. High Impact if Loss of Access 
This sub-theme depicts the opinions and reactions on the impact of deaf people losing 
access to their technology that they use on a daily basis.  Cooper pointed out that he would not 
be able to continue with his day to day life without the Internet or video phone. 
If the Internet or my video phone was taken away from me, I don’t know how I would 
be able to complete my daily duties and I would feel the impact because I cannot talk 
on the phone.  My reliance on the system is definitely higher than an average hearing 
person.  I am oblivious to the potential risks and the impact that it would have on me if 
I ever lost access.  (Cooper) 
 
Ryan shared that his life would be much more difficult without the Internet due to his 
deafness. 
Taking the Internet away from me would make it difficult because it is my primary 
venue of communication to anyone I know because I live on my own and cannot talk 
on the phone.  (Ryan) 
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Cathy compared losing access to the Internet akin to losing access to her family and 
friends because she would no longer be able to communicate with them. 
If I lost access to my iPhone or the Internet, I would be losing access to my family and 
friends.  I am not sure what I would do at that point.  I would definitely consider 
paying a large amount of money to get it back.  (Cathy) 
 
Jenni expressed concern that she would not know what to do if she lost access to her 
iPad and the Internet.   
I do not know what I would do if someone were to take it away.  My life would come 
to a halt if my iPad broke.  I don’t even know what I would do at that point.  I would 
have a really hard time though because all of my passwords and contacts are on it.  I 
don’t even have a backup or a second copy of that.  I need to look into backing up my 
data.  (Jenni) 
 
Cody explained that he relies on computers and the Internet and that the potential 
impact of losing access would be huge.  Cody said that he would be happy to pay someone to 
get access again. 
I use computers and the internet every day.  My primary use is emails, 
communication, and social media.  I can’t imagine not having that.  It would be 
challenging to be able to go on with my day to day living because I cannot talk on the 
phone.  If someone held my data or phone as ransom, I rely on the access to my 
information so much that I would gladly pay up to get access.  It really depends on 
what information it is that was stolen or how long I lost access for, but yes, I rely on 
everything a lot.  (Cody) 
 
Steven described that he uses the Internet and his computer on a daily basis to be able 
to communicate with his peers. 
I use the internet and my computer every day.  Primarily for social media, 
communication, and texting.  I would have to start over my life if I ever lost access 
because it would be hard to reach out to anyone without video phones or the Internet.  
(Steven) 
 
Eva communicated that her reliance on technology was tremendous and that losing 
access would result in chaos in her life. 
Every day all day, at work and at home. Everything personal, banking, finance, 
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everything is on technology.  If everything was taken away, I would have to go back 
to the 1970s and drive to places to ask for more information.  If someone stole 
everything, I would gladly pay to have access again.  The impact would be that I 
would have a hard time working because I work from home and not having access to 
my computer would be disastrous.  This is why I try to back-up everything every now 
and then, after this interview I will go do that.  I don’t understand what the iCloud is, 
how can we trust wherever our data is being stored?  I prefer to back-up things on my 
physical hard drive every now and then.  (Eva) 
 
Alison warned that losing access would force her to go back to the 1990’s lifestyle 
where it was difficult for deaf people to communicate with one another. 
If I did not have access to any of that, I do not know what I would do.  I would have to 
go to the library or ask my parents to call for me.  I use my video phone to make 
appointments, set up meetings, ask questions.  I would have to go show up in person 
or write a letter.  I would not be able to order food.  My god.  That is the 1990s.  
Thank god we are alive during this time.  Simple questions, I would not be able to get 
the answers that I want.  (Alison) 
 
 This sub-theme discussed the potential impact in the event of loss of access for deaf 
individuals.  Deaf people rely on technology for their day to day function and are at a greater 
risk of impact in the event of a compromise that disables their access to essential features 
provided by technology such as communication. 
This fourth theme was “Reliance on Technology”, which represented the deaf 
participant’s experience with technology and how much of an impact technology has on the 
lives of deaf people.  This theme was supported by two sub-themes: increased reliance on 
technology and high impact if loss of access. 
 
Theme V: Poor Security Knowledge 
The fifth theme became evident while analyzing the discussions that took place 
throughout the one-on-one interviews.  Deaf participants demonstrated poor fundamental 
security knowledge and understanding of various cyber security concepts.  This theme 
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consists of three sub-themes ranging from poor background knowledge, lack of breach 
experience, and common misconceptions about security. 
 
a. Poor Background Knowledge 
This sub-theme covered the poor background knowledge relating to security that deaf 
participants indicated throughout the interviews.  Eva communicated that she has taken 
training courses at work, but still has a poor understanding of how to identify and remove 
potential threats. 
Work requires us to take their workshop once a year to review our security practices.  I 
took it twice last year because I had a hard time understanding everything the first 
time around.  Fortunately, all of the instruction was delivered through videos and they 
were captioned.  I remember some things from that such as don’t open the attachments 
especially if it is an XLS, but I don’t really understand why.  If I run into more viruses, 
I am supposed to contact the information technology team right away.  Otherwise, I 
have not taken any classes or anything else.  My knowledge about this topic is very 
poor.  The things that work teaches us only helps me try to protect my computer, but 
not how to remove viruses.  I have to try to be aware to identify viruses and let my 
work know so they can fix it.  I have a difficult time identifying those things even after 
taking the course provided by my employer.  (Eva) 
 
Steven explained that he has no knowledge in how to secure his computer and that he 
relies on rebooting his computer in an attempt to fix potential threats. 
I have no experience in identifying or removing viruses and spyware.  I do not know 
how to put in security updates or patches either.  I just turn off the computer if I run 
into a problem and turn it on again to see what happens and hope for the best.  I think I 
have virus protection on my computer but I am not sure.  (Steven) 
 
Steven recalled how his Twitter account was hacked and that he does not why or how 
it happened. 
My Twitter account was somehow hacked and inappropriate things were tweeted 
without my permission.  I still do not know how that happened, but fortunately, my 
friend texted me to let me know after the friend noticed the posting.  I was really 
alarmed by that and immediately changed my password.  (Steven) 
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Alison shared that she has limited knowledge on topics relating to cyber security and 
that she struggles to understand concepts relating to this topic. 
I do not have the basic understanding of security that a lot of people do from word of 
mouth.  It also does not help that I hate computers, programming, and computer 
science.  I have no idea about all that stuff.  I would say 50% of the time, I struggle 
with terms and concepts.  If there is something wrong with my computer and I take it 
in, when they explain what was wrong, I don’t understand their explanation most of 
the time.  Like cookies.  I don’t understand what cookies are.  Do I allow them? block 
or delete them?  (Alison) 
 
Cooper described he struggled with learning more about security and that he still 
doesn’t understand what the purpose is for a lot of different things. 
Some parts.  At first, I struggled with encryption, decryption, and firewall concepts.  
What it was, what is the intention, why does it do what it does, who does it work.  
Sometimes I see it on a computer at work and I still have no idea what it is for.  Even 
after the IT guy explains it to me briefly, it still does not make much sense.  Umm… 
sure.  I guess, Okay.  I don’t understand why they use these things, like what is the 
point?  (Cooper) 
 
Cooper further explained that the security course he took for his Master’s degree 
helped him gain a basic understanding, but he still feels that there is much more to learn. 
I took a security course for my Master’s degree that helped me learn the best practices 
for data preservation and the importance of having different passwords and strong 
ones.  That course helped me a lot with understanding the importance of using strong 
passwords and following best practices for data security, but it did not help my 
computer literacy because there is so much that I still don’t understand.  I still do not 
have an in-depth understanding of the underlying mechanisms for security even if I 
took the course on best practices.  Even if I learned more about this additional security 
information, I feel like I would still lose out anyways and my accounts would still be 
compromised.  (Cooper) 
 
Jenni talked about how she does not have any experience or knowledge relating to 
technology and security skills. 
I used to have this software, I don’t remember the name, it would clean up the viruses 
on my devices.  I don’t have it anymore.  I would not know how to identify a virus or 
get rid of something bad from my android phone.  I am not sure if I would just leave it 
alone or try to delete it.  I’m not sure what to do.   I do not have any experience with 
that kind of thing.  Even updating stuff.  I hate updating my devices because they take 
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forever.  My brother comes over and tries to make sure that I do that every now and 
then, but it has been a long time since.  I don’t really understand why people have to 
update apps and their devices.  It is such an annoyance.  Honestly, the only things I 
know are what you just taught me today during our conversation.  Before today, the 
only thing I knew was to use that app to clean viruses that my brother showed me, but 
I don’t use that anymore.  (Jenni) 
 
Jenni expanded on the difficulties that she faces with spam emails and how she does 
not know how to stop it. 
I get a lot of junk emails that are foreign and often relate to sexual things.  How did 
they get my email address?  I think somehow they got it from a promotion that I 
signed up for and ended up sharing my email address to other third parties.  My email 
is pretty long and I would think that it is complex enough for it to not be a random-
chance type of thing.  I do not use a computer, I only have an iPad and an Android 
phone.  I use Gmail. I’ve been deleting all of these junk emails constantly, every day, 
it is so annoying.  I don’t know how to get rid of them.  (Jenni) 
 
Trista talked about how her knowledge mainly comes from articles that she reads 
online, but admitted that she has a limited understanding of information security. 
Most of the things I know come from the Internet.  I like to read articles a lot.  I 
recently read something about how Google knows everything about their customers 
and that we should use DuckDuckGo instead of Google.  I don’t get if I am supposed 
to use DuckDuckGo instead of Chrome or Safari.  Otherwise, I don’t really have any 
exposure or prior knowledge about information security.  (Trista) 
 
Eva explicated that she struggles with removing viruses from her computer because 
her knowledge is very limited even if her field of employment relates to computers. 
I work as a full-time programmer, working from home, using my personal computer 
and I run into viruses often.  It is aggravating.  The computer slows down a lot because 
of the viruses.  There are a lot of pop-ups and random executables that use up the 
memory.  The problem is I don’t know how to remove it or make it stop.  I end up 
having to get my husband to help me with removing it.  We have ended up paying for 
security software and downloading it to remove the viruses, and even then, it is not 
100% effective.  I have had my social security number stolen through the internet and 
I am pretty sure it is because of the viruses on my computer.  (Eva) 
 
Alison described that she relies on expert help to address any problems that she faces 
with her computers. 
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I had a PC laptop in college that constantly got viruses.  I gave it to my university’s 
tech center to set up a firewall.  I got a Mac and I’ve not had any problems since.  My 
PC would shut down and crash.  Some of my programs would not work and the 
computer was so sluggish.  I still don’t know how or why that happened.  (Alison) 
 
 This sub-theme discussed the poor background knowledge that was evident in the 
experiences of the deaf participants.  The evidence of poor background knowledge supports 
the case for more accessible workshops, training, and classes for deaf participants to be able 
to improve their overall security practice behavior. 
 
b. Lack of Breach Experience 
This sub-theme describes deaf participants’ lack of breach experience, which affects 
their ability to identify and respond to potential security threats.  Cooper explained his initial 
shock when he found that his information was stolen and that he did not have any prior 
knowledge. 
At first, I was shocked.  Then, I was like oh man that is right, there are a lot of smart 
kids out there trying to steal my stuff.  I was a bit overwhelmed and had to step it up 
and try to figure it out.  I did not know what to do to and I felt that it required a lot of 
extra unnecessary work compared to hearing people to be able to stay with the curve.  
I should have been able to prevent the majority of threats in the first place and that my 
deafness was a root cause of that.  (Cooper) 
 
Cathy disclosed that she had very limited knowledge on how to address phishing 
emails and that she still does not fully understand how to avoid them even after being 
compromised. 
My mistakes have helped me learn a little bit.  Before the mistake I made with the 
Google attack, I would have never thought twice about clicking on any of those links 
from emails.  I had very little to no prior knowledge to my experiences, and these 
experiences led me to look into it a little more and be more aware of a potential attack, 
but I still don’t fully understand why or how these things work, which makes it hard to 
identify good versus bad.   Without these resources, I am not sure what I would do.  I 
rely on my husband, son, and other resources to be able to resolve any issues that I 
face.  (Cathy) 
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Jenni recalled an event where she was targeted by phishing emails and she had no 
knowledge about phishing before being targeted.  
1 or 2 years ago I received emails from a person claiming that I was a benefactor of 
someone who passed away who had the same last name as me.  At first, I thought it 
was legitimate because I am not well versed in identifying threats.  The email was 
very fancy and pretended to be a lawyer.  The letterhead and everything looked 
professional trying to make it look real.  I was so stupid to think that it was real.  I 
exchanged emails with this person for a few days and I was having a hard time 
deciding if I should share my personal information.  Eventually, I told the person that I 
was going to ask my brother and they encouraged me not to do that.  That was when I 
thought it was pretty strange and I ended up not answering the person anymore.  I get 
a ton of junk mail related to that now.  (Jenni) 
 
Trista talked about a recent experience where she was targeted by a phishing email 
and she had no idea what to do. 
I have no experience at all.  I would have no idea what to do.  Several months ago I 
got an email from someone that said they got my password for some of my accounts.  
They also shared some personal information that people generally do not know about 
me, which made me believe them a little more.  I had to read the email over and over 
again.  Some of the information was accurate and some were not.  The email 
threatened me that if I did not pay them $2650, they would expose information about 
me to the world that could cause harm to my reputation.  They said they would tell 
people what videos I have watched online, some were true and some were not.  I was 
shocked.  I discussed with my husband and we thought that it was most likely fraud, 
but we weren’t 100% sure.  I decided to block the email address and have not heard 
from them since.  I use AOL because AOL lets people block addresses, but Gmail 
does not.  I did not feel prepared to address this kind of threat because it seemed very 
legitimate and I was panicking and concerned about my private information being 
exposed.  When I blocked the address, I never heard back, nothing has happened, and 
that relieved me.  If something actually happened, I have no idea what I would do at 
that point.  (Trista) 
 
Alison expressed that she was not prepared to address the potential threat because she 
had never been exposed to phishing emails. 
Recently, I got a phishing email for the first time, I really thought it was real.  It was 
inviting me to a conference and I’ve only published one paper, so I thought it was 
somewhat fishy.  It is not like I am well known, I just started my research.  I would 
think that it is rare that someone would invite me to speak at a conference.  That was 
the first thing that threw me off.  Second, I looked up that information and it did not 
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match.  Sometimes they even email me again as a follow up trying to “remind” me to 
sign up for the conference.  The first time I saw that email, I ignored it, but when they 
sent a follow-up, I felt more tempted to respond.  I was not prepared to address it, but I 
feel like I am able to now after trial and error and asking people about it.  (Alison) 
 
Ryan said that he had limited experience in dealing with potential threats as he has had 
limited exposure to that type of thing. 
Well, my dad has gone through some credit card fraud and identity theft and that has 
helped me be more aware of that type of thing.  I have not learned anything else 
otherwise.  I was expecting my university to offer something useful, but they never 
did.  (Ryan) 
 
Eva pointed to her limited experience as a reason why she had to throw out her laptop 
and start over completely because she could not get rid of the problems she was having. 
My internet service provider set up our defenses for us and how am I supposed to 
know if it is actually working?  That is the problem.  I did have a major breach with 
my personal laptop and I was not able to recover from it.  I had to end up throwing it 
out and buy a new laptop.  This experience made me feel like my defenses were not 
good enough, but I do not know what else to do.  I don’t want to go through that ever 
again.  I feel like this security suite from my internet service provider that I am paying 
for is purely for psychological reasons.  In fact, I purposefully use my iPhone for 
banking related things because I think Apple is more secure in general.  I think 
backing up some of my things is useful as well.  (Eva) 
 
 This sub-theme focused on the suggested lack of breach experience of deaf 
participants.  The lack of breach experience often directly affects a person’s ability to identify 
the presence of a threat and plays an important role in the success of a person’s overall 
security practice behavior.   
 
c. Common Misconceptions 
This sub-theme covers the common misconceptions about cyber security that these 
deaf participants had.  The most prevalent misconception was that if a participant owns an 
Apple product, they no longer have to put in any effort for security.  Cathy explained that she 
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expects her Apple devices to secure themselves and protect her information without having to 
do anything. 
I put a lot of trust into Apple and expect that they will take care of me.  Things are a 
lot better since I switched from Windows back in the day to Apple devices.  I used to 
have to deal with Norton Anti-Virus and other things with Windows, but now I don’t 
with Macs.  For Apple, I think they already have their own system in place.  I don’t 
use anything else on my Apple devices.  I assume that they are doing everything 
necessary to protect me.  I do not have anti-virus or anything else on my computer for 
this reason.  (Cathy) 
 
Jenni said that she believes her devices should be able to take care of themselves in 
regard to potential threats. 
I would like to learn more about security, but is it necessary?  I don’t really think so.  
Really most of my devices should be able to take care of themselves.  Apple is very 
good.  My Android, I call it a Banana, not as good as Apple, but I expect Android to 
do the same.  How often does a virus really happen?  I do not think that it happens 
enough for me to spend my time to learn more about that kind of thing.  If I do try to 
learn, I expect that it would be really complicated and that makes me not want to 
bother with it.  (Jenni) 
 
Eva explained that she does not apply security patches because she is concerned that 
they may be hidden viruses. 
If I had to choose a number between 0 and 10, I would choose a 3 for my confidence 
level in learning more about topics relating to security.  I would probably try to google 
ways to get rid of viruses if I had to (I haven’t yet).  Sometimes I get pop-ups that ask 
me to update my computer, but I refuse to allow them because there is no way for me 
to know if that is a virus in itself or not.  I’m more worried about making things worse 
because there is so much I don’t understand, so I tend to just leave it alone.  (Eva) 
 
Trista stopped using her husband’s Mac laptop when she would shop online because 
of prior credit card theft and opts to use her Mac desktop instead. 
What I found out later was that my husband’s Mac laptop has no security put in place.  
I think it was his laptop that was the issue, I don’t really know.  After we straightened 
that out, I tried to be really careful whenever I would order something online, I would 
do it on my Mac desktop instead of my Mac laptop because of what happened.  I 
refuse to order anything on my phone because my phone has no security either.  I was 
really worried about my information and finances after getting that email from the 
bank.  I was not able to call right away via video phone because the service is not good 
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when traveling compared to at home.  (Trista) 
 
Trista further explained that she used to have Mac Keeper security software to protect 
her Mac computers, but stopped using it because she could not tell if it was working or not. 
I stopped using Mac Keeper because I was not sure if it was really helping me be more 
secure or not.  I couldn’t tell.  Ignorance was bliss when the Mac Keeper was 
uninstalled because I was no longer getting these pop-up notifications of potential 
threats that were concerning me.  (Trista) 
 
Cody shared that he assumed Mac laptops would be able to secure his information and 
that he does not do anything else for that reason. 
Well, I assume that the Mac would be able to take care of that for me.  That is why I 
have not done anything.  I have a very superficial understanding of computer security 
even if my field is in computer science.  (Cody) 
 
 This sub-theme examined the common misconceptions relating to cyber security that 
arose during the analysis of the interview data.  By identifying common misconceptions and 
raising awareness on certain topics through pieces of trainings would pave the way for an 
improved overall security behavior. 
 This fifth theme was “Poor Security Knowledge”, which signified the deaf experience 
when attempting to engage in security practice behavior and their confidence levels in doing 
so.  This theme was reinforced by three sub-themes: poor background knowledge, lack of 
breach experience, and common misconceptions.  Each of these sub-themes played a role in a 
deaf individual’s overall poor security knowledge and their resultant security practice 
behavior and self-efficacy in information security. 
 
Theme VI: Poor Security Care Behavior 
The sixth theme became prevalent throughout the interviews with deaf participants.  
The evidence of poor security care behavior was overwhelming.  This theme is comprised of 
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three sub-themes including security not a priority, functionality over security, and knowing 
but not doing. 
 
a. Security not a Priority 
This sub-theme discusses how participants expressed that security is not a priority in 
their lives for a variety of reasons.  Cathy expressed that she is confident that she would be 
able to learn a lot about security, but she is not interested and it is not a priority. 
I feel extremely confident in being able to learn if I took a course or class, but I can’t 
be bothered to.  I’m not interested and I don’t think cyber is important enough of an 
issue nor are computers important enough to me.  I don’t see the value in learning 
these things and it is not a priority in my life right now.  I guess I just don’t see the 
importance in it and I don’t think anyone is stealing my information.  (Cathy) 
 
Eva acknowledged that she should be improving her security at home on her own, but 
she does not have the time for it. 
People at work tell me that it would probably be would be better for me to do it on my 
own, but the problem is I don’t understand how it works.  I don’t have the time to 
figure it out.  Every time the internet protocol address changes, the security suite 
causes everything in the house to stop working and I don’t know how to fix it, so I end 
up having my friend who is an information technology specialist come over and fix it.  
However, that friend just moved out of town, so I am thinking about not paying for it 
anymore.  I think I might just google for the top free security software and download 
it.  (Eva) 
 
Cody reasoned that he did not have enough time to keep up with the current 
happenings of cyber security and that he only puts in the effort to secure his finances. 
I don’t put in the time to keep up.  The only thing that I do try to keep up with my 
bank and checking my statements because my finances are important to me.  
Otherwise, everything else is just too much work.  I really should though.  I don’t have 
the time nor do I believe that it is important enough in my life for me to spend time on 
it.  Not yet at least.  I realize that it is impossible to be 100% secure but I really should 
at least try to minimize them, but I don’t as of right now until something awful 
happens, then probably would fix everything and update everything.  (Cody) 
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Alexa discussed how she has not made it a priority to learn more about cyber security 
and that she is worried that she would cause more harm than good.  
So far, I don’t think it has been a priority in my life to learn more about things like that 
even if it probably would be useful.  It probably should become a priority especially 
after these recent breaches in my computer.  I have no experience in doing that though.  
If I tried, I would be more worried about making things worse.  (Alexa) 
Cooper commented that he does not see the need to put in the time and effort to learn 
about cyber security. 
I would make an effort to learn if I have to, I feel like I would be able to.  Probably at 
a slower rate than the average hearing person, but it would be possible.  I would try to 
figure something out.  But admittedly, I don’t see the need to.  As of right now, not at 
all.  After I took that course for my Master’s, they were able to tell me that my 
password strength and other things were sufficient.  I’m confident in our resources on 
campus available to clean up any type of infection or breach.  Maybe it is because of 
me in the specific place of having my employer as a resource.  I’m not worried about 
the potential compromises.  (Cooper) 
 
Steven explained that he has not prioritized learning more about information security 
because it takes up too much of his time and that he has not lost any information yet. 
Yes, I just have not prioritized learning about information security.  It takes time and I 
do not feel like enough of my information has been stolen.  Nobody has stolen my 
identity or anything like that.  If someone did, I would probably be more compelled to 
improve my defenses.  (Steven) 
 
This sub-theme covered examples of security not being a priority in the lives of these 
participants.  By better understanding the reasons behind this mindset, it will be possible to 
instill certain thoughts that may lead to caring more about their security behavior.  
 
b. Functionality over Security 
This sub-theme encompasses the preference of functionality over security that was 
expressed by numerous participants in this study.  The desire for fewer restraints when 
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interacting with technology has led to poor security practice behavior.  Jenni justified herself 
for turning off the Wi-Fi encryption because it was making her video phone slower. 
I guess the only thing that I’ve done is to make sure I have a Wi-Fi password.  The 
Comcast guy set it up for me.  I have no idea how to change it to a personal password 
or anything.  My video phone was freezing all the time when I was making phone calls 
and I realized that my phone worked better when my Wi-Fi password is turned off.  
I’ve kept it off ever since for that reason because I can’t talk to anyone otherwise.  
(Jenni) 
 
Cody admitted that he never applies security updates because it slows down his 
computer to a point where it frustrates him. 
I hate security updates because it always ends up eating up more memory.  I have been 
canceling and ignoring those notifications for a very long time.  I get it, yes, security is 
important, but I want a computer that still is able to work.  These updates just slow it 
down so much and frustrate me.  Otherwise, I have no experience in mitigating and 
resolving security issues except for the basic “click X” to close.  (Cody) 
 
Steven described how he disables ad-block to be able to watch live streams on Reddit, 
but that led to him clicking on ads that caused problems with his computer. 
I can’t really think of any examples.  Well, I’m not sure it counts, but I’ve been 
watching Reddit streams for sports and sometimes ads pop-up.  One time I clicked on 
an ad by accident and like an alarm went off on my computer.  I immediately turned 
off my Mac panicking thinking that I broke my laptop or that malware or virus was on 
my computer.  When I turned it back, everything was fine, but I’m not sure if 
something was installed onto my computer.  I do have ad-block, but I disabled it to be 
able to use the stream for the sporting event.  I was not prepared to address the pop-
ups when I turned off the blocker and even now I’m still not sure if something was 
installed on my computer.  I do not know how to check and see if everything is still 
ok.  (Steven) 
 
This sub-theme covered examples of how participants chose to disable security 
features for their convenience or ease of use on the Internet.   These participants described 
their desire for functionality over security.  
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c. Knowing but Not Doing 
This sub-theme discusses how deaf participants described that they understood what 
they should be doing to secure their information and devices, but opt not to for a variety of 
reasons.  Alison described that she knows that she should be doing more to protect her 
devices, but she has not gotten around to it. 
I do not do much to protect my devices.  I mean, I have passwords set up on my 
accounts, but they are all the same with some of the important ones having slight 
variations on the end of them because I suck at remembering them.  I very much rather 
have them all the same for the convenience.  I remember the variations by keeping 
them in my notes on my phone, but my phone has a password.  A lot of my people 
know my phone password so that does not help either.  I do not have any encryption 
on my Wi-Fi.  I do not have a firewall or anything either.  Mac is the answer to 
everything. I know I should probably do something more than what I’ve done in the 
past.  (Alison) 
 
Cathy conceded that she retains and transmits personally identifiable information 
through insecure channels, but it is not a priority to her.  She also felt that she struggled to 
find the right answers on how to protect her information.  
I put most of my important papers in a fire safe, but for online, I am guilty of emailing 
and texting social security numbers and various passwords to family members when 
they need it.  I know that my computer has some files with social security numbers on 
them such as tax forms, but I have not had the time to go through everything to make 
sure that it is secure.  I hope nobody steals that. That would be bad.  I know I should 
fix that.  I might get around to it.  It is not a priority right now, and I don’t really feel 
like doing it.  Maybe I will make a little effort to, but I have a hard time knowing 
where the answer is though.  Where can I find the answer?  I just don’t know where to 
look or start.  (Cathy) 
 
Cathy shared that she knows that she should be backing up her data regularly, but has 
not backed up her data in a long time.  She also mentioned that she uses WEP encryption for 
her home and that she does not know how to upgrade it. 
I back up my computer data maybe once every 4 to 5 months.  Probably not as often as 
I should, but I do that when I have the time.  I haven’t backed up my iPhone in a really 
long time.  I don’t think my computer or network has a firewall or anything in place.  I 
do use encryption for my Wi-Fi.  I use WEP encryption to protect all communications 
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in my home and I know that is outdated.  I have not gotten around to upgrading 
everything to newer encryption.  (Cathy) 
 
Cody recalled a time where he received a Facebook message with a link and that he 
should not open them, but he decided to still open it anyway.  After noticing that something 
was installed, he dismissed the potential threat because there was not anything visible going 
on. 
One time someone on Facebook messaged me asking me to open a link to a video.  I 
usually don’t click on them, but it was from a good friend of mine.  It ended up 
installing something on my computer and I’m still not sure if it is still there or not.  I 
hope it isn’t.  At first, I was really worried that it might be tracking my keystrokes or 
stealing my information, but I guess I just ended up forgetting about it because there 
wasn’t anything happening visibly.  I just don’t understand how much access 
something might have if it was installed on my computer.  Who knows.  (Cody) 
 
Cody shared another story where he purchased a PDF book from a not-well-known 
website against his security knowledge to save some money. 
I can recall one time, I bought a PDF book online from this sketchy website.  I know I 
probably should not have, but I didn’t really care because it was cheap.  I got the book, 
but a few days later, Bank of America reached out to me via email that someone was 
using my card at Walmart and other stores.  Thank god for Bank of America for 
catching that.  (Cody) 
 
Cody described how he understands the importance of protecting his data, but he has 
not backed up his data in a really long time for no reason.   
I haven’t backed up my data in years for no real reason, but I finally did for the first 
time because I have almost 1TB of data that I’ve worked on for so long over the years.  
I use time machine now to back that up, but I can’t figure out why it has a limited 
amount of data unless I pay for more.  I need to figure that out soon. Otherwise, I 
haven’t done anything else to protect my information.  (Cody) 
 
Alison explained that she thinks her computer and information can be easily hacked 
into, but that she just has trust that nothing bad will happen. 
My systems are probably not secure at all.  Anyone can hack into my computer.  I 
don’t know.  But they would not understand my research data anyway.  My passwords 
and other things would be a different story.  Anyone can hack and get it.  I just have 
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trust that they won’t.  (Alison) 
 
Eva talked about how she backs up her data regularly, but that her router does not have 
any encryption.  She acknowledges that the lack of encryption is bad, but she does not want to 
break anything.  
I back up the data every now and then, but I don’t remember the last time I did it.  I 
don’t think that our Wi-Fi has any encryption, but my work computer uses an Ethernet 
cable.  I have not touched the router in years because I don’t want to make things 
worse.  I tried to use different passwords across my accounts, but I keep forgetting 
which ones are for which, so I ended up making a book with the most important ones 
and still use the same password for things that I don’t consider to be as important. If I 
lost the book, I don’t know what I would do.  I would have to reset all of my 
passwords again.  (Eva) 
 
Trista pointed out that she recently changed all of her passwords, but that she stores 
them on four pieces of paper.  She realizes that this is not the smartest thing to do, but it is the 
most convenient solution for her. 
I’ve recently changed all of my passwords to varying ones because of that experience.  
I have a paper with 4 pages, front and back, with every account and their passwords.  
If they are the same, then they can hack all of them.  I don’t bring my paper with me 
because I usually don’t access those accounts when I travel.  I realize that this is 
probably not a very good idea especially if our house caught on fire or someone stole 
the papers. I don’t have any other layers of security in my network or devices.  (Trista) 
 
Cathy shared that she knew that it is important to take caution when clicking on links 
from emails, but that she still went ahead because it was from someone she trusted. 
I usually don’t do this, but I guess I am at fault for this but my friend sent me an email 
with a link saying to open this because they wanted to share something funny with me.   
I was excited because this friend does not email me very often.  So I went ahead and 
clicked on the link.  I immediately regretted it because when I clicked on it, an email 
was sent to everyone on my contact list.  I don’t know what you call it, a virus or 
something, but it spread to people in my friend circle.  I trusted my deaf friend that I 
know very well, which is why I clicked on the link.  I am not sure how I could prevent 
this from happening again next time, the link looked real to me.  I can recall at least 
three of my other deaf friends who clicked on the link that was emailed from me.  I 
tried to email everyone to tell them not to open it because it was a scam, but it was too 
late.  My friends told me that I had to change my password just in case, so I did that.  
Now I have a hard time remember the new password.  It was a Google attack, so I had 
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to change my Google password to prevent that from happening again.  I don’t know if 
any of my other information was stolen from my computer when this happened.  
(Cathy) 
 
Cooper expressed that he should be taking more steps to protect his information, but 
he has not taken the time to do so. 
I definitely probably should take more steps to protect my information.  For me, now 
I’m at a point if it is not broken, I won’t bother fixing it.  I don’t have much 
incriminating stuff on my computer and for that reason, I don’t feel the need to put in 
the effort to protect my stuff.  Even after these compromises, I don’t really feel that 
need anyway.  If it was a major one, then maybe I would reconsider.  (Cooper) 
 
Alexa explained that there is always room for improvement, but that she feels her data 
is not valuable enough for other people to want to target her. 
There is always room for improvement, but I feel content with the current state of 
defenses.  I don’t feel that I am at risk of threats.  I don’t feel like my information is 
special or valuable enough for people to want to go after me, but if they do, I would 
probably be okay with that too.  Just don’t take my money.  (Alexa) 
 
 This sub-theme examined instances where participants knew the right thing to do but 
did not do so.  Participants described that they have an understanding of some security 
principles, but fail to enforce them when presented in a real-world situation. 
 This sixth theme was “Poor Security Behavior”, which represents the deaf 
participant’s experiences when attempting to engage in security practice behavior.  This 
theme was supported by three sub-themes: security not a priority, freedom over security, and 
knowing but not doing.  These sub-themes have broken down components of poor security 
behavior and how this knowledge may be used to improve overall security behavior in deaf 
individuals. 
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Theme VII: Having a Support Network 
The seventh and final theme became evident through the analysis of the interview data 
obtained from deaf participants.  This theme was evident while discussing each of the above 
themes I-VI.  Additional examples that were not incorporated above are included in this 
section.  Deaf participants relied on having a support network in numerous ways to be able to 
address security concerns, implement security features, and even help other deaf people. 
Cathy said that she feels confident about getting help with any problems that she 
encounters because of her family and friends.  She admitted that she probably would not have 
been able to resolve the issues without her husband. 
I can definitely try to get help.  I’ve looked at instruction manuals relating to 
computers, printers, or hard drives.  Often times I will simply ask my deaf husband 
(information technology professional) because something is too confusing.  I 
remember getting persistent pop-ups that say that my computer has malware and 
would not let me click on anything else except to perform emergency cleaning.  I 
knew this was a Trojan horse or something bad.  I looked on Google for some answers 
and I had to try to delete the exe files and that was difficult.  I’m not sure how it got on 
my computer in the first place.  I think it was because I was browsing websites that 
were not secure and ended up clicking on ads that seemed interesting to me.  This 
happened to me so many times, so I rarely try to look around much further than 
whatever links Google provides to me from a search.  I want nothing to do with it.  It 
is not worth it and I don’t want to deal with things like that anymore.  I was not and 
still am not prepared to address these types of security threats.  I was fortunate enough 
to have my husband be able to spend a few hours to figure out how to clean up the 
computer after I clicked on those ads that installed the malware.  I would not have 
been able to resolve that problem on my own.  (Cathy) 
 
Cody pointed out that he does not know how to set up anything and that his hearing 
family has always taken care of everything for him. 
My hearing family is the ones who have put in security mechanisms if they are any in 
place at all.  I believe that there are security features in place, but I cannot say for sure.  
I don’t know how to set any of that stuff up on my own.  (Cody) 
 
Cooper explained that he relies on expert assistance from his university and the Geek 
Squad from Best Buy to take care of any problems that he faces.   
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My knowledge is superficial.  We don’t really have exposure to security software.  I 
did not know about any kind of security software until I took that course for my 
Master’s that explained there is various security software available for us to use.  For 
the anti-virus or any computer problems, I was lucky enough to have resources 
available to me at my school.  I just give my computer or device to the tech center to 
clean up the infection and give it back to me good as new.  If those resources didn’t 
exist, I would probably reach out to something like Geek Squad from Best Buy.  
Whatever tech company out there that can clean up computers.  I don’t know how to 
do much of that stuff in general with computers.  (Cooper) 
 
Alexa shared that she has asked her dad to take her computer in the shop because she 
does not want to deal with the interaction with hearing employees. 
The last time I experienced that was in the last year where my computer was behaving 
strangely, so I enlisted my dad to go and take the computer in to figure out what was 
wrong because I wanted to avoid the encounter with hearing employees.  (Alexa) 
 
Trista communicated that she has a list of people that she tends to go through for 
assistance starting with her husband then friends, and then the local computer shop. 
If I don’t know how to do it, I ask my husband.  If my husband doesn’t know how to 
solve it, I’ll ask my friends.  If my friends don’t know how to do it, I’ll take it into a 
local computer repair shop.  They can fix computers and they don’t charge a lot.  The 
prices are very reasonable.  Some instances where I’ve taken it in would include when 
the computer was acting funny, freezing, being really slow, and have a lot of pop-ups.  
They would clean it up for me.  I’ve noticed that my Mac has been doing well lately, 
but once in a while, it will slow down.  I’m not sure whether that is because it is a 
virus or because it is getting old.  (Trista) 
 
Eva relied on information technology people from work to remote into her computer 
to repair any issues that she faces. 
For work-related issues, I have information technology people who will remote into 
the computer and fix everything for me.  There is no way that I would be able to do 
that on my own.  For my personal network, I pay an extra amount of money every 
month for my internet provider to provide additional security and firewalls.  It doesn’t 
seem to work because I have viruses on my computer right now, but I suppose it could 
be worse.  (Eva) 
 
Ryan relayed that he usually takes his computer into the shop for any type of 
assistance. 
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Honestly, I would probably try to see if I could, but I usually just immediately take it 
to an expert to have them take a look and fix it.  I do not want to make things worse if 
I can help it.  Contacting someone and paying them to fix it is my primary way of 
solving security issues.  The laptop that I used at school was set up my school’s tech 
center.  I basically just gave it to them and asked them to set everything up.  By doing 
that, it handled very well for a very long time.  The difference between a home 
computer and the computer I used for college showed exceptional differences in 
performance and consistency in lack of security concerns.  Much better well 
maintained.  (Ryan) 
 
Alison discussed how her friend helped her install some anti-virus software and 
attempted to help her with persistent pop-ups. 
My friend did help me install Norton Anti-Virus and it did find some things and got 
rid of the pop-ups that kept appearing.  My friend thinks it was probably downloaded 
from websites when I clicked around randomly accepting permissions to try to get to 
where I wanted to be.  I think that is how they somehow got onto my computer and 
messed it up.  (Alison) 
 
Alison further elaborated that her roommate set up the Wi-Fi at home and that she 
relies on her family, friends, and employer to implement security. 
My roommate set up our Wi-Fi at home and I do not know how to change any of the 
settings.  If I were to set anything up, I would likely have my friends or family do it.  
The cloud storage was set up by my university and I did not have to do anything.  I 
would think that I am good at advocating for myself and trying to find the necessary 
help.  I am lucky that my university provides IT services to help solve problems.  I just 
drop it off there.  I would also ask friends who are good with computers.  (Alison) 
 
 This seventh theme was “Having a Support Network”, which involves the deaf 
participant’s experience in utilizing their support network to be able to address security 
concerns, implement security features, and even help other deaf people. 
 
Evaluation of Findings 
In this section, all findings from the second phase of the study are discussed in several 
contexts.  The findings are discussed in the context of the theoretical framework that was used 
for the basis of this study.  Next, the ways how the results from this phase of the study are 
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potentially relevant for the deaf population by answering the primary research question are 
examined.  Lastly, the findings are also summarized in the context of what themes were 
discovered and their respective sub-themes.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework that was used for the basis of this second phase of the study 
is the sociocultural theory developed by Leo Vygotsky (McGlonn-Nelson, 2005).  The 
sociocultural theory focuses on the role of social interactions and the cultural experience of an 
individual’s life in the development of an individual’s nature and cognition (John-Steiner & 
Mahn, 1996).  Deaf individuals experience unique personal, behavioral, and environmental 
experiences that are different from hearing people and that may affect their resultant behavior 
relating to cyber security threats.   The disability inquiry lens was also utilized alongside the 
sociocultural theory as the guiding framework.  The use of the disability inquiry lens allows 
for a greater understanding of a population’s sociocultural perspectives that allow them to 
take control of their lives instead of the more common biological understanding of disability 
(Mertens, 2009).  Blending the sociocultural theory with the disability inquiry lens will aid the 
researcher to be able to identify essential themes that may explain the root cause of variances 
in results in SEIS and security practice behavior between the deaf and hearing populations. 
 The sociocultural theory with the disability inquiry lens was kept in mind throughout 
the semi-structured interviews with deaf participants from the first phase of the study.  The 
interviews resulted in the identification of seven essential themes that encompass the deaf 
experience when engaging in security practice behavior and their confidence levels in doing 
so.  Vygotsky’s sociocultural theory was supported by the themes that were captured.  Each of 
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these seven themes contained nuances that were unique to the lived experiences of deaf 
individuals and played a role in their SEIS and resultant security practice behavior.   
 
Relevance of Results 
These themes that were distilled from the interviews are used to address the 
discrepancies in SEIS and security practice behavior scores in the first phase of this study.  It 
is hoped that the results that were obtained in the second phase will provide researchers a 
glimpse of the deaf experience when engaging in anything related to learning about or 
practicing cyber security.  With a greater understanding of what the root causes of the 
discrepancies in scores may be from, the primary research question of this study is answered.  
The understanding of the lived experiences of deaf individuals should lead to the advent of 
tailored cyber security awareness programs specifically for the deaf population.  By doing so, 
these cyber security awareness programs can address weaknesses that were identified.  In 
turn, researchers, educators, and professionals will be able to address the statistically 
significant poor security practice behavior for the deaf population that was evident in the 
results of the first phase of this study. 
 
Summary of Phase 2 Results 
 This section covered the results that were collected in the second phase of the study 
through one-on-one semi-structured interviews with 10 deaf participants.  Seven essential 
themes were extracted from all of the interviews to describe the essence of the experience of 
the deaf individual when engaging in security practice behavior and their confidence levels in 
doing so.  The first theme was deaf-specific barriers that were encountered by deaf individuals 
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when learning and engaging in security practice behavior.  This theme had three sub-themes 
that included: English as a second language, lack of accessibility, and missed incidental 
learning opportunities.  The second theme described the digital literacy challenges that deaf 
individuals faced.  This theme contains two sub-themes: believing literacy is subpar compared 
to hearing people and poor literacy as a cause of overall poor security behavior.  The third 
theme was positive security intention, which entailed positive security knowledge & behavior 
and desire to try and improve security behavior as its sub-themes.  The fourth theme 
explained the reliance on technology that deaf individuals suggested.  This theme contained 
two sub-themes including increased reliance and high impact if the loss of access.  The fifth 
theme described the poor security knowledge that was present in the deaf individuals who 
were interviewed.  This theme consisted of three sub-themes ranging from no background 
knowledge, no breach experience, and common misconceptions.  The sixth theme expounded 
the poor security care behavior that deaf individuals seemed to indicate.  This theme entailed 
three sub-themes including security not a priority, functionality over security, and knowing 
but not doing.  The final theme was having a support network.  This theme was evident 
throughout the discussion of all the other themes listed above.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
The purpose of this study was to explore the potential influence that sociocultural 
factors of the deaf population have on their resultant SEIS and security practice behavior.  At 
the time of this research study, there is virtually almost no literature addressing human factors 
in marginalized groups i.e., deaf, blind, and other disabilities that may hinder their role in 
combating against potential cyber threats.  The overall objective of this study was to produce 
new knowledge in the area of understanding the potential influence that sociocultural factors 
of the deaf population have on their end-users’ SEIS and security practice behavior.  The 
primary research question of this explanatory sequential mixed methods research study was, 
“To what extent and in what ways have semi-structured qualitative interviews explained 
quantitative survey results to provide a better overall understanding of variances in SEIS and 
overall security practice behavior in the deaf population?” 
To successfully answer the primary research question, two phases were performed 
sequentially beginning with a quantitative phase and then a qualitative phase.  The 
quantitative phase was geared toward determining if there was a statistically significant 
difference between deaf and hearing end-users’ SEIS and security practice behavior.  In order 
to achieve this goal, a validated survey measurement model for measuring SEIS and security 
practice behavior was utilized.  The survey that was deployed to both deaf and hearing end-
users consisted of 41 items including 12 demographic questions, 20 Likert-scale items, 19 
multiple choice items, and two fill-in-the-blank items.  There were 228 responses from 119 
deaf participants and 109 hearing participants.  The results of the survey supported that deaf 
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end-users had significantly higher SEIS while having a significantly lower behavioral 
intention, security practice – technology, and security practice – conscious care behavior than 
hearing end-users.  It was also determined that a positive SEIS corresponds to improved 
security practice behavior for both deaf and hearing end-users. 
The qualitative phase was designed to understand what may be causing a statistically 
significant difference between deaf and hearing end-users’ in regard to SEIS and security 
practice behavior.  The primary research question for the qualitative phase was, “What is the 
essence of the deaf end-user’s lived experiences when engaging in security practices and their 
confidence levels in doing so?”  In order to capture the essence of the deaf experience, in-
depth interviews were completed with 10 deaf participants who fell under the category of 
being statistically significant different from hearing participants.  The long interview method 
with semi-structured questions was used to capture details about deaf participant’s 
experiences engaging in security practices and their confidence levels in doing so.  A 
phenomenological analysis was performed on the interview data that was obtained from deaf 
participants.  Seven essential themes were distilled from the interview data that encompassed 
the essence of the deaf experience.  The remainder of this chapter covers a discussion of key 
findings as they aided the researcher in answering the overarching primary research question 
of this mixed methods study.  The implications of these findings, recommendations for future 
research, and conclusions are also discussed in this chapter. 
 
Discussion of Essential Themes 
As shown in Figure 17 below, seven themes were distilled from the interviews that 
captured the essence of the experience of the deaf individual engaging in security practice 
behavior and their SEIS.  The first theme was described as deaf-specific barriers.  In this 
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theme, participants recounted the obstacles that they encountered in trying to learn more about 
cyber security and addressing potential threats.  The second theme captured the digital literacy 
challenges that deaf individuals faced and how it impacted their experience.  In this theme, 
deaf individuals expressed their views on their digital literacy compared to hearing people and 
how it may have impacted their overall security behavior.  The third theme discusses the 
positive security knowledge and behavior that deaf individuals exhibited.  In this theme, 
positive security knowledge and behavior and the deaf individual’s desire to learn and 
improve their security practice behavior are covered.  The fourth theme examined the reliance 
on technology that deaf participants showed throughout the interviews and the potential 
impact if deaf participants lost access to technology.  The fifth theme described the poor 
security knowledge that deaf individuals possessed and the lack of background knowledge, 
lack of breach experience, and common misconceptions are covered.  The sixth theme 
encapsulated the poor security care behavior that deaf individuals practiced due to a variety of 
reasons.  The seventh and final theme was having a support network that included friends, 
family, experts, and other professionals. 
A variety of topics relating to the themes that were identified are discussed in the next 
section.  Each of these topics describe the role of a particular factor in the deaf experience 
when engaging in security practice behavior.  These topics are: the role of deaf-specific 
barriers and digital literacy challenges, the role of reliance on technology and positive security 
intention, and poor security knowledge and security care behavior.  
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Figure 17 – Essential Themes of the Deaf Experience 
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Topic I: The role of deaf-specific barriers and digital literacy challenges 
 Deaf participants in this research study described the role of deaf-specific barriers and 
digital literacy challenges in their ability to learn more about cyber security and to adequately 
protect their information and devices.  A large percentage of deaf participants pointed to 
difficulties that they experienced due to ASL being their first language and English as their 
second.  Deaf participants who use ASL as their primary form of communication expressed 
that they prefer receiving instruction in ASL instead of English.  These participants reported 
that the presence of instructional material relating to cyber security being delivered in ASL on 
the Internet is virtually nonexistent.  In most instances, the information is delivered through 
text or audio.  Some participants commented that the ASL-based videos that were provided in 
the first phase of the study were extremely helpful and that they wish more people would do 
that.  Deaf participants also shared that they are visual-based learners and that reading text-
based materials are difficult to understand, take more effort to process, and often require 
reading multiple times.  As a result, their digital literacy is poor and they struggle to 
understand concepts relating to cyber security. 
 The lack of accessibility was another commonly reported barrier from gaining access 
to information.  According to participants, they have attempted to watch videos that related to 
cyber security, but they often do not have captions available.  In instances where captions are 
available, they are often on YouTube that utilizes the auto-generated captioning feature and is 
not accurate enough to understand.  Some participants expressed the importance of 
understanding every single word to be able to understand concepts relating to cyber security 
because of its complex nature.  Additional participants have reported that even if the captions 
were perfect, it is still a struggle because of ASL being their first language.  Another 
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accessibility issue that arose was the lack of ASL interpreting services when attempting to 
take a workshop or class to learn more about cyber security.  The inability to talk on the 
phone and having to use a video phone was another common barrier cited by deaf 
participants.  In situations where a deaf participant needed to call the bank in the case of fraud 
or needing to talk to an expert for assistance with a problem, they would not be able to for a 
variety of reasons.  Some of those reasons included poor video quality when not at home, 
putting off on making phone calls because of the additional hassle of using a video phone, and 
even some participants said they would not call at all.  One participant shared a unique 
experience where the tech center had experts who knew ASL and that there should be more 
instances of that for deaf people. 
 It was discovered that missed learning opportunities were prevalent in the experiences 
of deaf participants.  These participants expressed their concern of not being able to take 
advantage of information that often gets shared through sound.  Some examples of this 
included not being able to listen to the radio or podcasts while driving to work, being unable 
to capitalize on current news and gossip shared through word of mouth by family, friends, and 
coworkers, and being unable to understand experts when taking their device into the repair 
center.  Participants pointed out that it is like a cyclical experience whenever they experience 
a problem with their computer because when they get a virus, they take the computer into the 
shop, the expert explains how to avoid the problem next time but the deaf individual is unable 
to understand them, missing out on the learning opportunity, and ends up getting infected 
again after receiving repairs.  Some participants reported not bothering to take their device in 
and opt to replace the device instead for this reason. 
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 Taking account of these deaf-specific barriers and digital literacy challenges, every 
deaf participant conveyed that they believed their literacy is subpar compared to hearing 
people.  A variety of factors in addition to the deaf-specific barriers and digital literacy 
challenges were mentioned: interests, motivation, priorities, and upbringing.  These 
participants also expressed that poor literacy was a cause of their poor security practice 
behavior.  This is especially important because the themes of deaf-specific barriers and digital 
literacy were persistent throughout all deaf participants who were interviewed in this study.  It 
would be extremely beneficial for professionals, educators, and researchers to explore ways to 
make materials relating to cyber security be deaf-accessible and even create more venues of 
deaf-accessible materials for deaf participants to capitalize on. 
 
Topic II: The role of reliance on technology and positive security intention 
 Deaf participants exhibited that they rely on technology tremendously for their daily 
living as an essential part of their experience.  To keep in touch and communicate with family 
and friends was cited as the most common use of technology.  While this may be true for 
hearing individuals as well, deaf participants also expressed that they would not be able to use 
the telephone as an alternative if they lost access to texting and video telecommunication.  
Additional examples of reliance that were shared included the use of speech-to-text software 
to be able to understand co-workers who have accents, video phones to be able to make phone 
calls to the bank or other expert help to fix their computer problems and get access to 
information through the Internet.  Some expressed concern that they would not be able to 
succeed at work because of not being able to make phone calls without a video phone or 
understand their co-workers due to the lack of speech-to-text software.  Others shared that 
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they would lose touch with the world and feel isolated because of the lack of access to the 
Internet while hearing people still have the ability to make phone calls, listen to the radio and 
the news, and take advantage of the word of mouth from co-workers, family, and friends. 
 Participants warned that the impact of losing access to technology and the Internet 
would have a tremendous impact on their lives.  They admitted that they would be willing to 
pay a good amount of money to get their access back if it was taken away due to a cyber 
security threat.  Deaf participants expressed genuine concern about losing access because of 
their reliance on technology and the potential impact.  This led to the development of the 
positive security intention theme because of their reliance on technology. 
Participants in this research study indicated that they had positive security intention as 
an essential part of their lived experience.  What this means is that deaf participants 
consistently expressed the desire to try and improve their security practice behavior for a 
variety of reasons.  One reason was their reliance on technology and fearing a loss of access.  
Other reasons included concern for their information, privacy, feeling that their current setup 
is not secure, and to make sure that their financial assets do not get stolen.  Evidence of 
positive security knowledge and behavior was prevalent throughout the interviews with deaf 
participants regardless of the barriers and digital literacy challenges that they faced.  Several 
participants mentioned that taking a required training or a workshop from their employer has 
been beneficial.  Other interviewees who did not have the opportunity described their desire to 
attend a class or a workshop on cyber security taught in ASL to improve their knowledge and 
resultant security practice behavior to address their concerns.  Some concerned participants 
attempted to pay for and install security software.  Additional participants demonstrated 
positive security behavior in instances where their employer required them to utilize 2-factor 
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authentication and forced passwords to be reset on a regular basis with a complexity 
requirement.   
It is clear that deaf participants intend to try and improve their security practice 
behavior due to their reliance on technology, fear of losing access to their information, and 
wanting to properly defend their devices and network.  Their reliance on technology may 
explain why deaf people generally indicated that they are more confident in information 
security than hearing people in the first phase of the study.  The potential benefits of 
providing deaf-accessible materials relating to cyber security are bolstered even further after 
discussing the themes of reliance on technology and positive security intention in all deaf 
participants. 
 
Topic III: The role of poor security knowledge and poor security care behavior  
 Deaf research study participants described the role of poor security knowledge and 
security care behavior as a part of the essence of their experiences.  The theme of poor 
security knowledge focused on three primary experiences including no background 
knowledge, no breach experience, and common misconceptions.  The other theme, poor 
security care behavior, captured the deaf participant’s participation in security care behavior.  
There were three primary experiences that were identified to support the poor security care 
behavior theme including security not a priority, functionality over security, and knowing but 
not doing.  Both of these themes go hand in hand with each other as poor security knowledge 
generally indicates poor security care behavior.   
 Deaf participants shared in an assortment of ways how they had very limited to no 
knowledge about cyber security.  Some expressed that they do not know how to address 
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security threats on their devices and do not know where to start to be able to find a solution to 
their problem.  Others explained that they attempted to search for answers, but were not able 
to solve their problems.  Several participants admitted that they do not understand how to 
identify potential threats and rely on rebooting to fix any problems that they encounter.  
Numerous participants shared that they have taken pieces of training and courses on cyber 
security, but still feel that their knowledge is very limited because the concepts are too 
complex.  These participants reported that they do not understand the purpose of various 
security features and have neglected in using them for this reason. 
 The lack of breach experience affects a participant’s ability to identify and respond to 
potential security threats.  Multiple participants detailed how they encountered phishing 
campaigns for the first time and would fall for them because they had never seen anything 
like it before.  This highlights the importance of cyber security awareness and exposing 
individuals to potential threats for future identification and mitigation. 
 There are a handful of common misconceptions that seemed to arise from the 
interviews.  The most common misconception was that their devices should be able to secure 
themselves automatically, especially if they were using an Apple product, they do not have to 
worry about security at all.  Another misconception that was mentioned is that if you do not 
see anything, it means that there is no security threat or compromise.  Similar to the lack of 
breach experience, a cyber security awareness program can easily clarify misconceptions and 
help bolster security fundamentals. 
 A big reason why participants have not been engaging in positive security care 
behavior is that they indicated that security is not a priority to them.  Some participants 
expressed that they would like to improve their security, but they simply do not have enough 
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time for it.  Other participants shared that they have not been breached before and do not think 
they have enough valuable data to be a target.  Lastly, several participants cited that it would 
be too much work and effort to learn and practice positive security care behavior. 
 Opting for functionality over security was another common excuse for poor security 
practice behavior.  Several participants described how they would disable their Wi-Fi 
encryption because it was making things slower in their network.  Another example was when 
a participant disabled ad-block to be able to watch a live stream and that resulted in 
downloading unwanted software.  Others avoided installing security patches and updates on 
their computer because it would slow things down and cause frustration.   
 Knowing but not doing was a very common theme that appeared throughout the 
interviews with deaf participants.  Multiple participants explained that they realize they need 
to do more to secure their systems, but they have not gotten around to it.  Another set of 
participants admitted to sending personal information such as social security numbers through 
insecure channels.  Some participants described how they know that they should not be 
clicking on random links from unknown sources and that they should avoid entering credit 
card information on shady websites, but they still opted to do so out of curiosity, for the 
convenience, or to save money.  Participants indicated poor security practice behavior when 
they admitted that they knew their Wi-Fi did not have any encryption and that they do not 
back up their data regularly even if they have years’ worth of data on their computer.   
 Deaf participants interviewed in this study demonstrated poor security knowledge and 
poor security care behavior as the essence of their lived experience.  It would be worthwhile 
for experts to take account for all of these examples of poor knowledge and care behavior 
when creating a tailored cyber security awareness program for deaf people.   
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 In summary, findings from the second phase of the study were discussed relating to 
the role of deaf-specific barriers and digital literacy challenges, the role of reliance on 
technology and positive security intention, and the role of poor security knowledge and poor 
security care behavior in the lives of deaf individuals.  Each of these roles provides clues to 
what extent and in what ways lived experiences of deaf individuals have played in their SEIS 
and overall security practice behavior.  The next section will cover the limitations and 
delimitations of the study, describe the implications of the overall findings, present 
recommendations for future research, and share some final reflections. 
 
Limitations and Delimitations of the Study 
There are limitations in this study.  For the first phase, the primary limitation of this 
quantitative study assesses the dependent variable, the survey participant, through self-report.  
A participant may attempt to portray themselves in a more positive or negative manner by 
selecting particular answers even if it is not true.  This limitation of the study was addressed 
through internal statistical analysis and validation to ensure the confidence of the data that 
was collected.  An additional limitation that applies to both phases is that the population 
sample set was collected through the researcher’s network, resulting in a skewed data set 
toward a certain demographic of deaf individuals.  The researcher made every effort to utilize 
the snowball effect to spread the word about the survey and attended a wide variety of social 
events to ensure diversity.  The researcher also collected demographic data from all 
participants to demonstrate that every effort was made to capture a diverse set of participants.  
The demographics of this sample set primarily represented college-educated deaf individuals 
as shown in the “Level of Education” section of the demographic characteristics of 
participants in the first phase and “Highest Level of Education Completed” in the profiles of 
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participants in the second phase.  In the first phase, approximately 85% of participants 
reported having completed a college degree.  In the second phase, two participants reported 
having completed high school, two reported having completed an Associate’s degree, three 
reported having completed a Bachelor’s degree, and three reported having completed a 
Master’s degree as their highest level of education completed. 
 The primary delimitation of the first phase of the study is that non-probability 
sampling was used to obtain data.  Attempts to make generalizations or statistical inferences 
from this collected sample set to represent a national sample cannot be made.  Rather, the data 
that was captured in this phase should be viewed as a method of identifying deaf individuals 
who indicate variances in SEIS and security practice behavior between the deaf and hearing 
sample sets.   This delimitation was minimized by ensuring that the sample population was a 
diverse representation of the deaf and hearing population as a whole through the use of 
demographic survey questions. 
 For the second phase of the study, the primary limitation was that it is assumed the 
participant will be able to provide an accurate and honest recollection of their life experiences 
(Bryant, 2004).  Other limitations include the fact that information is collected in a designated 
place where the interviewee can filter information rather than obtaining data through 
observations in the participant’s natural setting (Creswell, 2014).  The researcher leveraged 
his life experiences of being raised in a deaf family to better relate with the subject and 
perform the interview using the participant’s preferred style of communication to earn the 
subject’s trust to maximize responsiveness to the interview questions.  Similar to the 
limitation of the first phase of the study, the lived experiences of 10 deaf individuals were 
captured and cannot be considered as a representative national sample of the deaf population. 
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 A primary delimitation of the second phase of the study is that all participants who 
were interviewed had to have taken the survey from the first phase of the study and had to 
indicate that they were deaf.  The researcher has decided to exclude hearing people from the 
qualitative survey because the scope of the study has been defined to focus solely on studying 
factors prevalent in the deaf population that may influence their SEIS and security practice 
behavior.  Steps to minimize the potential impact of these delimitations was to make every 
effort to select a diverse representation of the deaf population through the collection of 
demographic questions. 
 The statistical results obtained in the first phase may be used as indicators for potential 
discrepancies in various aspects of SEIS and security practice behavior between the deaf and 
hearing populations.  The themes from the second phase of the study may be further 
investigated for the transfer of knowledge into developing cyber security awareness programs 
for deaf people.  The themes also may be used as a framework for additional research into 
identifying unique sociocultural characteristics of marginalized groups that may affect their 
SEIS and security practice behavior. 
 
Implications of the Overall Findings 
 The results of this study have far-reaching implications are discussed in this section as 
possible areas for further research and development.  It is important to note again that the 
results obtained in this study cannot be generalized to the deaf population.  However, these 
results have the potential to aid in identifying possible starting points to be able to better 
understand how the essence of the lived experiences of deaf individuals in the realm of cyber 
security may affect their overall SEIS and security practice behavior.  Through the first phase 
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of the study, it was determined that deaf participants indicate higher SEIS and poorer security 
practice behavior than hearing participants.  The potential causes of this variance and its 
implications are explored through the key themes that were obtained in the second phase of 
the study.   
Potential implications are derived from participant interview data and the researcher’s 
interpretations of that data.  Some of the implications that were identified in this study include 
the creation of accessible cyber security awareness training programs for deaf people, the 
exploration into the role of barriers for other marginalized groups and the impact on their 
access to cyber security awareness training, the investigation into the role of digital literacy in 
an individual’s SEIS and security practice behavior, the exploration into the role of increased 
technological reliance and its impact on an individual’s response to cyber security threats, the 
development of tailored materials for deaf participants of cyber security awareness training 
programs, and exploring ways to create new networking opportunities between deaf 
individuals to share common experiences relating to cyber security to lead to resolution of 
problems faced. 
 Each deaf participant in this study has faced numerous deaf-specific barriers to 
gaining access to information relating to cyber security.  The experience of the deaf individual 
in learning more about cyber security plays a crucial role in the development of their security 
knowledge and their resultant security care behavior.  Some participants pointed to the lack of 
interpreting services when attempting to attend pieces of training and workshops.  The lack of 
interpreting services means that the participant is unable to capitalize on learning 
opportunities relating to cyber security.  Others complained about the lack of functional or 
accurate captioning services on videos relating to cyber security.  The inability to watch 
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YouTube videos on how to solve basic problems on a computer hinders the deaf participant’s 
ability to address potential cyber security threats.  Additional participants have expressed their 
desire for ASL-based learning opportunities relating to cyber security as well. 
Almost every deaf participant mentioned that they miss out on numerous learning 
opportunities.  These missed learning opportunities range from not being able to listen to the 
radio, missing out on the word of mouth, and being unable to learn from experts when getting 
professional assistance.  These missed learning opportunities tie into another theme that was 
discovered through the interviews.  Deaf participants demonstrated positive security intention 
and the desire to try and learn more about cyber security.  Numerous participants shared their 
experiences in attempting to engage in good security practice behavior but struggled to do so 
because of deaf-specific barriers and not being able to capitalize on incidental learning 
opportunities. 
From these comments above, it is proposed that researchers, educators, and experts 
should strive to create a fully accessible cyber security awareness training program for deaf 
people that are fully taught in ASL and provides additional captioning and text-based options 
for users to be able to tailor their experience.  While the creation and development of such 
program may be costly, it is important to recognize that the deaf population makes up a 
notable percentage of the United States and has the potential to benefit millions of people.  
Employers, educators, deaf people, and even hearing people all stand to benefit from the 
creation of an accessible cyber security awareness training program. 
An additional area of exploration that arose from these comments about deaf-specific 
barriers was the role of barriers for other marginalized groups in accessing cyber security 
awareness training.  By understanding the scope and potential impact of some shortfalls that 
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may exist for these marginalized groups, existing programs may be modified or the creation 
of a new program may be needed to enhance accessibility for these groups. 
Digital literacy was a theme that was distilled from the interview data collected from 
deaf participants.  Deaf participants indicated that they felt their digital literacy was worse 
than hearing people due to a variety of factors.  Deaf participants also expressed that they felt 
their resultant security practice behavior was poor due to their subpar digital literacy.  In 
general, to be able to read, learn, and practice concepts relating to computers require an 
individual to have sufficient digital literacy skills to do so (Martin, 2008).  It is proposed that 
research should be performed focusing on the role of digital literacy in an individual’s SEIS 
and security practice behavior.  By understanding the relationship between digital literacy, 
SEIS, and security practice behavior, researchers and educators may be able to pinpoint 
critical digital literacy skills that are needed for positive SEIS and successful overall security 
practice behavior. 
It is proposed that there needs to be more research in the role of increased 
technological reliance and its impact on an individual’s response to cyber security threats.  
Deaf participants seemed to show a heavy reliance on technology for their day-to-day living.  
In several instances, it was learned that deaf individuals would be willing to spend a 
significant sum of money to regain access to their devices if they were to lose it.  Other deaf 
participants shared that they would feel isolated and not know what to do if they did not have 
access to their cellphone and video phone.  These comments planted the seed for the role of 
how an individual’s reliance on technology may shape their response to a cyber security 
threat.  For example, if an individual finds that their computer and phone were infected with 
ransomware.  The individual would have to make an evaluation on whether they would be 
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willing to pay money to regain access to their information and devices.  The targeting of a 
deaf individual in a ransomware campaign may prove to be more successful due to their 
increased reliance on technology for their day to day living. 
 The fifth theme, poor security knowledge, was determined as an essential part of a 
deaf participant’s experience.  Deaf participants shared instances of misconceptions relating 
to computers and cyber security.  They also admitted that they have very limited knowledge 
relating to cyber security including the lack of any prior breach experiences.  The lack of 
exposure to different types of cyber security threats directly affects one’s ability to identify 
and attempt to mitigate a threat.  Each of these elements likely plays a role in a deaf 
individual’s overall SEIS and security practice behavior.  It is proposed that during the 
creation of the accessible cyber security awareness training program, researchers take into 
account of these elements in order to create tailored training modules that address unique gaps 
that were prevalent in the experiences of deaf participants.  Tailoring the accessible cyber 
security awareness training program to address known gaps would allow deaf individuals to 
better relate to the lessons being taught and allow educators to maximize the effectiveness of 
the pieces of training. 
 Similar to poor security knowledge, another identified theme was poor security care 
behavior.  Deaf participants described various reasons for why they choose not to prioritize 
security in their lives.  Some of these reasons were that they do not have enough time, that 
they believe they do not have anything valuable enough to be targeted, and that it is too much 
work and effort to practice positive security care behavior.  Another root cause of poor 
security care behavior was determined to be that participants opt for functionality over 
security.  When faced the ability to make things go faster, participants decided to do so even if 
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it puts their device or entire network at risk of compromise.  For example, participants 
reported using basic encryption or no encryption at all because it was supposedly slowing 
down their network.  Others turned off security updates because it was slowing down their 
computer and disabled ad-block to be able to watch a live stream.  The emphasis of 
importance on taking the basic steps toward defending your devices and network have the 
ability to go a long way.  Due to these insights from deaf participants, it would be beneficial 
for educators and researchers to incorporate training modules that address these three 
elements that were discussed.  This will allow the cyber security awareness training to provide 
lessons that are tailored specifically to address known concerns that have the potential to 
result in compromise.    
 The final implication that was derived from the results of the study is based on the 
seventh theme of the study, which is having a support network.  Some deaf participants 
expressed how they wish they had another deaf individual to reach out to for assistance when 
facing problems in cyber security.  Other deaf participants shared how lucky they were to 
have a deaf family member or a friend who knew some things about cyber security and were 
able to help them out in resolving problems.  These comments from deaf participants made 
sense because the deaf community is known to have a collectivist mindset where information 
is openly shared with one another (Holcomb, 2012; L. Siple & Holcomb, 2004).  The 
exploration of ways to create further networking opportunities between deaf individuals to 
share common experiences relating to cyber security and to help each other out may be useful.  
It would be interesting and potentially beneficial for deaf people if there were more ways to 
collectively tackle cyber security problems together as a community. 
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 A total of 228 individuals, 119 deaf and 109 hearing, took a survey in the first phase of 
the study to be able to identify statistical variances in SEIS and security practice behavior.  
The 10 deaf individuals were purposefully selected and provided rich and descriptive data of 
their experiences with cyber security.  Seven essential themes of deaf participant experiences 
were captured from the second phase of the study.  The researcher further analyzed these 
themes and experiences to generate a concise list of possible implications of the findings of 
this explanatory sequential mixed methods research study. 
Each of these implications that were discussed above is tied to their respective themes 
in the essence of the deaf experience in the following table. 
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Table 22 – Table of Themes & Implications 
Theme Implications 
Theme I: Deaf-Specific Barriers The creation of accessible cyber security 
awareness training programs for deaf 
people. 
 
The exploration into role of barriers for 
other marginalized groups and the impact on 
their access to cyber security awareness 
training. 
 
Theme II: Digital Literacy The investigation into the role of digital 
literacy in an individual’s SEIS and security 
practice behavior. 
 
Theme III: Positive Security Intention The creation of accessible cyber security 
awareness training programs for deaf 
people. 
 
Theme IV: Reliance on Technology The exploration into the role of increased 
technological reliance and its impact on an 
individual’s response to cyber security 
threats. 
  
Theme V: Poor Security Knowledge The development of tailored materials for 
deaf participants of cyber security awareness 
training programs. 
 
Theme VI: Poor Security Care Behavior The development of tailored materials for 
deaf participants of cyber security awareness 
training programs. 
 
Theme VII: Having a Support Network The exploration of ways to create new 
networking opportunities between deaf 
individuals to share common experiences 
relating to cyber security and help each 
other out. 
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Recommendations for Future Research 
The completed research study consisted of 119 deaf and 109 hearing individuals in the 
quantitative phase and 10 deaf individuals in the qualitative phase of the study.  These 
individuals were recruited from the researcher’s personal network, attending a wide variety of 
social events, and leveraging the snowball effect to garner additional participants.  Based on 
the limitations and delimitations of the study, there are several recommendations for future 
research.  The results of this research study do not represent the deaf population as a whole.  
Thus, it is recommended that the first phase of the research study be replicated with a large 
number deaf people from across the United States to be able to have statistical results 
representative of the entire deaf population for SEIS and security practice behavior.  Focused 
recruitment for diversity or specificity in the demographics of deaf individuals based on their 
gender, level of education, ethnicity, race, employment status, and field of study may provide 
further insight on nuances of a specific group of deaf individuals in regard to SEIS and 
security practice behavior.  Given the demographics of the deaf participants who were 
interviewed in the second phase of the study, it is also recommended that the qualitative phase 
of the study is replicated with a larger number of deaf participants in various age groups and 
levels of education.  For example, it may be beneficial to distinguish Millennials, Generation 
X, Generation Y, and Baby Boomers from one another to be able to determine if the essence 
of deaf experiences vary across age groups.  Another example may include distinguishing 
levels of education ranging from Doctoral, Professional, Master’s, Bachelor’s, Associate, 
Some College Credit, High School Graduate, and Less than a High School diploma to identify 
further variances. 
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There are also additional areas of research to explore based on the implications of the 
study that were discussed.  First, an evaluation of unique barriers for other marginalized 
groups and the impact on their access to cyber security awareness training would be 
worthwhile and has the potential to impact large numbers of people in diverse groups.  
Second, an investigation into the role of digital literacy in an individual’s SEIS and security 
practice behavior may pave the way for targeted cyber security awareness campaigns to aid 
those who need help.  Third, an examination of the role of increased technological reliance 
and its impact on an individual’s response to cyber security threats should be considered.  
Lastly, it may be beneficial to explore ways to create new networking opportunities between 
deaf individuals to be able to share common experiences relating to cyber security and to help 
each other out. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter covered a thorough discussion of the results from this explanatory 
sequential mixed methods study.  The quantitative phase of the study consisted of surveying 
119 deaf and 109 hearing individuals to conclude that deaf participants have a higher level of 
SEIS while having poorer security practice behavior than hearing participants.  It was also 
determined from the data of 228 participants that a positive SEIS does predict the facilitation 
of improved security practice behavior, supporting the results that were obtained by Rhee et 
al. (2009).  The qualitative phase of the study captured the essence of the deaf experience 
when engaging in security practice behavior and their confidence levels in doing so through 
semi-structured interviews with 10 deaf participants.  Seven essential themes were distilled 
from the rich and descriptive data that was obtained from the interviews.  These identified 
themes were: (1) Deaf-Specific Barriers; (2) Digital Literacy; (3) Positive Security Intention; 
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(4) Reliance on Technology; (5) Poor Security Knowledge; (6) Poor Security Behavior; (7) 
Having a Support Network.  These themes have allowed the researcher to provide a better 
overall understanding of what may be leading to variances in SEIS and overall security 
practice behavior in deaf individuals. 
Based on the results of this study, it was strongly encouraged that researchers, 
educators, and employers invest the time and resources for an accessible cyber security 
awareness training program for deaf people.  It was also recommended that materials within 
the awareness training program should strive to address some of the gaps in security 
knowledge and weaknesses in security care behavior that were identified through the 
qualitative phase.  Recommendations for future research included: (1) an evaluation of unique 
barriers for other marginalized groups and the impact on their access to cyber security 
awareness training; (2) an investigation into the role of digital literacy in an individual’s SEIS 
and security practice behavior may pave the way for targeted cyber security awareness 
campaigns to aid those who need help; (3) an examination of the role of increased 
technological reliance and its impact on an individual’s response to cyber security threats 
should be considered; (4) an exploration into creating new networking opportunities between 
deaf individuals to be able to share common experiences relating to cyber security and to help 
each other out. 
 The social cognitive theory and sociocultural theory were supported by the results of 
this study (Bandura, 1986; John-Steiner & Mahn, 1996).  Self-efficacy is a construct of the 
sociocultural theory, which was a big part of the first phase of the study.  The social cognitive 
theory proposes that there is a direct correlation with a person’s perceived self-efficacy 
resulting from personal, behavioral, and environmental influences and their resultant 
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behavior, which is consistent with the rejection of the third null hypothesis of the quantitative 
phase of the study.  A positive SEIS predicts the facilitation of improved security practice 
behavior.  This finding was also consistent with the findings from the research study that was 
used for the quantitative survey instrument (Rhee et al., 2009).  The sociocultural theory 
proposes that social interactions and the culture of an individual’s life play a role in the 
development of an individual’s nature and cognition.  The results from the second phase of 
the study revealed seven essential themes in the lives of deaf participants while engaging in 
security practice behavior and their confidence levels in doing so.  As defined by Mertens, 
(2009), the disability inquiry lens is the understanding of a population’s sociocultural 
perspectives allows them to take control over their lives instead of the more common 
biological understanding of disability.  The researcher utilized the disability lens to absorb 
countless shared stores, perspectives, and experiences throughout the qualitative interviews in 
the appropriate manner that best represented the community as a whole. 
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Appendix B: IRB Approval Letter – Quantitative Phase 
 
 
 
 
DSU Institutional Review Board  Expedited Research Project Review 
 
To: Kyle Murbach   
Date: 6-19-18 
Project Title: Self-Efficacy in Information Security: Mixed Methods Study of Deaf and Hard-of-Hearing End-Users
  
 
 
Approval #: 2017-18-13 
 
The Dakota State University IRB has received and reviewed your submitted research project materials as listed 
below.  The IRB conducted Expedited Review as described in 45 CFR 46.110; due to presenting no more than 
minimal risk to human subjects, and in accordance with OHRP Expedited Category 7.  The DSU Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) review included comparative assessment (via deaf community representative) of the survey and consent 
to the ASL videos for language equivalency as well as verification of the research plan satisfying corresponding 
group needs as well as a vulnerable populations expert for local verification.  This project has been approved as of 
June 12th, 2018, with approval expiring June 11th, 2019.   
 
This review and approval includes the following:  
  Survey and Informed Consent  
  ASL Videos  
  Mini Recruitment Handout with survey link 
  Recruitment Email 
  Vulnerable Population review 
  Risk Determination: No greater than minimal risk 
  Research Information Security Level: The research data security management plan 
 
Please note; your research must be conducted according to the final (most recent) plan and corresponding materials 
reviewed.  You must notify the IRB of:  
• Any changes to your research plan including any information provided in the application and/or other documents 
submitted; 
• Any unexpected or adverse event that occurs in relation to your research project;  
• Additional time needed to complete aspects of your project that require continuing review by the DSU IRB (if so 
please contact the irb@dsu.edu or at 605-256-5038 at minimum 30 days prior to the expiration of approval noted 
above) and/or; 
• A notice of closure once all study procedures have concluded. 
 
If you have any questions regarding this determination or during the course of your study, please contact us at 605-
256-5038 or irb@dsu.edu. We are happy to provide guidance as needed. 
 
Yours truly, 
 
 
 
 
Jack H. Walters, Chair 
DSU Institutional Review Board 
Dakota State University    •    820 North Washington Ave.    •    Madison, SD 57042-1799 
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Appendix C: Initial Invitation Message – Quantitative Phase
 
  
Hello! 
 
I am conducting a research project entitled “Self-Efficacy in Information Security: A Mixed 
Methods Study of Deaf and Hard-of-Hearing End-Users” as part of a dissertation at Dakota 
State University. 
 
You as a Deaf, hard-of-hearing, or hearing adult are invited to participate in the study by completing 
the attached survey. We realize that your time is valuable and have attempted to keep the 
requested information as brief and concise as possible. It will take you approximately 20 to 30 
minutes of your time. Your participation in this project is voluntary. You may withdraw from the study 
at any time without consequence. 
 
Please click on the following URL to enter the landing page of the survey where you will be 
presented a form of consent.  Agreeing to the consent form is needed to be able to access 
the remainder of the survey questions. 
 
https://bit.ly/dhhsurvey 
 
Thanks, 
Kyle Murbach 
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Appendix D: Mini Recruitment Handout – Quantitative Phase 
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Appendix E: Informed Consent & Survey – Quantitative Phase
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Appendix F: IRB Approval Letter – Qualitative Phase 
  
232 
 
Appendix G: Follow Up Message – Qualitative Phase 
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Appendix H: Informed Consent – Qualitative Phase 
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Appendix I: Semi-Structured Interview Guide – Qualitative Phase
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